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Timeline			July	27,	1929:	Geneva	Convention	created	by	nine	signatory	nations	1931:	Britain	ratifies	the	Geneva	Convention	1934:	Germany	ratifies	the	Geneva	Convention	April	1934:	Hitler	seizes	power,	first	waves	of	Jewish	migration	to	Britain.		September	3,	1939:	Britain	and	France	declare	war	on	Germany	October	1939:	the	International	Red	Cross	committee	offers	to	establish	a	central	agency	for	prisoner	of	war	affairs	January	31,	1940:	Mr.	Thorne	asks	Secretary	of	State	for	War	Oliver	Stanley	about	the	treatment	of	German	POWs	August	28,	1940:	American	ambassadors	observe	British	POW	camps	in	Germany	December	7,	1941:	The	United	States	declares	war	on	the	Empire	of	Japan,	Germany	declares	war	on	the	United	States	1942:	British	begin	integration	of	German	POWs	into	the	British	prison	system	September	3,	1943:	Allied	Invasion	of	Italy	begins;	British	government	begins	transporting	large	numbers	of	German	POWs	to	the	British	Isles	Late	1944:	British	authorities	find	that	they	are	unable	to	affect	a	real	shift	in	POW	attitude,	Colonial	Office	reports	show	a	failing	interest	and	weak	support	for	reeducation	November	1,	1944:	German	pastors	set	up	a	system	to	help	POWs	obtain	postwar	work	December	1944:	Reverend	L.B.	Angliss	first	visits	the	POW	Camp	on	the	Isle	of	Man	1945-1948:	British	authorities	begin	using	the	ABC	classification	system	in	POW	camps	February	28,	1945:	Reverend	Angliss	returns	to	the	Isle	of	Man	Camp	March	8,	1945:	Victory	in	Europe	April	9,	1945:	Pastor	Martin	Böckheler	arrives	in	Sydenham	and	works	as	a	permanent	official	to	“market”	the	German	Protestant	churches	June	13th,	1945:	Home	Office	states	that	repatriation	is	now	the	primary	objective	for	POWs	July	5,	1945:	United	Kingdom	general	election	results	in	a	landslide	victory	for	the	Labour	Party	July	17-	August	2,	1945:	Potsdam	Conference	January	1946:	The	German	Young	Men’s	Christian	Association	begins	operating	in	Britain	under	the	guidance	of	Pastor	Werner	Jentsch	March	1946:	Noel	Baker	writes	a	letter	to	the	editor	expressing	concern	over	the	POWs	December	11,	1946:	German	pastors	start	camp	lecture	series	April	29	–	May	6,	1947:	Reverend	Birger	Forell	visits	Germany	to	supervise	the	Espelkamp	and	to	check	on	POW	affairs		May	1947:	Ecumenical	event	as	pastors,	politicians	and	human	rights	activists	converge	on	the	Norton	Camp	to	discuss	POW	treatment;	Pastor	Jentsch	begins	psychological	surveys	of	German	POWs	remaining	in	camps	November	1947:	German	pastors	begin	creating	and	working	in	transition	camps	to	prepare	POWs	for	repatriation	March	15-19,	1948:	The	“young	youth	leaders’	course,”	begins	its	examination	period	under	the	guidance	of	the	German	pastors	November	1948:	Pastor	Böckheler	expresses	unease	over	the	ineptitude	of	the	British	government	in	preparing	the	POWs	for	repatriation	1949:	German	Democratic	Republic	established	in	East	Germany	
															 Introduction			“We	must	learn	to	regard	people	less	in	the	light	of	what	they	do	or	omit	to	do,	and	more	in	the	light	of	what	they	suffer.”			-Dietrich	Bonhoeffer,	in	Letters	and	Papers	From	Prison,	1943.		
	 	 		 5	On	February	26th,	1948,	Pastor	H.	Dietrich	Pompe	wrote	a	letter	to	the	Right	Reverend	Archbishop	of	York,	discussing	“the	greatest	difficulty”	he	has	ever	faced.	He	begged	the	Archbishop	to	aid	him	in	his	mission:	helping	Johann	Orend,	a	German	held	at	a	prisoner	of	war	(POW)	camp	in	Britain,	receive	artificial	fingers.	A	German	national	living	in	Romania,	Orend	had	been	forced	to	join	the	SS	during	World	War	II,	and	on	December	12,	1947,	had	lost	three	fingers	of	his	left	hand.	Not	only	had	he	not	heard	from	his	family	in	a	long	time,	but	Orend	was	also	scheduled	for	German	repatriation	in	the	coming	months	to	go	to	live	with	his	brother.	Earlier	that	year,	the	Archbishop	had	helped	another	German	POW,	to	receive	artificial	limbs	before	returning	to	Germany	to	live	in	housing	the	Archbishop	had	arranged,	and	Pompe	hoped	for	a	similar	favor	for	Orend.	As	the	pastor	Pompe	explained,	he	worried	about	the	“thousands	of	amputated	men	waiting	in	vain	for	artificial	limbs.”	Moreover,	he	told	the	Archbishop	that	“existing	regulations	do	not	oblige	British	authorities	to	provide	German	POWs	with	artificial	limbs.”1	When	it	came	to	helping	POWs,	the	church	authorities	would	be	on	their	own.		Pastor	Pompe’s	search	for	an	artificial	limb	for	a	POW	reflected	a	larger	pattern	of	interaction	between	German	POWs	and	German	pastors	that	scholars	have	largely	ignored.	For	more	than	350,000	German	POWs	interned	in	Britain	between	1945	and	1950,	German	pastors	played	a	critical	–	though	often	unseen	–	role.	Never	taking	center	stage,	the	work	of	German	pastors	in	aiding	the	British	internment	of	POWs	has	been	largely	snubbed	until	now.	Bilingual,	multicultural,	brilliant,	religious,	distraught	and	hopeful,	these	German	pastors	were	thrust	into	a	role	that	at	first	glance	seems	like	it	only	opened	them	up	to	greater	suspicion	from	the	British	government.	Motivated	by	a	critical	shortage	in																																																									1	“Pompe,	Pastor	H.	Dietrich	(British	Council	of	Churches):	Correspondence	concerning	work	with	the	prisoners	of	war,”	London	Metropolitan	Archive	(LMA)/4288/D/04/032:	22.		
	 	 		 6	manpower,	the	British	government	created	a	system	of	internment	for	German	POWs	that	would	last	well	beyond	the	Second	World	War.	Furthermore,	from	1945	to	1947,	the	British	government	debated	the	question	of	whether	the	continued	employment	of	German	POWs	was	in	violation	of	the	Geneva	Convention,	struggling	with	the	issues	of	violating	international	law,	and	with	the	very	real	concern	of	how	to	meet	these	labor	demands.2	Eventually,	the	British	government	would	turn	to	German	pastors	as	the	medium	through	which	to	reeducate,	rehabilitate,	and	repatriate	the	German	POWs.		In	October	and	November	of	1939,	various	branches	of	the	British	government	began	to	debate	whether	POWs	could	be	used	as	labor,	based	on	the	precedent	of	POW	employment	during	World	War	I.3	Their	initial	discussions,	however,	did	not	take	into	account	the	Geneva	Convention.4	As	the	number	of	POWs	grew	and	the	British	labor	force	shrank	after	the	war	began	in	1939,	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	Forestry	began	to	push	for	greater	control	of	POW	employment.	The	Army	Council	initially	refused,	citing	the	low	numbers	of	prisoners	and	a	fear	of	a	potential	“fifth	column”	on	the	home	front,	but	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	Forestry	estimated	that	the	unskilled	labor	pool	in	Britain	would	reach	such	a	low	level	that	only	German	POW	labor	could	make	up	the	losses.	However,	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	Forestry	would	have	to	wait	for	the	situation	to	become	truly	dire	before	they	were	granted	greater	access	to	the	German	POWs.			 This	internal	debate	ran	parallel	to	conversations	occurring	between	Prime	Minister	Winston	Churchill,	and	the	Home	Defense	Security	Executive	(HDSE),	chaired	by	Viscount	
																																																								2	The	British	National	Archives	(NA),	War	Cabinet	Records,	CAB/128/2,	Image	Reference	0017:	8.		3	NA,	“Report:	Employment	of	Prisoners	of	War	and	Enemy	Aliens,”	MAF47/54,	4	November	1939.	4	Bob	Moore,	“Turning	Liabilities	into	Assets:	British	Government	Policy	towards	German	and	Italian	Prisoners	of	War	during	the	Second	World	War,”	Journal	of	Contemporary	History,	Volume	32,	Issue	1,	1997:	119.	
	 	 		 7	Swinton,	in	May	1940;	they	initially	discussed	removing	dangerous	aliens	and	civilian	internees	to	the	Dominions.5	Swinton	and	the	HDSE	hoped	that	German	POWs	could	be,	in	turn,	relocated	to	the	Dominions	or	Canada	in	order	to	prevent	them	from	becoming	a	factor	on	the	European	front,	and	Swinton	actively	lobbied	the	British	government	to	pursue	this	policy.	However,	under	the	Geneva	Convention,	POWs	could	not	be	moved	from	a	theater	of	war	from	which	they	were	captured.6	Swinton	was	not	particularly	concerned,	and	only	worried	once	he	learned	that	Newfoundland	would	not	be	ready	to	hold	these	POWs	captured	as	part	of	the	North	Africa	campaign	in	1943.	Relocation	attempts	abroad	faltered,	seemingly	in	tandem	with	a	significantly	depleted	labor	force	at	home.		As	the	war	progressed,	the	conscription	of	almost	three	and	half	million	men	depleted	the	labor	resources	of	the	British	Isles.	While	women	entered	the	workforce	at	record	levels,	the	British	government	still	experienced	shortages,	particularly	in	food	production,	with	rationing	in	effect	throughout	most	of	the	war	and	afterward	from	1945	to	1951.7	The	government	seriously	reconsidered	using	POWs	as	the	foundation	for	a	new	war	labor	system,	as	they	recognized	that	British	labor	could	be	directed	towards	munitions,	while	foreign	workers	could	be	used	in	less	“high	risk”	industries	such	as	agricultural	and	infrastructure	work.	While	writing	about	the	employment	of	POWs,	one	British	official	stated,	“it	is	difficult	to	establish	a	nice	correspondence	between	the	
																																																								5	Ibid:	120.	These	first	groups	of	“dangerous	internees”	were	actually	be	sent	to	Canada	in	the	coming	months.	Philip	Cunliffe-Lister,	the	First	Earl	of	Swinton	would	serve	as	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Air,	and	was	a	confidant	of	Churchill.	Further	research	into	these	exchanges	could	be	done	in	Philip	Cunlifee-Lister’s	records	in	the	Churchill	College	Archives.			6	Ibid:	121.	“Theater	of	War,”	refers	to	either	the	“European	theater”	or	the	“Pacific	theater,”	thus	moving	the	POWs	to	Britain	was	not	a	violation	of	the	Geneva	Convention.		7	Peter	Clarke,	Hope	and	Glory:	Britain	1900-2000,	London:	Penguin	Books,	2004:	209.	David	Kynaston,	Austerity	Britain,	London:	Bloomsbury	Publishing,	2007:	19.		
	 	 		 8	conditions	of	labor	in	countries	where	civil	workers	are	treated	like	slaves,	and	countries	where	labor	is	regulated	in	terms	of	an	industrial	democracy.”8	However,	the	challenges	of	integrating	Axis	troops	with	Allied	economic	systems	would	have	to	be	solved	much	faster	than	expected.	As	a	result	of	surprising	military	successes	in	North	Africa,	the	British	faced	an	abundance	of	Italian	POWs	in	1943.	The	British	captured	over	59,000	Italian	soldiers,	and	faced	the	impossible	task	of	trying	to	guard	and	evacuate	the	soldiers	from	Africa	and	into	Europe.	Sensing	an	opportunity,	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	Fisheries	began	to	put	in	requests	for	POWs	to	fill	shortages	in	the	domestic	market	as	long	as	they	did	not	include	any	“violent	or	fascist	types.”9	As	the	Army	Council	officially	processed	and	accepted	requests,	it	became	apparent	that	the	domestic	British	labor	force	was	in	much	shorter	supply	than	initially	estimated,	resulting	in	a	demand	for	approximately	15,000	Italian	laborers.	After	the	Italian	government	changed	alliances	to	support	Britain,	the	government	felt	uncomfortable	with	interning	large	numbers	of	their	new	“allies”	and	began	to	import	German	POWs	instead.		The	difficulties	of	transporting,	accommodating,	and	utilizing	the	manpower	within	the	constraints	of	security	policy	slowed	the	process	at	first,	but	eventually	the	first	permanent	camps	were	established	in	southern	of	England	in	1944.	The	Axis	POW	camps	in	Britain	grew	to	incarcerate	as	many	as	163,000	German	soldiers	by	early	1945.10	While	the	war	seemed	to	be	coming	to	a	close,	agricultural	shortages	showed	no	signs	of	slowing,	
																																																								8	Moore,	“Liabilities	into	Assets”:	122.		9	Ibid:	122.	This	exchange	is	also	detailed	in	NA	Minute	12,	CAB65/7,	3	July	1940:	192,	and	in	NA,	Foreign	Office	(FO),	G.W.	Lambert	of	the	War	Office’s	letter	to	the	Under-Secretary	of	State,	MAF47/54,	10	September	1940.		10	NA,	War	Cabinet	Records,	CAB/129/2,	Image	Reference	0002:	3.	It	is	worth	noting	that	of	those	163,000	German	POWs,	there	were	14,000	deemed	“unemployable”	by	the	British	government	for	their	so-called	“Ardent	Nazi	Status.”	
	 	 		 9	alarming	British	officials.	Minister	of	Agriculture	and	Fisheries	Robert	Hudson	wrote	in	May	of	1945	that	“the	deficiency	in	agricultural	manpower	cannot	be	met	other	than	by	the	employment	of	more	prisoner	labor.”11	This	massive	labor	shortage	kick-started	a	mammoth	prisoner	transfer,	moving	over	150,000	Germans	from	the	European	continent	to	Britain	for	employment	in	the	agriculture	industry,	to	offset	the	100,000	person	manpower	deficit.12	By	late	1945,	the	situation	had	become	so	desperate	that	George	Isaacs,	Minister	of	Labour	and	National	Service,	began	soliciting	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union	for	manpower	from	their	camps	of	German	soldiers,	attempting	to	move	as	many	as	45,000	men	to	the	Isles.13		 In	addition	to	the	labor	shortages	rocking	Britain,	the	Allies	began	to	face	problems	in	the	failing	POW	camps	located	in	Continental	Europe	because	of	camp	overcapacity	and	rampant	disease.	In	various	memoranda	written	in	November	1944	and	February	1945,	Secretary	of	State	for	War	Sir	P.J.	Grigg	expressed	serious	concerns	that	the	current	POW	camps	could	no	longer	hold	the	necessary	number	of	prisoners,	while	maintaining	the	standards	outlined	in	the	Geneva	Convention.	He	noted	in	particular	the	high	threat	of	disease	in	the	camps,	specifically	pointing	out	prisoners	in	Belgian	camps	suffering	from	diphtheria.14	By	1946,	new	camps	were	established	in	the	north	of	England	and	German	POWs	in	Britain	numbered	well	over	350,000.	The	die	had	been	cast:	for	many	of	the	
																																																								11	NA,	War	Cabinet	Records,	CAB/66/65/54,	Image	Reference	0001:	1.	Minister	Hudson	further	stated	that	there	was	“no	prospect”	of	workers	coming	from	any	other	areas	of	the	British	Isles,	and	in	order	to	have	“any	reasonable	chance”	of	maintaining	food	production,	they	would	need	vastly	to	increase	the	number	of	German	POWs	in	Britain.		12	NA,	War	Cabinet	Records,	CAB/66/65/54,	Image	Reference	0001:	1.		13	NA,	War	Cabinet	Records,	CAB/128/2,	Image	Reference	0017:	8.		14	NA,	War	Cabinet	Records,	CAB/66/61/44,	Image	Reference	0001:	2.	Austerity	scales	for	prisoner	of	war	camps	put	maximum	occupancy	at	39,000,	but	Grigg	placed	current	capacity	as	high	as	56,700,	with	an	expected	45,000	needing	accommodation	within	the	next	few	months.		
	 	 		 10	German	soldiers	captured	during	the	Second	World	War,	their	destination	lay	across	the	narrow	channel	of	water,	in	Britain.		 It	is	at	this	point	that	the	figure	of	the	German	pastor,	with	unparalleled	access	to	over	350,000	POWs,	comes	into	play.		The	German	pastors	occupied	a	unique	niche	in	these	events,	as	they	possessed	the	ability	to	interact	with	many	different	communities,	both	British	and	German.	Mandated	by	both	the	British	government	and	the	international	convention	to	provide	religious	services	to	POWs,	the	pastors	of	this	period	had	an	opportunity	to	have	a	massive	impact	on	the	men	who	would	eventually	rebuild	Germany.	The	“pastors”	of	discussion	make	up	three	primary	groups,	and	were	all	Protestant,	and	mostly	Lutheran.	First,	the	“German	pastors,”	such	as	Julius	Rieger	and	Werner	Jentsch,	who	worked	most	directly	with	the	camps,	were	ethnically	German.	Most	were	born	in	Germany,	but	at	some	point	in	the	interwar	period	or	before	1939,	migrated	to	Britain.	Those	before	1933	were	viewed	as	“migrants”	by	the	British	government,	and	often	took	up	residency	as	part	of	a	system	of	pastoral	exchange.15	Those	who	arrived	after	the	rise	of	fascist	Germany	were	“refugees.”16	Their	Anglican	British	counterparts,	with	whom	they	had	strong	connections	dating	to	before	the	First	World	War,	aided	them	in	this	process.	They	not	only	able	to	settle	quickly	into	the	well-established	German	community,	which	had	become	more	insular	in	the	aftermath	of	the	First	World	War,	but	they	were	also	able	to	garner	support	from	powerful	Anglican	figures.	Finally,	the	German	pastors	and	British	
																																																								15	Revd.	Dr.	Ulrich	Lincoln,	the	current	pastor	of	the	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer	Church	in	London,	in	an	interview	with	the	author,	5	June	2015.		16	German	pastors	were	also	interned	in	these	camps,	albeit	at	smaller	numbers.	The	LMA	records	surrounding	this	issue	are	unclear	as	to	why	some	pastors	were	interned	while	others	were	not,	but	they	do	describe	other	pastors’	efforts	to	get	them	removed.	It	is	likely	that	the	later	German	pastor	connection	with	the	left-leaning	British	Council	of	Churches	helped	protect	many	of	them	from	internment.		
	 	 		 11	pastors	in	the	postwar	period	aimed	to	facilitate	the	visitation	and	migration	of	German	pastors	to	Britain	who	had	lived	in	Germany	throughout	the	war,	in	order	to	aid	in	the	repatriation	process.		Yet,	the	pastor	role	has	never	been	fully	understood	by	historians,	and	instead	is	often	relegated	to	a	footnote	in	which	“religious	instruction	given	to	prisoners”	is	noted	as	an	afterthought.	What	is	known	is	that	these	clergy	were	present	in	the	camps,	and	were	offered	access	to	POWs,	at	levels	greater	than	some	British	officials.	Instead	of	being	viewed	as	enemies	of	the	state,	like	many	of	their	German	migrant	and	refugee	counterparts,	the	German	pastors	were	offered	nearly	unrestricted	contact	with	some	of	Hitler’s	most	ardent	supporters.17	Released	for	public	viewing	in	the	last	ten	years,	the	writings	of	many	of	the	German	pastors	operating	in	these	camps	are	available	for	analysis	for	the	first	time.	What	did	the	German	pastors	hope	to	gain	by	helping	Hitler’s	Nazi	soldiers?	Was	there	more	to	their	motivations	than	compassion	and	pastoral	commitment?	And	could	their	involvement	have	a	real	impact	not	only	on	POWs,	but	also	on	both	British	and	international	views	of	the	German	state?	It	is	time	that	the	role	of	the	German	pastors,	as	confidants	and	activists	take	center	stage.	At	a	turning	point	in	European	and	international	history,	German	pastors	offer	a	window	into	larger	discussions	of	migration,	ethnicity,	rebuilding,	and	global	Christianity.	The	historical	work	done	on	the	POW	experience	in	Britain	is	copious	in	parts,	while	sparse	in	others.	Indeed,	most	of	the	relevant	scholarship	on	the	German	POW	experience	focuses	principally	on	the	relationship	between	captors	and	prisoners,	from	two	angles:																																																									17	As	noted	previously,	some	German	pastors	were	interned,	but	it	was	a	small	portion	of	the	overall	group.	This	issue	is	still	very	unclear,	and	had	time	allowed,	would	have	benefited	from	greater	research.		
	 	 		 12	economic	and	social.18	My	study	of	the	German	pastors	not	only	enriches	our	understanding	of	the	POW	experience	in	Britain,	but	it	also	enriches	our	understanding	of	a	postwar	period	fraught	with	uncertainty	and	political	turmoil.	For	the	German	pastors,	POW	involvement	acted	as	a	springboard	into	the	critical	issues	of	“German	humanity”	as	the	Second	World	War	ended.	The	pastors	found	themselves	caught	between	two	different	eras,	as	Allied	objectives	shifted	from	punishing	Nazis	towards	fighting	the	Cold	War.	The	defeated	nation	of	Germany	“proved	to	be	the	literal	and	figurative	divider.”19	Initially,	the	Western	Allies’	policies	regarding	denazification,	the	prosecution	of	war	criminals,	and	the	treatment	of	refugees,	seemed	to	be	motivated	by	victor’s	justice,	leading	to	anger	from	German	churches.	The	German	pastors	in	Britain	found	themselves	trapped	between	their	desires	to	be	complicit	in	the	Allied	mission,	while	fearing	that	these	policies	only	strengthened	Communist	appeals.	However,	like	the	British	officials	working	with	the	POWs,	the	Allies	realized	that	the	churches’	political	and	propaganda	efforts	against	the	Soviet	Union	could	lead	to	tangible	gains	for	their	side.		This	thesis	argues	that	German	pastors,	through	the	medium	of	the	German	POWs,	created	a	space	for	themselves	to	take	part	on	international	conversations	of	denazification,	humanization,	and	reintegration	of	the	postwar	world.	These	actions	were	undertaken	under	the	umbrella	of	the	movement	toward	an	end	to	the	Second	World	War,	
																																																								18	See	Neville	Wylie,	Barbed	Wire	Diplomacy:	Britain,	Germany,	and	the	Politics	of	Prisoners	of	War,	
1939-1945,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012;	Sönke	Neitzel	and	Harald	Welzer,	Soldaten:	On	
Fighting,	Killing,	and	Dying,	the	Secret	World	War	II	Transcripts	of	German	POWs,	New	York:	Alfred	A.	Knopf,	2012;	Henry	Faulk,	Group	Captives:	The	Reeducation	of	German	Prisoners	of	War,	Toronto:	Chatto	&	Windus	Ltd,	1977;	Sophie	Jackson,	Churchill’s	Unexpected	Guests:	Prisoners	of	War	in	
Britain	in	World	War	II,	Stroud,	Gloucestershire:	The	History	Press,	2010.		19	JonDavid	K.	Wyneken,	“The	Western	Allies,	German	Churches,	and	the	Emerging	Cold	War	in	Germany,	1948-1952,”	in	Religion	and	the	Cold	War:	A	Global	Perspective,	ed.	Philip	Emil	Muehlenbeck,	Vanderbilt	University	Press:	Nashville,	2012:	18.		
	 	 		 13	and	later,	on	the	coming	Cold	War.	Both	British	authorities	and	German	pastors	recognized	that	these	POWs	presented	them	with	an	opportunity	to	influence	part	of	the	population	that	would	rebuild	Germany,	and	German	pastors	recognized	an	opportunity	to	attempt	to	transform	the	image	of	Germany	conveyed	to	Britain	and	the	world.		First,	I	argue	that	because	of	the	failure	of	British	efforts	to	reeducate	the	German	POWs	located	on	the	Isles,	German	pastors	took	up	the	mantle	of	reeducation.	Their	efforts	involved	a	holistic	program	of	reeducation,	including	employment,	intellectual	engagement,	and	the	forging	of	personal	connections	to	Germany.	By	participating	in	these	efforts,	German	pastors	sought	to	reeducate	German	POWs,	and	to	improve	the	image	of	the	German	citizen	worldwide,	particularly	as	the	war	came	to	a	close.	Second,	I	contend	that	the	pastors’	aid	to	POWs	in	their	transition	to	Germany	was	motivated	by	a	desire	to	evangelize	the	POWs	and	also	to	help	change	the	damaged	German	Protestant	Churches.	Because	the	West,	due	to	the	events	of	the	war,	called	the	ethical	reputation	of	German	churches	into	question,	pastors	sought	an	opportunity	to	show	how	Germans	could	contribute	to	the	global	movement	for	Christian	Reconstruction.20	As	Britain	failed	to	prepare	POWs	for	repatriation,	pastors	instead	helped	ready	POWs	for	their	reintegration	into	the	homeland.	Finally,	I	assert	that	the	POWs	remaining	in	the	camps	after	the	war	ended,	experienced	a	critical	moral	reckoning,	facilitated	and	monitored	by	the	German	pastors.	Some	members	of	the	British	populace	began	to	perceive	the	great	suffering	of	the	POWs,	and	protested	the	government’s	efforts	to	treat	them	as	second-class	citizens	with	restricted	opportunity	to	remain	in	Britain.	In	tandem,	German	pastors	began	to	try	and	“return	their	humanity”	to	the	POWs,	by	reconnecting	them	with	their	families	and	using																																																									20	Ibid:	19.		
	 	 		 14	them	to	examine	their	feelings	toward	their	captors.	The	German	pastors	were	then	able	to	expand	these	transcontinental	POW	connections	to	help	not	only	German	migrants	coming	to	Britain,	but	German-Jewish	refugees	as	well.	As	the	war	ended,	Germans	and	Britons	alike	were	compelled	to	assess	their	roles	in	the	coming	new	world	order.	Ultimately,	through	their	involvement	in	German	POW	affairs,	pastors	endeavored	to	create	a	transnational,	religious,	and	cultural	connection	between	Germany	and	Britain	that	would	be	vital	in	the	coming	Cold	War.			 			 			 		
	 	 		 15		 														Chapter	I:		Camps	Without	Walls:	German	Prisoner	of	War	Internment	Interaction	with	the	German	and	Ethnic	British	Communities,	1940-1948	
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In	December	1944,	Reverend	L.B.	Angliss,	a	British	pastor	of	German	descent,	found	himself	continually	stymied	in	his	efforts	to	visit	German	prisoners	of	war	detained	on	the	Isle	of	Man.	Angliss	had	left	the	relative	comfort	of	the	mainland	to	visit	the	isolated,	cold,	and	uncomfortable	camp,	and	the	jailer	greeted	him	with	a	rude	reception,	initially	refusing	to	let	him	inside.21	After	this	disrespectful	reception,	Angliss	decided	that	he	would	need	to	avoid	these	kinds	of	complications	in	the	future,	and	wrote	a	stern	letter	to	the	Home	Office,	demanding	his	right	to	visit	detainees	in	accordance	with	Command	Paper	6162.22	Angliss	declared	himself	the	official	Home	Office	representative	to	the	prisoners	on	the	Isle	of	Man	by	invoking	this	order,	creating	a	new	role	for	himself	as	a	Government	advocate	on	behalf	of	the	POWs.			While	the	Government	allowed	outsiders	to	act	as	advocates	for	the	German	soldiers,	it	did	not	trust	the	potential	“fifth	column”	activity	of	the	POWs.	In	Churchill’s	
Unexpected	Guests:	Prisoners	of	War	in	Britain	in	World	War	II,	Sophie	Jackson	describes	the	British	interrogation	network	and	the	monitoring	system	of	the	camps’	public	spaces,	which	recorded	POW	conversations	then	used	for	analysis	by	the	Government	into	the	psyche	of	the	German	soldier.23	Angliss’s	next	recorded	visit	to	the	Isle	of	Man	jail	occurred	on	February	28th,	1945,	and	he	reported	no	issues	in	entering	the	facility.	At	this	point,	his	real	work	began:	the	assessment	of	both	the	facilities	available	to	the	POWs	and	the	physical	and	mental	health	of	the	prisoners.		
																																																								21	NA,	Home	Office	(HO)	215/245,	28	Feb.	1945:	11.		22	Ibid:	11.	A	Command	Paper	is	a	document	issued	by	the	British	government	and	presented	to	Parliament.	Command	Papers	include	white	papers,	green	papers,	and	reports	from	various	government	bodies.		23	These	reports	were	routed	to	the	interrogation	centers	located	in	London,	and	are	currently	available	through	the	NA	in	limited	amounts	to	the	public.		
	 	 	17		 Inside	the	isolated	Isle	of	Man,	Angliss	began	his	interviews	with	the	POWs,	and	encountered	POWs	who	professed	both	anti-Nazi	and	anti-British	sentiments,	sometimes	in	tandem.	The	first	prisoner,	“Larsen”,	had	an	ordinary	conversation	with	Angliss.	At	the	end	of	their	discussion,	Angliss	recommended	that	Larsen	“be	sent	to	London	and	not	returned	to	“X”	camp	along	with	his	companion	“Saunderson.”24	A	third	prisoner,	“Neserov”	started	the	conversation	with	a	simple	request	for	newspapers,	to	which	Angliss	agreed,	but	the	conversation	then	took	a	turn.	Nesterov,	a	very	adventurous	young	German,	talked	to	Angliss	with	great	enthusiasm	about	his	attempted	escape	from	his	previous	POW	facility;	his	failure	and	subsequent	recapture	had	sent	him	to	the	Isle	of	Man.25	Angliss	was	more	amused	than	afraid,	and	humored	Nesterov	by	continuing	the	conversation;	however,	this	sort	of	humoring	of	prisoners	did	not	continue	into	the	next	meeting.	As	Angliss	and	prisoner	“Kamerman”	began	to	talk,	Angliss	concluded	that	Kamerman	was	“a	mental	case.”	They	began	to	get	into	an	argument	about	the	Home	Office	and	the	police;	Angliss	was	“visibly	shaken”	as	the	conversation	ended.26	He	immediately	left	to	return	home	following	the	encounter.		The	misadventures	of	Angliss	in	dealing	with	a	German	POW	population	that	varied	widely	in	character	and	disposition,	exemplified	the	coming	struggles	of	the	British	government	in	dealing	with	both	the	logistics	of	the	internment	system	and	the	POWs	themselves.	During	the	war	and	in	the	immediate	postwar	period,	British	officials	believed	that	the	vast	majority	of	German	POWs	were	not	“ardent	Nazis,”	and	only	acted	on	orders	
																																																								24	Ibid:13.	When	reporting	on	POW	activities,	authors	struck	out	all	the	names	of	camps,	using	the	distinction	“X,”	for	security	reasons.		25	Ibid:	13.		26	Ibid:	13.	Angliss	used	the	term	“mental	case”	based	on	his	own	judgment	that	Kamerman	was	displaying	paranoiac	behavior	toward	the	Home	Office	and	the	police.		
	 	 	18		from	their	superiors.27	In	their	internal	discourse,	Government	officials	argued	that	most	Germans	were	“war	weary”,	and	had	a	greater	connection	to	Germany	as	a	homeland	than	to	Hitler’s	ideology.28	However,	this	presumption	has	proven	largely	false,	and	contemporary	historians	have	challenged	the	“clean	hands”	legend	surrounding	the	German	Wehrmacht.	Leading	German	historians	such	as	Dieter	Pohl	and	Johannes	Hürter	in	conjunction	with	the	Hamburg	Institute	for	Social	Research’s	Wehrmacht	exhibition	and	research	project,	argue	that	the	Wehrmacht	had	a	history	of	anti-Semitism	and	extreme	militarism,	carrying	out	horrific	acts	of	violence	on	the	Eastern	Front	largely	of	their	own	accord.	Most	critically,	they	also	played	off	the	British	need	for	a	strong	European	ally	in	the	context	of	Cold	War	tensions	with	the	Soviet	Union,	to	hide	their	own	complicity	in	Hitler’s	violent	mission.29	As	British	authorities	began	to	take	a	more	active	role	in	reeducating	German	POWs	in	late	1944,	the	Government	found	that	they	were	unable	to	effect	a	real	shift	in	the	attitudes	of	the	camp	towards	democracy,	which	can	largely	be	explained	by	a	vastly	underestimated	assessment	of	POW	support	for	a	Nazi	regime.30	Into	
																																																								27	The	term	“ardent	Nazi”	appears	frequently	throughout	the	primary	documentation	surrounding	classification	of	German	POWs.	However,	the	term	seems	to	be	largely	arbitrary,	and	left	up	to	the	distinction	of	those	classifying	the	POWs.	The	criteria	surrounding	the	categorization	of	“ardent	Nazi”	are	thus,	highly	suspect	and	largely	unknown.		28	Jackson,	Churchill’s	Unexpected	Guests,	40.		29	This	discussion	is	detailed	in	Wolfram	Wette’s	The	Wehrmacht:	History,	Myth,	Reality,	Dieter	Pohl’s	Die	Herrschaft	der	Wehrmacht,	and	Johannes	Hürter’s	Hitlers	Heerführer.	It	is	also	critical	to	note	here	that	the	polarization	of	Europe	did	not	really	begin	until	1947,	almost	two	years	after	the	war	had	ended.	However,	German	POWs	could	play	off	rising	tensions	inside	the	Allied	alliance,	particularly	after	the	death	of	President	Roosevelt,	Churchill’s	electoral	defeat,	and	the	desire	to	rebuild	Germany.	The	rebuilding	of	Germany,	and	the	subsequent	superficial	denazification,	has	been	well	documented	in	the	historiography	of	the	period.	Moreover,	German	POWs	used	the	British	government’s	lenient	denazification	policies	to	create	a	space	for	themselves	in	both	Germany	and	Britain	post-1947.		30	In	Group	Captives:	The	Reeducation	of	German	Prisoners	of	War,	Henry	Faulk	states	that	while	there	were	some	early	attempts	at	reeducation	in	late	1944,	began	in	earnest	after	the	Potsdam	Conference,	July	17th	–	August	2nd	1945,	in	which	the	Allies	affirmed	their	intention	to	“denazify	and	democratize”	the	Germans:	52.		
	 	 	19		the	reeducation	void	stepped	the	Anglo-German	pastors	of	the	British	Isles	who	took	up	the	movement	for	reeducation,	while	also	helping	to	renew	the	connections	between	the	German	and	British	communities	of	both	nations.	The	pastors	viewed	POWs	as	a	microcosm	of	German	society,	suffering	from	a	“frightening	sense	of	isolation	and	guilt	by	the	crumbling	of	the	Nazi	social	structure…[they]	needed	a	reorientation,	a	renewed	sense	of	belonging.”31		Why	did	the	German	POWs	have	the	particular	experience	that	they	did?	Why	did	German	POWs	have	the	opportunity	to	forge	connections	with	the	outside	community,	and	why	did	the	British	government	allow	the	interaction	to	continue?	This	chapter	seeks	to	answer	the	question	of	why	the	British	government	decided	to	invest	in	reeducating	the	German	POWs	and	why	the	German	pastors	located	in	Britain	decided	to	get	involved	in	this	project.	Answering	these	fundamental	questions	sheds	light	on	the	state	of	relations	between	Germany	and	Britain	as	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	approached,	and	as	Britain	began	to	rebuild	Germany,	particularly	as	Allied-controlled	West	Germany	emerged	as	a	partner	against	the	Soviet	Union	in	1947.	Britain	and	Germany	possessed	deep	cultural,	linguistic,	and	historical	links,	but	the	Second	World	War’s	fracturing	of	relations	created	a	need	for	a	new	enthusiasm	to	renew	the	connections,	while	also	suppressing	“other”	movements	of	the	left	and	the	right	in	the	context	of	the	Cold	War.		The	small	undertaking	of	the	German	pastors	to	influence	the	German	POW	experience	played	a	role	in	a	changed	perspective	of	both	German	POWs	and	the	British	populace	in	the	postwar	period,	by	recreating	a	connection	between	individuals	of	the	two	nations	both	in	terms	of	employment	and	intellectual	understanding.	These	changes	would																																																									31	Ibid:	161.		
	 	 	20		gain	momentum	in	the	1950s.	As	the	British	authorities	failed	to	see	“change”	beyond	simple	professed	sentiments	for	the	democratic	cause,	German	pastors	in	Britain,	eager	to	change	the	view	of	Germany,	took	up	the	mantle	of	reeducation.	German	pastors’	acted	as	messengers	between	German	and	British	communities,	and	their	efforts	to	bring	democratic	outlooks	to	the	POWs	created	a	new	vision	of	rebuilding	in	the	postwar	period.	However,	German	pastors’	motives	were	not	solely	altruistic:	they	possessed	deep	concerns	over	their	status	in	British	society,	and	as	the	internment	of	“enemy	aliens”	gained	moment,	the	German-British	pastors	saw	an	opportunity	to	portray	themselves	as	“Germans	working	for	the	Allied	cause.”	This	chapter	addresses	the	British	creation	of	the	camp	system,	and	then	moves	to	a	deeper	discussion	of	how	the	German	pastors	interacted	with	the	German	POWs,	in	the	context	of	an	expanding	Soviet	Union	in	1947	and	1948.			
International	and	National	Contexts	for	the	Internment	of	POWs		As	the	British	campaign	in	Italy	began	to	gain	momentum	in	1943,	the	British	government	faced	a	new	and	unexpected	challenge:	an	overabundance	of	German	prisoners	of	war.	Before	this	operation,	the	Axis	prisoner	of	war	camps	in	Britain	had	been	filled	with	Italian	POWs	captured	during	the	North	African	campaign,	but	the	camps	on	the	Continent	were	filled	to	capacity,	and	a	rising	demand	for	labor	on	the	home	front	necessitated	British	attention.	In	its	desperation,	the	British	government	in	1943	began	in	earnest	the	process	of	transporting	huge	numbers	of	German	POWs	to	the	British	Isles.	However,	along	with	the	logistical	considerations	of	moving	thousands	of	people	into	a	comparatively	small	landmass,	the	British	had	to	consider	how	their	treatment	of	German	POWs	fit	into	the	existing	system	of	POW	protection	under	the	Geneva	Convention,	the	only	legal	international	document	protecting	wartime	conduct.		
	 	 	21			 Created	in	1929	by	nine	signatory	nations,	the	Geneva	Convention	stated,	“in	the	extreme	event	of	war,	it	will	be	the	duty	of	every	Power,	to	mitigate	as	far	as	possible,	the	inevitable	rigours	thereof	and	to	alleviate	the	condition	of	prisoners	of	war.”32	While	neither	Germany	nor	Britain	were	signatories,	both	“ratified”	the	Geneva	Convention	in	1934	and	1931,	respectively.	The	signatories	described	the	means	by	which	nations	engaged	in	conflict	should	uphold	the	treatment	standards	of	POWs	during	times	of	war.	They	argued	that	each	nation	should	be	responsible	for	maintaining	a	standard	of	care	for	POWs	equivalent	to	the	level	received	by	the	nation’s	own	soldiers,	thereby	ensuring	POWs	received	adequate	care	to	the	level	a	nation	could	supply.	33	The	idea	of	equivalency	between	enemy	soldiers	and	the	nation’s	own	troops	formed	the	basis	of	the	Geneva	Convention’s	protection	of	POWs,	after	the	astonishing	atrocities	committed	against	POWs	during	the	First	World	War.	However,	while	the	standard	of	equivalency	was	legally	binding	amongst	the	signatories,	as	the	Second	World	War	began,	a	disparity	arose	between	the	treatment	given	to	Axis	and	Allied	POWs	in	the	European	theater	of	war.			 Before	the	United	States	entered	the	war	in	1941,	the	Germans	allowed	American	emissaries	to	visit	German	POW	camps	that	held	British	soldiers,	in	order	to	help	ensure	the	acceptable	treatment	of	the	prisoners.	On	August	28,	1940,	the	American	ambassador	in	Berlin	transmitted	a	series	of	reports	to	the	British	government,	containing	notes	from	
																																																								32	“Preamble,”	Convention	relative	to	the	Treatment	of	Prisoners	of	War,	International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross,	27	July	1929.		33	There	was	not	an	extended	debate	seeking	the	lowering	of	the	standard	of	care	for	POWs.	Led	by	the	International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross	(ICRC),	forty-seven	states	began	to	revise	the	existing	rules	under	the	Hague	regulations	of	1907.	While	the	Belgian	and	German	delegations	expressed	some	discomfort	with	the	notion	of	“collective	penalties,”	the	nations	ratified	the	Convention	without	much	delay.	In	“Collective	Responsibility	and	Accountability	under	International	Law,”	Shane	Darcy	argues	“the	excesses	of	the	First	World	War	had	spurred	the	drafters	toward	increasing	considerably	the	humanitarian	safeguarding	prisoners	of	war.”	34.		
	 	 	22		POW	Camps	Oflag	IX,	A,	Ober	und	Unterlager,	Stalag	IX	B,	Dulug	XII	and	Dulag	Luft,	on	behalf	of	American	intermediaries.34		Conditions	varied	from	camp	to	camp:	one	facility	was	described	as	“decent,”	with	adequate	clothing	stocks,	regular	mail,	and	access	to	well-prepared	food,	while	others	had	possible	water	contamination.	However,	the	worst	facility	was	Spangenberg,	an	over-capacity	camp	with	180	prisoners	of	war,	housed	in	an	ancient	and	gloomy	castle.	The	reporter	described	his	disgust	over	inadequate	bathing	and	washing	facilities,	poor	toilets,	and	ventilation	so	bad	that	a	nearby	hospital	continuously	received	British	prisoners.35		The	reporting	by	American	forces	painted	a	conflicting,	but	bleak	picture	overall	for	the	British	authorities,	and	British	fears	for	POW	treatment	were	compounded	once	the	United	States	entered	the	war.	Once	the	Americans	were	officially	part	of	the	Allied	war	effort,	the	Germans	cut	off	American	access	to	the	camps.	Therefore,	the	British	had	no	way	to	inspect	or	ensure	that	British	POWs	received	a	satisfactory	standard	of	treatment.36	It	is	critical	to	note	here	that	even	if	the	Germans	had	wanted	to	maintain	a	high	standard	of	POW	treatment,	it	is	unlikely	that	this	would	have	been	possible.	Particularly	as	the	war	took	a	turn	for	the	worse,	German	soldiers	were	often	on	the	edge	of	starvation,	and	very	few	resources	could	be	devoted	to	taking	care	of	them	or	of	enemy	POWs.	In	his	account	of	his	interment	in	Stalag	IVB,	RAF	Squadron	Sergeant	Douglas	J.	Gillam	wrote	“without	food	
																																																								34	NA,	FO	416,	27	May	–	3	June	1940:	6.	The	timing	of	these	reports	is	particularly	interesting	because	the	US	government	recalled	their	ambassador	in	protest	of	Kristallnacht	in	1938,	and	there	was	no	new	ambassador	appointed	to	the	post.	Instead,	a	charge	d’affairs	led	the	office,	but	all	reports	continued	to	be	signed	as	“the	American	ambassador.”	35	Ibid:	1.		36	German	POW	response	to	the	improvement	of	treatment	during	internment	is	discussed	in	the	second	chapter.		
	 	 	23		sent	to	us	by	the	Red	Cross,	many	prisoners	would	have…starved.”37	The	Red	Cross,	as	part	of	the	international	concern	for	POW	welfare	following	the	First	World	War,	operated	as	best	it	could	in	Continental	Europe,	but	the	Germans	often	refused	its	help	or	made	aid	difficult	to	obtain.	For	instance,	German	authorities	refused	all	aid	for	camps	that	housed	Soviet	Union	prisoners,	on	the	grounds	that	the	USSR	had	not	ratified	the	Geneva	Convention,	and	therefore,	the	Germans	could	not	be	held	accountable	for	providing	adequate	care.38	The	British	were	faced	with	a	moral	dilemma:	should	they	continue	to	care	for	German	POWs	to	the	best	of	their	abilities	as	mandated	under	the	Geneva	Convention,	or	should	they	mirror	the	ill-treatment	that	British	soldiers	were	receiving	in	the	Third	Reich,	even	though	the	British	government	could	provide	better	care	for	the	German	POWs?		The	debate	raged	in	the	letters	to	the	editor	of	both	national	and	local	British	newspapers,	as	members	of	the	population	vented	anger	against	both	the	German	government	and	the	German	people.39	However,	economic	motivations	won	out,	as	the	British	decided	to	utilize	German	POWs	as	a	labor	base	to	sustain	agricultural	production	on	the	island.40		
																																																								37Tony	Vercoe,	Survival	at	Stalag	IVB:	Soldiers	and	Airmen	Remember	Germany’s	Largest	POW	Camp	
of	World	War	II,	McFarland	&	Company:	London,	2006.		38	The	atrocities	against	Soviet	soldiers	in	German	POW	camps	in	the	East,	are	well	documented	by	historians,	particularly	in	Pohl’s	Die	Herrschaft	der	Wehrmacht,	and	will	not	be	discussed	at	length	here.		39	See	Are	They	Getting	a	Fair	Deal?:	Our	prisoners	–	and	Theirs,”	in	The	Evening	Telegraph	and	Post	of	December	6,	1940,”	which	discussed	in	great	detail	the	harsh	conditions	to	which	the	Germans	subjected	the	British	soldiers.	In	a	contrasting	Times	letter	to	the	editor,	Violet	Barbour	asked	the	British	public,	“if	these	men	[the	German	POWs]	are	not	given	a	degree	of	freedom,	how	can	they	shed	the	outlook	of	the	prisoner	of	war	or	regard	this	as	a	free	and	democratic	country?”	The	debate	would	largely	be	settled	with	the	recognition	of	the	services	that	German	POWs	offered	as	agricultural	workers.	The	third	chapter	will	look	at	the	response	of	British	populace	to	German	POWs	using	newspaper	editorials.	40	In	the	Geneva	Convention,	Section	III,	Labor	of	Prisoners	of	War,	Article	27,	it	specifically	states,	“belligerents	may	utilize	the	labor	of	able	prisoners	of	war,	according	to	their	rank	and	aptitude.”	
	 	 	24		 In	1942,	the	British	began	the	integration	of	German	POWs	in	mass	into	the	British	prison	system,	which	already	held	enemy	aliens	interned	at	the	beginning	of	the	war.41	Under	the	Prison	Act	of	1890	and	section	4	of	the	Prison	Act	Amendment	of	1911,	the	British	government	“with	respect	to	the	Management,	Good	Order,	and	Discipline	of	the	Isle	of	Man	Prison	and	to	the	Classification	and	Treatment	of	Prisoners”	guaranteed	certain	rights	to	POWs.42	The	prison	staff	regulated	the	facilities	in	many	areas,	including	enforcing	cleanliness,	inspecting	cells,	and	engaging	with	prisoners.43	The	prison	staff	enforced	the	standard	of	living,	and	visiting	justices	protected	POW	rights	by	traveling	to	the	prisons	to	hear	complaints	expressed	by	the	internees.	They	then	reported	that	information	to	the	various	commanders	of	the	camps.	Critically,	the	Government	also	mandated	that	all	prison	staff	be	legally	bound	to	report	accidents	and	all	complaints	to	the	camp	commandant,	the	senior	British	official	running	the	camp.44	The	camp	commandant	dealt	with	a	wide	span	of	issues	in	the	POW	system,	from	facilitating	reeducation	programs	to	dealing	with	simple	complaints	about	the	food.45		
																																																																																																																																																																																		Captors	were	not	required	to	compensate	POWs.	In	the	postwar	period	various	groups	raised	concerns	about	the	ethical	concerns	of	using	POWs	as	laborers.		41	There	is	a	large	literature	surrounding	the	internment	of	“enemy	aliens”	in	Britain	during	the	Second	World	War,	and	the	issue	of	enemy	aliens	will	not	be	discussed	here.	It	is	worth	noting,	however,	that	many	of	the	interned	“enemy	aliens”	were	actually	German	and	Austrian	Jewish	refugees	who	had	fled	before	the	Second	World	War	started.	The	Research	Center	for	German	and	Austrian	Exile	Studies,	“Totally	Un-English”?:	Britain’s	Internment	of	“Enemy	Aliens”	in	Two	World	
Wars	(2205)	describes	this	internment	period	at	length.		42	H.M	Prison,	Isle	of	Man.	Regulations	with	Respect	to	Management	etc.,	1929,	NA:	HO	215/245:1.		43	Ibid:	2.		44	Ibid.	45	Ibid:	9.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	a	complaint	about	the	food	to	the	commandant	was	not	dismissed	or	even	mocked	by	the	British	staff.	Rather,	the	staff	addressed	and	remedied	even	a	complaint	on	this	small	scale,	and	the	British	commandant	spoke	to	the	head	cook	“that	very	same	day.”	The	quick	redress	of	complaints	shows	a	level	of	care	for	POW	welfare	that	seems	to	contrast	with	the	traditional	idea	of	the	treatment	towards	enemies	of	the	state.	Daniel	Hutchinson,	“’We	Are	the	Most	Fortunate	of	Prisoners:’	The	Axis	POW	Experience	at	Camp	Opelika	during	World	War	II”	(Alabama	Review	64.4	Oct	2011,	285),	states	that	“Nazi	Germany	and	the	Soviet	Union	treated	their	
	 	 	25		 Essential	for	German	POWs,	the	British	authorities	also	guaranteed	access	to	a	chaplain,	who	had	permission	to	keep	a	confidential	journal	where,	in	the	words	of	the	prison	management	regulation	handbook,	“he	shall	record	his	visits	and	enter	any	observations	that	may	occur	to	him.”46	The	right	to	a	chaplain	was	also	guaranteed	under	the	Geneva	Convention.	This	confidential	record	served	the	dual	purpose	of	providing	the	POWs	with	a	trustworthy	confidant	inside	the	camp	who	had	connections	in	the	German	immigrant	world,	and	permitting	the	chaplains	to	record	their	findings	without	fear	of	repercussions	from	the	British	authorities.	In	particular,	chaplains	could	“see	every	prisoner	in	private,	in	order	to	be	able	to	direct	his	advice	and	instruction.”47	The	pastors	were	under	no	obligation	to	report	what	the	POWs	said	to	British	authorities,	creating	a	confidential	source	where	POWs	could	express	their	emotions	about	their	internment.	By	having	a	built-in	system	where	prisoners	possessed	a	guaranteed	right	to	visits	by	pastors,	the	German	pastors	could	immediately	begin	to	establish	a	relationship	with	the	German	POWs	interned	in	locations	including	the	Isle	of	Man;	this	relationship	would	give	pastors	legitimacy	with	the	German	POWs	as	they	became	more	involved	in	reeducation	efforts.	While	prisoners	could	receive	visitors	on	designated	days	and	write	and	receive	letters,	often	they	did	not	have	anyone	to	write	to,	much	less	to	visit,	when	they	arrived	in	Britain.	Visitations	by	pastors	created	the	opportunity	for	German	POWs	to	forge	a	connection	with	the	outside	world.	In	order	to	assess	the	needs	of	the	prisoners,	pastors	wrote	the	Monatsbericht	des	
Lagerpfarrers	(the	monthly	report	of	the	camp	pastors).	These	reports	included																																																																																																																																																																																			prisoners	with	criminal	callousness…but	pockets	of	humanity	and	compassion	did	exist…with	American	and	British	military	planners.”		46	Ibid:	12.	47	Ibid.		
	 	 	26		information	such	as	the	home	address	in	Germany	of	the	various	internees,	the	services	they	provided	in	the	camps,	and	the	pastor’s	assessment	of	the	likelihood	of	a	successful	repatriation.48	Often,	the	reports	by	the	pastors	focused	on	the	qualities	of	the	internees	most	likely	to	result	in	their	release,	such	as	the	relative	warmth	of	the	relationship	between	the	German	prisoner	and	his	British	captors.	In	die	Monatsbericht	of	a	lieutenant	colonel	in	the	German	Wehrmacht,	one	pastor	noted	the	friendly	relationship	between	the	British	and	the	lieutenant	colonel,	and	his	approval	for	multiple	jobs	inside	of	the	camp.49	The	relationship	between	the	British	“captors”	and	the	German	POWs	was	particularly	critical	in	securing	the	release	and	possible	repatriation	of	the	German	soldiers.	By	proving	that	soldiers	were	friendly,	hardworking,	and	most	importantly,	supportive	of	the	Allied	mission,	German	pastors	aimed	to	change	the	British	perspective	of	the	POWs.	This	became	particularly	important	after	February	1945,	when	news	about	the	concentration	camps	reached	the	British	public.	After	this	point,	the	pastors,	set	against	“all	notions	of	revenge,”	worked	to	rebuild	the	“human	equality	between	captives	and	pastors,”	which	seemed	to	disappear	as	British	authorities	increasingly	saw	POWs	as	“morally	inferior.”50	By	altering	the	British	perspective	of	a	German	POWs,	the	pastors	were	not	only	able	to	help	increase	the	chance	of	a	repatriation,	but	they	also	proved	their	own	loyalty	to	the	British	government	and	their	mission	of	freedom	and	democracy.		
																																																								48	“Correspondence	including	pastors’	reports	on	ministry	to	prisoners	of	war	in	Britain,”	LMA/4288/A/03/003,	October	1947:	72.		49	Ibid:	The	“das	Verhältnis	zwischen	der	britischen	Bevölkerung	und	den	Kreigsfang…”	[becomes	illegible	here,	but	the	word	is	most	likely	Kriegsgefangener,	meaning	prisoner	of	war]:	
freundschaftlich,	The	record	further	indicates	the	relative	likelihood	of	this	prisoner’s	chance	of	repatriation	as	“sehr	gut”	but	no	further	mention	is	made	of	his	particular	case	throughout	the	file,	74.		50	Faulk,	Group	Captives:	16.		
	 	 	27		 As	the	German	POWs	began	to	arrive	in	Britain	in	1942,	they	fell	into	an	existing	camp	structure	that	provided	them	guaranteed	rights	and	resources	under	both	the	Geneva	Convention	and	British	law.	The	interaction	between	the	outside	world	and	the	German	POW	camps	was	both	unparalleled	and	unheard	of:	most	POW	camps,	particularly	those	run	by	the	Axis	forces	that	held	Soviet	prisoners,	were	better	known	for	starvation	and	torture	than	their	community	involvement	in	the	POW	camps.	The	German	pastors	vastly	expanded	the	initial	scope	of	their	roles	in	the	British	POW	camps,	by	taking	up	the	mantle	of	reeducation,	after	the	British	authorities	found	their	own	attempts	stymied	in	late	1944.		
The	Problems	of	Reeducation		The	POW	camp	network	extended	across	Britain	as	the	war	heated	up	in	1943.	Each	camp	contained	an	average	of	150	prisoners,	and	the	classification	of	the	POWs	determined	their	camp	location.	In	his	report	to	the	Colonial	Office	Camp,	Commandant	Major	Johnstone	described	how	the	updated	system	of	classifying	prisoners	applied	to	a	particular	set	of	German	POWs.	The	previous	classification	system	used	by	the	British	authorities	of	black,	white,	and	gray,	with	“black”	being	most	ardently	against	the	British	cause,	and	“white”	being	most	pro-democratic,	had	proven	too	vague	for	application	on	a	unit	to	unit	basis.	As	a	result	of	the	imprecise	classification	system,	the	Foreign	Office	moved	to	a	system	of	classification	using	letter	grades,	A,	B,	and	C,	with	“A”	being	the	most	pro-democratic,	and	“C”	being	the	most	pro-Nazi,	and	a	plus/minus	scale.	However,	both	systems	of	classification	were	used	interchangeably	throughout	the	years	of	POW	internment	and	also	applied	to	interned	enemy	aliens.	In	an	analysis	of	the	screening	for	the	camp	in	question,	Major	Johnstone	noted	the	breakdown	as	A	(41	POWs),	A-	(5),	B+	
	 	 	28		(70),	B	(376),	B-	(133),	C+	(1),	and	C	(113).51	The	camp	was	unique	because	of	the	disproportionally	higher	numbers	of	B/C	POWs	as	opposed	to	other	camps	evaluated	from	1945	to	1948.52	However,	because	of	the	British	authorities’	desire	to	show	that	“progress”	was	being	made	in	the	camps,	it	is	difficult	to	ascertain	how	accurate	these	measures	were.	That,	coupled	with	the	British	tendency	to	underestimate	the	numbers	of	“ardent	Nazis,”	can	account	for	the	generally	higher	numbers	of	“pro-democratic”	prisoners,	which	contrasts	with	existing	historiographical	evidence	about	the	makeup	of	the	Wehrmacht.53		The	British	authorities	often	blamed	the	elected	officials	inside	the	camp,	voted	on	and	chosen	out	of	the	POWs	inside	each	camp,	for	the	“negative	camp	outlook.”54	While	voting	for	camp	leaders	provided	some	sense	of	control	for	the	POWs,	the	system	ran	the	risk	of	giving	the	POWs	an	opportunity	to	elect	someone	who	had	no	desire	to	make	real	changes	in	line	with	British	goals	for	reeducation.	For	example,	Camp	Leader	Ernest	Schroeder,	a	prisoner	in	Johnstone’s	camp,	was	described	as	“an	opportunist	member	of	the	Party	and	the	S.A…	despite	his	surface	enthusiasm	for	re-education,	he	has	achieved	nothing	so	far	in	this	respect,”	who	oversaw	the	day-to-day	morale	of	the	camp.55	The	Deputy	Captain	Leader	Ernst	Trompeter,	a	“B”	prisoner,	a	“thoroughly	non-political	type,”	had	no	party	record	(in	reference	to	the	Nazi	Party),	while	also	having	little	influence	on	the	intellectual	life	of	the	camp.56	According	to	Commandant	Johnstone,	while	Trompeter	
																																																								51	Report	of	Camp	Commandant	Major	Johnstone,	July	1946,	the	NA,	Colonial	Office	(CO)	152/3:	12.			52	Ibid:	1-10.	Includes	other	reports	from	various	camp	commandants	describing	the	breakdowns	by	unit.	Major	Johnstone	had	the	highest	level	of	B/C	POWs.		53	See	Wette,	The	Wehrmacht:	History,	Myth,	Reality.		54	NA,	HO	215/419:	5.	“In	so	far	as	possible,	internees	should	manage	their	own	camp	organizations	and	activities,	and	every	opportunity	has	been	taken	to	develop	and	maintain	this	general	principle	through	a	system	of	camp	and	house	leaders.”	55	NA,	CO	152/3:	12.		56	Ibid:	12.		
	 	 	29		and	Schroeder	did	not	actively	undermine	the	work	of	the	British	government,	they	had	a	negative	impact	on	British	plans	for	reeducation	because	of	their	apathy	towards	the	movement.	The	British	camp	authorities	created	an	environment	in	which	the	POWs	could	select	their	own	compatriots	into	camp	leadership	positions,	and	where	indifference	to	British	reeducation	policies	resulted	in	no	visible	repercussions.	As	a	result	of	these	policies,	the	British	government	gave	neither	the	camp	leadership,	nor	the	German	POWs,	any	incentive	to	participate	in	reeducation.		The	POW	camp	leadership	included	the	elected	position	of	an	“educational	leader,”	responsible	for	aiding	the	British	in	reorienting	the	German	POWs	away	from	Nazism	and	towards	the	“values	of	a	democratic	society.”57	In	this	particular	camp,	educational	leader	Gefr.	Arimond	had	been	a	Nazi	party	member	since	1938,	and	obtained	his	position	through	his	experience	as	a	doctor	of	psychology	and	a	university	tutor.	In	his	reports,	Commandant	Major	Johnstone	described	Arimond	as	“seeing	the	need	for	re-education	and	progressing	in	anti-Nazi	outlook,	but	cannot	yet	be	considered	a	white.”58	By	having	a	mixture	of	elected	and	selected	leadership	positions	in	the	camps,	the	British	hoped	to	create	a	sense	of	political	agency	for	the	German	POWs,	by	giving	them	an	introduction	into	an,	albeit	smaller,	“democratic”	system.	However	as	the	elected	Nazis	did	not	possess	the	will	to	change	their	ideological	orientation,	attempts	stalled	overall.	Sönke	Neitzel	and	Harald	Welzer	in	Soldaten	suggest	the	POWs	possessed	an	“ideologically	charged	frame	of	reference,”	in	which	fear,	indoctrination	and	political	education	completely	altered	the	German	soldier	psyche.	They	argue	“a	young	German	did	not	become	an	SS	man	only	by																																																									57	The	documents	measured	a	camp’s	reception	towards	democratic	values	principally	through	the	number	of	POWs	taking	English	language	courses,	their	understanding	and	reception	to	British	society,	and	their	relationship	with	their	British	captors.		58	Ibid:	12.	“White”	is	here	used	to	describe	a	prisoner	who	is	the	most	pro-democratic.		
	 	 	30		reading	pamphlets.	He	had	to	be	bound	up	in	a	network	of	common	practices.”59	German	pastors	needed	to	change	the	POW’s	frame	of	reference.		The	indifference	of	elected	POWs	towards	reeducation	manifested	the	strongest	in	camps	with	large	numbers	of	the	Waffen	SS	and	Luftwaffe,	groups	viewed	as	the	most	difficult	to	reeducate	and	control.60	For	example,	in	Commandant	Major	Johnstone’s	camp,	over	forty	percent	of	German	POWs	were	members	of	the	Waffen	SS,	transferred	in	July	1946	from	Belgium,	with	“little	change	affected	in	six	months	of	reeducation	activities,”	and	a	general	camp	complexion	of	black	and	gray.	61	However,	the	British	authorities	deemed	the	vast	majority	of	the	German	POWs	not	“ardent	Nazis”,	who	fell	into	the	“black”	or	“C”	categories.	As	the	war	progressed,	the	British	isolated	more	and	more	of	the	“ardent	Nazis”	in	specifically	remote	camps,	particularly	on	the	Isle	of	Man,	in	order	to	try	to	prevent	their	malicious	attitudes	from	“infecting”	the	rest	of	the	German	POWs.62	The	British	hoped	these	efforts	would	improve	overall	morale.	The	units	included	a	wide	diversity	of	economic	standing	and	educational	background;	for	example,	enlisted	soldiers	included	both	university-educated	men	and	lower	class	laborers.		There	was	also	no	correlation	between	social	class	and	the	classification	letter	assigned	to	a	POW.63	The	high	education	level	of	the	German	POWs	was	not	uncommon:	prisoner	D.	Winkler	attended	a	“privatschule”	or	private	school,	and	H.	Haustein	worked	as	an	electrician	and	merchant	
																																																								59	Neitzel	and	Welzer,	Soldaten:	312.		60	Francois	Lafitte,	The	Internment	of	Aliens,	Harmondswoth,	Middlesex:	Penguin	Books:	1940.	Lafitte	was	a	specialist	on	the	reeducation	efforts,	and	he	described	in	great	detail	the	uncooperative	actions	of	the	Luftwaffe	and	the	Waffen	SS.		61	NA,	CO	152/3:	12.		62	Lafitte,	The	Internment	of	Aliens.			63	NA,	CO	152/3:	7.		
	 	 	31		after	attending	trade	school.64	The	British	worked	to	maximize	their	use	of	the	talents	of	the	German	POWs,	“employing	them	to	the	fullest	extent	possible”,	and	encouraging	them	to	start	their	own	businesses	as	tailors,	carpenters,	and	barbers.65		The	British	also	utilized	the	skills	of	educated	German	POWs	in	order	to	aid	in	the	reeducation	effort.	Men	like	H.	Haustein,	who	were	recruited	to	teach	English	to	their	compatriots,	aided	the	British	goal	of	German	POW	reeducation.	However,	British	reeducation	efforts	often	fell	short,	because	the	British	were	unable	to	establish	a	connection	with	the	German	POWs,	who	often	did	not	speak	English,	and	had	been	exposed	to	the	Nazi	propaganda	machine	for	most	of	the	1930s.	The	British	faced	a	complex	and	difficult	task;	they	became	increasingly	discouraged	by	their	lack	of	impact	upon	the	men	in	the	camps.	The	Colonial	Office	reports	in	late	1944	show	the	falling	interest	and	weak	support	for	the	British	education	program:	“no	serious	attempt	has	been	made	to	get	re-education	going	on	a	sound	basis….little	provision	for	lectures	or	discussion	groups…mental	standard	is	low.”66	Even	after	the	renewed	interest	in	reeducation	following	the	end	of	the	war	in	May	1945,	and	the	Potsdam	Conference	in	August	1945,	the	British	authorities	found	their	efforts	failing.	It	is	into	this	increasingly	bleak	environment	of	the	POW	camp	that	the	German-British	pastors	began	to	make	their	mark	through	1948.	
German	Communities	in	Britain	German	migrants	to	Britain	were	a	sizable	minority,	numbering	about	73,000	by	1939,	but	that	number	skyrocketed	to	200,000	by	the	end	of	the	war.67	Many	of	those	
																																																								64	Ibid:	10.		65	NA,	HO	215/419:	5.	66	NA,	CO	152/3:	13.		67	Inge	Weber-Newth	and	Johannes-Dieter	Steinert,	German	Migrants	in	Post-War	Britain:	An	Enemy	
Embrace,	New	York:	Routledge,	2006:	2.	While	there	were	about	200,000	Germans	living	in	Britain,	
	 	 	32		initial	migrants	were	Jewish	refugees,	who	arrived	in	several	waves.	The	first	wave	occurred	immediately	after	Hitler	seized	power,	with	only	2,000	to	3,000	refugees	arriving	to	Britain	by	April	1934.	Only	after	1938	did	numbers	begin	to	rapidly	increase,	with	over	40,000	Jews	arriving	that	year.	Originally,	the	Jewish	refugees	were	admitted	as	“transmigrants”	on	the	condition	that	they	would	eventually	leave	Britain,	lumping	them	together	with	over	80,000	refugees	who	arrived	from	Germany,	Austria,	and	Czechoslovakia,	but	were	not	Jewish.68	The	German	Jews	experienced	a	crushing	dislocation	stemming	from	their	identity	as	Germans.	Marion	Berghahn	in	Continental	
Britons	details	the	internment	of	Jews,	and	the	fundamental	identity	crisis	they	experienced	as	their	“cultural	German	identity”	and	their	Jewish	spiritual	existence	came	into	conflict.				Many	wealthy	German	communities	located	in	the	northern	or	northwestern	parts	of	London	were	a	huge	draw	for	German	and	Austrian	refugees	who	possessed	the	resources	to	move	straight	into	the	middle	and	upper	middle	class	districts	of	London.69	Refugees	often	compared	Hampstead	to	the	Tiergarten	of	Berlin.	However,	for	many	working	class	Germans	and	Jews,	they	were	plagued	by	problems	with	homelessness	and	unemployment,	with	few	options	for	income	or	living	in	a	place	other	than	a	hostel.	Some	members	of	the	German	community	who	traveled	frequently	between	Britain	and	Germany	in	the	interwar	years	even	further	complicated	the	distinction	between	refugees	and	migrants.70	This	distinction	between	Jews	and	Germans,	refugees	and	migrants,	was	not	
																																																																																																																																																																																		they	were	by	no	means	homogenous.	Only	28,000	of	those	were	born	in	Britain,	while	the	rest	were	refugees	fleeing	the	Third	Reich	or	economic	migrants.		68	Marion	Berghahn,	Continental	Britons:	German-Jewish	Refugees	from	Nazi	Germany,	New	York:	Berghahn,	2007:	76.		69	Ibid:	127.	70	Throughout	the	DBKC,	many	pastors	discussed	the	case	of	interned	enemy	aliens	who	left	Britain	for	a	short	period,	only	to	return	and	be	placed	in	internment.	Johannes-Dieter	Steinert	and	Inge	
	 	 	33		clearly	made	by	the	British	government.	With	the	outbreak	of	Nazism,	the	Anglo-German	community’s	integration	came	under	attack,	in	an	ominous	repetition	of	World	War	I	anti-German	sentiment.71	The	non-German	British	populace,	including	migrants	from	other	parts	of	Europe,	as	well	as	the	“ethnically	British”	population,	contributed	to	significant	attitudes	of	distrust	toward	the	Germans	living	in	Britain.	Classified	as	“enemy	aliens	of	the	state,”	80,000	Anglo-Germans,	some	of	whom	had	lived	in	Britain	for	generations,	along	with	refugees	and	migrants,	underwent	a	forced	period	of	review	in	special	tribunals	to	determine	their	loyalty	to	British	society	in	the	early	1940s.	Migrants	were	forced	to	report	a	change	of	address,	were	subjected	to	a	curfew,	and	some	were	even	accused	of	disloyalty	towards	Germany,	in	a	bizarre	distortion	of	anti-Nazi	sentiment.72	While	99	percent	of	the	“potential	enemy	aliens”	who	migrated	before	1933	fell	into	groups	viewed	as	a	non-threat	to	British	society,	the	British	classified	around	600	members	as	high	security	risks,	and	sentenced	those	select	few	to	immediate	internment.73	The	Jewish	refugees	were	not	so	lucky.	Marion	Berghahn	in	Continental	Britons	found	that	almost	all	refugees	experienced	some	form	of	permanent	or	temporary	internment.	The	pressures	exerted	on	the	refugees	by	members	of	the	existing	Jewish	community	in	Briton	were	huge:	the	German	Jews	were	instructed	to	“be	grateful	for	their	asylum,”	and	were	given	pamphlets	to	teach	them	the	“eight	commandments	of	good																																																																																																																																																																																			Weber-Newth’s	research	falls	in	line	with	the	German	pastors’	discussions	of	an	intergenerational,	cross-Atlantic	migration	in	this	period.	Jerry	White,	London	in	the	Twentieth	Century:	A	City	and	Its	
People,	London:	Viking,	2001.		71	Steinert	and	Weber-Newth,	“German	Migrants	in	Postwar	Britain:	Immigration	Policy,	Recruitment,	and	Reception,”	in	German	Diasporic	Experiences:	Identity,	Migration,	and	Loss,	ed.	Mathias	Schulze,	James	M.	Skidmore,	David	G.	John,	Grit	Liebscher,	and	Sebastian	Siebel-Achenbach,	Canada:	Wilfred	Laurier	University	Press,	2008:	217-229.		72	Berghahn,	Continental	Britons:	137.	73	“Fact	File:	Civilian	Internment	1939-1945,”	BBC,	15	October	2014,	http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a6651858.shtml.	
	 	 	34		behavior.”74	The	entire	refugee	and	immigrant	crisis	strained	the	British	and	German	populations.	The	distinctions	between	the	groups	blurred,	and	the	comparatively	small	German	community	that	was	in	place	before	the	war	broke	out	changed	completely.		It	is	into	this	environment	that	the	German	immigrant	pastors	began	to	make	their	mark	in	early	1944.	At	this	stage	of	process,	the	German	pastors	involved	were	born	in	Germany,	but	had	arrived	in	Britain	either	during	the	interwar	period,	or	fleeing	the	rise	of	fascism	in	the	early	1930s.	For	those	that	arrived	during	the	interwar	period,	they	came	via	a	system	of	exchange	between	the	theological	German	communities	in	Britain	and	Germany.	Most	of	the	pastors	who	worked	in	the	German	churches	of	Britain	received	their	initial	training	in	Germany,	but	then	were	rotated	into	communities	in	Britain.75	All	were	of	German	descent,	but	relied	on	their	theological	connections	with	their	British	Anglican	counterparts	to	provide	them	with	support	beyond	their	parish	connections.		Coming	from	a	largely	Lutheran	background,	the	German	pastors	gained	their	credibility	with	the	British	government	because	of	their	vocal	dissent	of	Nazi	activity	in	Germany,	and	their	connection	with	prominent	figures	like	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer	and	Martin	Niemöller.76	For	those	that	fled	as	Hitler	rose	to	power,	the	German	pastors	were	able	to	rely	on	their	kinsmen	who	were	already	in	place	before	the	war,	and	British	religious	allies	who	supported	anti-Nazi	theological	figures.	As	the	British	government	began	exponentially	increasing	the	number	of	German	POWs	heading	to	the	Isles,	the	German	pastors	saw	an	opportunity	to	spread	a	religious	message	to	the	POWs	and	to	gain																																																									74	Berghahn,	Continental	Britons:	140.	75	Revd.	Dr.	Ulrich	Lincoln,	the	current	pastor	of	the	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer	Church	in	London,	in	an	interview	with	the	author,	5	June	2015.		76	Richard	Steigmann-Gall,	The	Holy	Reich:	Nazi	Conceptions	of	Christianity,	1919-1945.	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003.		
	 	 	35		credibility	with	the	British	government.	The	British	saw	Nazis	as	anti-Christian,	and	thereby	a	Christian	as	an	opponent	of	Nazism.77	The	German	pastors	played	off	that	expectation	in	order	to	not	only	raise	their	status	in	the	eyes	of	the	British,	but	also	to	raise	the	opinion	of	Christianity	in	the	German	soldiers’	mind.	Led	by	large	church	organizations	like	the	World	Council	of	Churches	(WCC),	and	smaller	community	groups	like	the	Dietrich	Bonhöffer	Kirche	(DBK),	the	German	pastors	took	steps	to	get	involved	in	the	camps.	British	reeducation	efforts	were	failing,	because	of	disinterest	from	both	German	POWs	and	government	officials	alike,	and	they	needed	the	help	of	the	pastors	who	could	activate	the	German	community	to	reintegrate	and	reeducate	the	POWs	toward	a	more	democratic	set	of	ideals.	While	the	German	pastors	had	altruistic	and	religious	reasons	for	helping	the	POWs,	the	British	government	saw	an	opportunity	to	make	real	progress	in	the	reeducation	effort.	The	roots	of	this	German-British	connection	grew	from	the	POW	camps,	as	pastors	began	to	make	an	impact	on	the	precarious	home	front.		The	German	churches,	on	behalf	of	the	German	immigrant	communities,	had	a	challenging	role	to	play	as	aids	to	the	POWs.	By	acting	in	a	way	that	could	be	viewed	by	the	British	populace	as	too	sympathetic	to	enemies	of	the	state,	the	Anglo-German	pastors	had	to	be	continuously	cognizant	of	how	their	actions	would	be	viewed,	and	as	a	result,	made	critical	choices	about	not	only	their	camp	initiatives,	but	also	their	discourse	in	the	camps.	A	Christmas	sermon	on	behalf	of	the	British	Council	of	Churches	(BCC)	in	1946,	exemplified	the	tensions	German	pastors	faced	as	active	members	of	British	society	with	strong	roots	in	Germany,	but	who	were	also	directly	opposed	to	the	actions	of	the	Nazis.78	The	letter	began																																																									77	Faulk,	Group	Captives,	160.		78	The	British	Council	of	Churches		(BCC)	was	an	organization	created	in	1942	to	“further	common	Christian	action”	and	promote	the	cause	of	unity	among	the	Churches	of	Great	Britain	and	Ireland.	
	 	 	36		by	offering	a	typical	Christmas	greeting	to	“you	who	wait	in	our	country	for	our	release…and	to	those	dear	to	you	who	are	waiting	for	you	at	home.”79	This	opening	acknowledged	not	only	those	who	were	suffering	in	the	camps,	but	also	those	in	Germany	who	eagerly	awaited	the	return	of	their	loved	ones.	The	letter	recognized	“those	who	laid	down	their	lives	in	doing	their	duty,”	but	intriguingly	did	not	specify	which	group	the	pastors	meant:	Germans	or	British.	The	ambiguity	was	clearly	intentional.	If	the	pastors	sided	too	openly	with	the	German	cause,	they	could	lose	their	credibility	with	the	British	government,	but	if	they	were	too	outwardly	supportive	of	the	British	cause	they	would	alienate	the	very	prisoners	whom	they	were	trying	to	help.	Instead,	the	writers	Geoffrey	Cantuar,	the	Archbishop	of	Canterbury	and	President	of	the	British	Council	of	Churches,	and	M.E.	Aubrey,	Chairman	of	the	Committee	of	the	POWs,	opted	for	a	blanket	statement	of	peace	between	both	nations,	in	the	spirit	of	postwar	connections	between	both	nations.	Cantuar	and	Aubrey	relied	on	ambiguous	language	of	support	for	both	groups	in	order	to	prevent	the	risk	of	alienating	either	group.		The	struggles	were	felt	at	the	highest	levels	of	those	who	aided	the	POWs,	and	stemmed	from	the	dual	role	the	pastors	had	to	play.	Arguably,	those	who	possessed	a	strong	connection	between	both	the	German	and	British	communities	faced	the	strongest	
																																																																																																																																																																																		The	BCC	grew	off	interwar	organizations	such	as	the	Federal	Council	of	the	Evangelical	Free	Churches	and	Bishop	William	Temple’s	Conference	on	Christian	Politics,	Economics	and	Citizenship.	After	the	foundation	of	the	World	Council	of	Churches	in	1948,	the	BCC	became	an	“Associated	Council.”	The	Council	of	Churches	for	Britain	and	Ireland	succeeded	it	in	1990.	79	“Burlingham,	Reverend	R	E:	papers	concerning	ministry	to	prisoners	of	war,”	LMA/4288/D/04/019,	2	June	1948:	4.	The	BCC	was	also	an	active	player	in	the	nuclear	deterrent	movement	at	the	beginning	of	the	Cold	War	era.	In	a	report	written	about	the	effect	of	the	nuclear	technology	on	society,	the	BCC	argued	that	a	destruction	of	linkages	between	nations	creates	“the	only	alternative	left	open…recklessness.”	“British	Council	of	Churches	Report	1946,”	17.	The	BCC	was	also	working	to	reestablish	connections	in	the	context	of	a	looming	Cold	War	and	the	fears	of	the	Soviet	Union	as	a	global	communist	superpower.		
	 	 	37		internal	tensions,	such	as	Aubrey	who	was	Anglo-German.	The	identity	struggle	of	the	German	pastors	appears	throughout	the	Dietrich	Bonhöffer	Kirche	records,	as	pastors	continued	to	battle	with	the	issue	of	how	to	help	the	prisoners	while	also	recognizing	that	too	close	of	contact	with	Hitler’s	soldiers	would	not	endear	them	to	the	British	population.	Their	internal	considerations	aside,	the	German	pastors	deeply	entangled	themselves	in	a	battle	for	the	soul	of	the	German	POWs,	while	also	hoping	to	prove	their	ultimate	loyalty	to	a	British	populace	that	had	a	complicated	relationship	and	viewpoint	of	the	German	people	by	1946.	In	trying	to	reeducate	the	POWs,	the	German	pastors	hoped	to	remodel	the	German	POWs	to	fit	a	narrative	in	which	the	German	soldier,	while	an	executor	of	violence,	was	not	ultimately	responsible	for	the	war.	The	British	government,	through	the	German	pastors,	also	hoped	to	create	a	bridge	between	the	German	and	British	populations	by	using	anti-Fascism	as	a	foundation	to	begin	greater	economic	cooperation,	which	eventually	turned	into	a	strategic	partnership	against	a	growing	Soviet	Union,	in	1947.		
Aid	Programs	Created	by	German	Pastors	The	German	pastors	believed	in	a	holistic	aid	program,	which	combined	the	efforts	of	the	pastors	with	the	resources	available	to	them	via	the	German	immigrants	in	Britain,	who	possessed	an	obvious	ethnic	tie	to	the	POWs.	In	Britain	an	active	immigrant	group	already	began	to	connect	the	camp	to	the	outside	world.	Local	grassroots	movements,	spearheaded	by	pastors	at	churches	like	the	Dietrich	Bonhöffer	Kirche	in	Sydenham	and	the	German	Lutheran	Church	of	London,	worked	within	the	overarching	protocols	developed	by	the	War	Office	and	the	Scottish	Command.	One	of	the	largest	groups	working	on	behalf	of	the	German	POWs	was	the	Friends	Committee	for	Refugees	and	Aliens,	spearheaded	by	Secretary	John	W.	Perry,	who	often	tried	to	connect	various	members	of	
	 	 	38		the	German	immigrant	community	with	those	expressing	needs	inside	the	POW	camps.		For	instance,	he	recommended	Marianne	Spier,	a	German	refugee	who	came	to	Britain	with	the	
Kindertransport,	to	work	in	a	German	POW	camp	as	a	translator.80		German	pastors	used	their	connections	and	intimate	knowledge	of	the	German	immigrants	living	in	Britain	both	to	assess	an	urgent	need	in	a	camp,	and	to	fill	it	with	a	person	in	possession	of	deep	knowledge	and	of	investment	in,	the	community.		While	pastors	solicited	grassroots	donations	throughout	the	German	immigrant	communities,	the	efforts	always	possessed	a	clear	sense	of	purpose,	particularly	in	regards	to	reeducation.	For	instance,	Rita	Oaterman	of	Essex	donated	various	books	and	novels	to	a	POW	camp	located	in	eastern	Britain.	A	pastor	encouraged	Oaterman	writing,	“that	for	obvious	reasons	it	is	very	desirable	to	send	books	by	Thomas	Mann	and	others	to	prisoner	of	war	camps.”81	The	encouragement	stemmed	from	a	desire	on	the	part	of	the	churches	for	POWs	to	appear	sympathetic	to	the	Allied	cause	by	reading	German,	anti-fascist,	anti-Nazi	authors,	whose	writings	could	not	be	construed	as	sympathetic	to	the	Third	Reich.	By	reading	books	that	had	been	banned	by	the	Nazis	instead	of	more	recent	fascist	literature,	the	churches	hoped	to	use	even	small,	simple	acts	to	move	prisoners	into	a	favorable	status	with	the	government	and	change	the	public	view	of	the	average	German.	The	pastors	wanted	to	change	the	terms	of	the	conversation	from	a	judgment	of		“brainwashed”																																																									80	“World	War	II	correspondence	from	interned	pastors	and	other	prisoners	and	the	responsible	authorities,”	LMA/4288/D/04/001,	18	October	1944:	34.	The	letter	went	on	to	list	the	various	qualifications	of	Spier,	including	her	secondary	education	in	Germany	in	combination	with	her	excellent	English	skills,	but	also	her	desire	to	establish	a	tighter	connection	with	the	German	community.	See	Frieda	Stolzberg	Korobkin,	Throw	Your	Feet	Over	Your	Shoulders,	Pittsburgh:	Dorrance	Publishing,	2012,	and	Diane	Samuels,	Kindertransport,	London:	Nick	Hern,	2008,	on	the	children’s	exodus	from	Germany.		81	Ibid,	15	November	1944:	89.	Rita	Oatermann	was	also	encouraged	to	send	works	by	Gottfried	Keller,	clearly	part	of	a	desire	to	encourage	prisoners	to	read	German	works	that	were	a	very	sharp	contrast	to	Nazi	works.		
	 	 	39		Germans	to	“reformed”	Germans.	Small	steps	towards	a	holistic	reeducation	helped	German	pastors	introduce	their	plan	of	a	reorientation	towards	democracy,	and	to	rebuild	connections	with	the	German	immigrant	community.		The	primary	goal	of	the	German	pastors	was	to	create	a	rich	intellectual	environment	for	the	German	POWs,	through	lecture	series,	book	donations,	and	the	creation	of	newspapers.	German	pastors	expressed	a	concern	for	“the	lack	of	suitable	material	for	organizing	German	services	within	the	camp,”	in	a	letter	written	to	Rev.	B.	Forell	of	the	YMCA	Prisoner	of	War	Department	by	an	unnamed	writer.	Often,	the	organization	of	German	services	centered	around	educational	opportunities	that	involved	the	entire	POW	community.	London	church	organizations	shouldered	responsibility	for	helping	interned	Germans	set	up	their	own	camp	newspaper,	titled	Die	Heimat	und	Wir	(The	Homeland	and	Us).	The	newspaper	drew	contributions	from	thirty-six	smaller	units	inside	a	given	camp,	and	included	a	wide	range	of	topics	such	as	“biblical	passages”,	“political	science	in	Germany”,	“the	value	of	culture”,	and	“how	to	live	a	good	life.”	In	the	August	1947	issue,	prisoner	Alfred	Jacobson	contributed	an	article	titled	“’das	Schwarze	Problem’	der	USA,”	which	discussed	issues	of	race,	the	United	States	Civil	War,	and	black	identity.82	Other	articles	compared	the	various	educational	systems	of	Scotland,	England,	and	Germany,	and	discussed	a	scientific	study	of	chromosomes,	providing	detailed	illustrations.83	The	only	kind	of	articles	that	seemed	to	be	conspicuously	absent	was	that	on	military	affairs,	which	the	British	government	likely	censored.	Newspapers	emerged	in																																																									82	“Prisoner	of	War	Camp	36,	prison	Newspaper	No.	15,”	LMA/4288/D/04/005,	28	July	1947:	1.	This	article	in	particular	showed	a	strong	understanding	of	racial	and	political	issues,	which	was	not	radically	different	from	the	many	other	articles	in	Die	Heimat	und	Wir.	These	articles	often	conversed	on	a	wide	variety	of	topics	at	a	high	intellectual	level,	as	discussed	above.	“Das	Schwarze	Problem	der	USA”	is	translated	as	“the	Problem	of	Blackness	in	the	United	States.”	83	Ibid,	28	July	1947:	25.	
	 	 	40		large	part	from	the	involvement	of	advocates	in	the	German	churches,	who	looked	to	give	the	German	prisoners	a	greater	degree	of	control	of	a	highly	restricted	system.		The	intellectual	engagement	of	the	prisoners	expanded	beyond	just	newspapers	and	the	delivery	of	Bibles	and	books;	the	London	communities	also	organized	speakers	to	come	and	teach	classes	for	the	prisoners.	A	letter	to	Rev.	Birger	Forell	from	Dr.	H.	Fuglsang-Damgard	stated	his	acceptance	of	an	appointment	as	a	teaching	professor	for	German	students	in	the	camps.	Fuglsang-Damgard	wrote	that	he	would	prefer	to	teach	about	ethical	problems,	but	would	also	lecture	on	topics	of	dogmatism	and	the	philosophy	of	religion.84		Pastor	G.R.	Halkett	created	a	popular	lectures	series	for	the	German	POWs,	stating	that	the	“commandant	of	the	camp	[had]	written	to	[him]	again,”	about	providing	more	speakers	given	such	high	demand.	85	The	creation	of	newspapers	and	lecture	series	gave	German	POWs	a	sense	of	agency	in	their	environment:	pastors	enabled	POWs	to	have	the	freedom	to	write	and	to	discuss	issues	on	a	wide	variety	of	intellectual	topics.	Intellectual	engagement	gave	German	POWs	an	outlet	that	encouraged	them	to	think	“positively”	about	democracy.	Increasingly	“positive”	results	in	English	language	testing	showed	an	inclination	towards	a	changing	attitude	towards	Britain.	The	Colonial	Office	reported	that	while	“results	are	disappointing	[on	the	last	round	of	English	tests]	there	is	considerable	keenness	to	learn	English…they	are	evidently	making	an	effort	to	learn.”86	Greater	personal	
																																																								84	“Forell,	Pastor	Binger:	correspondence	regarding	aid	for	prisoners	of	war,”	LMA/4288/D/04/025,	11	December	1946:	3.	While	prisoners	were	afforded	excellent	opportunities	to	learn	from	professors,	they	were	in	many	respects	limited	by	those	who	were	willing	to	teach	on	religious	subjects.	Resources	were	restricted	in	this	manner	not	only	by	the	British,	who	believed	that	religion	was	so	anti-Nazi	it	was	very	unlikely	to	be	misconstrued,	and	also	by	the	pastors	themselves,	who	had	a	vested	interest	in	evangelizing	the	POWs.	So	while	there	were	many	different	resources	available	to	the	POWs,	they	were	restricted	in	scope.		85	LMA/4288/A/03/003,	31	August	1946:	38.	86	CO	152/3:	8.	
	 	 	41		agency	and	the	development	of	the	German	POWs,	translated	into	tangible	gains	in	their	reception	of	democratization	and,	the	British	hoped,	in	a	greater	sense	of	cooperation	with	British	society	in	the	coming	future.		Beyond	intellectual	engagement,	German	pastors	gave	German	POWs	hope	for	their	post-war	futures,	by	becoming	involved	in	repatriation	efforts	and	by	seeking	employment	opportunities	for	the	interned	soldiers.	For	instance,	a	“young	German	prisoner”	whom	a	pastor	met	during	his	rounds	at	a	local	hospital	in	Liverpool,	was	“very	anxious	to	get	in	touch	with	some	organization	which	could	help	him	to	assist	in	relief-work	in	Germany	after	the	war.”87	The	pastor	recommended	setting	the	young	interned	German	up	with	work	through	the	Christian	International	Service,	which	was	a	trans-European	mission	based	in	London.88	This	action	created	an	opportunity	for	a	life	after	the	war,	and	the	advocacy	of	the	pastor	created	a	bond	of	support	between	the	two	men.	German	pastors	used	all	of	the	connections	available	to	them	to	create	spaces	in	which	POWs	could	be	employed	after	the	war.	In	a	letter	from	Pastor	Rieger	to	Cyril	Hudson,	Rieger	discussed	a	wounded	German	soldier	who	often	helped	with	the	chaplains’	rounds	in	the	hospitals.89	He	was	the	son	of	a	pastor	who	had	lived	in	London	before	the	First	World	War,	and	had	returned	to	Germany	after	the	Armistice.	The	pastors’	attempts	to	remove	him	from	the	camp	for	religious	reasons	and	to	find	him	satisfactory	employment	inside	the	city	showed	how	the	pastors	often	used	religious	resources	and	the	special	permissions	given	to																																																									87	LMA/4288/D/04/001,	1	November	1944:	62.	It	is	unclear	from	the	letter	how	successful	their	attempts	were	with	Cyril	Hudson,	and	if	the	government	approved	these	kinds	of	appeals.		88	This	operation	would	likely	become	part	of	the	World	Council	of	Churches	operation,	created	in	1948.		89	Pastor	Julius	Rieger	was	a	German	Evangelical	Lutheran	theologian	and	writer.	He	was	not	only	a	pastor	of	a	German	congregation	in	London	(St.	George’s)	but	a	friend	of	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer.	He	later	worked	with	the	Evangelical	Church	in	Germany	(EKD)	overseeing	the	pastoral	care	entrusted	to	POWs.		
	 	 	42		churches	in	order	to	rescue	men	from	the	internment	camps.	The	German	pastors	gave	the	POWs	tangible	opportunities	in	the	postwar	world,	and	solidified	the	connections	between	Germany	and	Britain	through	employment-based	linkages.		German	pastors	even	helped	create	a	system	of	visitation	and	a	letter	delivery	system	that	simultaneously	strengthened	POW	connections	with	the	German	immigrant	community,	and	helped	to	retain	ties	to	homes	abroad.	The	Glasgow	YMCA	set	up	a	part-time	camp	visitor	system	in	order	to	encourage	German	prisoner	interaction	with	the	outside	community.	Other	localized	communities	got	involved;	in	Aberdeen,	German	prisoners	were	permitted	walks	along	the	moors.90	The	German	pastors	also	helped	ensure	that	letters	from	German	POWs	reached	their	relatives	abroad;	the	letters	revealed	POW	satisfaction	with	the	camp	experience.	On	February	13,	1946,	POW	Willi	Sturmat	of	Camp	174	in	the	Norton	Facility	wrote	to	his	wife,	barely	containing	his	love	for	her	
																																																								90	“YMCA	Prisoners	Aid:	correspondence	regarding	organization,”	LMA/4288/D/04/003,	3	March	1947:	2.	
Roger	Thomas	and	Sophie	Jackson,	“Every	Prisoner	of	War	Camp	in	the	UK,”	English	Heritage	Research,	2003.		
	 	 	43		and	his	excitement	at	his	first	letter.	He	writes	that	“dies	Berliner”	is	extremely	happy.91	The	letters	and	visitation	created	a	sense	of	home	for	the	detached	POWs,	providing	them	with	a	familial	basis	of	support	throughout	their	wartime	internment.		However,	the	members	of	the	British	and	German	communities	who	tried	to	aid	the	POWs	faced	some	obstacles	created	by	the	British	government.	As	the	camps	located	in	the	vicinity	of	London	closed,	it	would	be	much	more	difficult	for	pastors	to	give	aid	to	the	POWs.92	As	early	as	December	of	1944,	various	pastors	began	to	describe	difficulties	visiting	the	POWs	located	in	hospitals	around	London;	the	War	Office	started	to	require	permission	in	order	simply	to	visit	some	of	the	wards.	Pastors	faced	increasing	resistance	to	the	kind	of	educational	and	biblical	studies	that	they	wanted	to	provide	to	the	internment	communities:	a	letter	to	Dekan	Rieger	discussed	the	pastors	of	the	Theological	School	of	Camp	174	in	May	of	1947	facing	difficulties	from	the	camp	administrators	in	regards	to	teaching	material.93	These	bureaucratic	walls	put	up	by	the	British	government	did	not	deter	the	pastors	from	their	mission;	instead	they	sought	increasingly	more	thorough	ways	of	aiding	the	prisoners,	both	at	a	local	community	level,	but	also	at	a	larger	governmental	office	level.		Often	the	resistance	came	from	a	failed	understanding	and	continued	distrust	of	the	democratic	mission	of	the	pastors	working	in	the	German	POW	camps	on	the	part	of	the	British	government.	While	the	vast	majority	of	the	pastors’	activities	sought	to	work	with	the	professed	goal	of	the	reeducation	of	the	German	POWs,	the	British	government	nevertheless	did	not	fully	and	publically	support	the	pastors’	work,	probably	because	of																																																									91	“Grüber,	Provost	H.:	correspondence	regarding	his	search	for	relatives	of	prisoners	of	war	and	emigrants,	including	letters	from	Norton	Camp,”	LMA/4288/D/04/026,	13	February	1946:	54.		92	LMA/4288/D/04/019,	12	April	1948:	11.	93	LMA/4288/D/04/003,	13	March	1947	and	27	May	1947:	4,11.	
	 	 	44		anti-Nazi	pressure	from	the	British	population	particularly	during	the	war.94	The	British	Parliament,	in	particular,	treated	the	seriousness	of	the	democratic	mission	of	the	German	pastors	with	mockery.	In	March	1940,	the	Times	reported	on	a	discussion	concerning	the	reeducation	of	German	POWs	and	the	involvement	of	BBC	media.	Mr.	G.	Strauss	of	the	Labour	Party	asked	the	Secretary	of	War	whether	any	“any	steps	were	being	taken…to	bring	before	the	German	prisoners	interned	in	this	country	the	virtues	of	democracy	against	fascism,”	to	which	Financial	Secretary	Sir	V.	Warrender	stated	that	they	have	the	opportunity	to	listen	to	BBC	programs.	Sir	Herbert	Williams	of	Croydon	jested,	“serves	them	right,”	and	the	members	of	Parliament	descended	into	laughter	with	no	further	debate	on	the	matter.95	The	flippancy	with	which	the	manner	was	treated	reflected	an	ignorance	of	the	seriousness	of	the	process	in	the	earlier	years,	but	also	a	greater	emphasis,	probably	fairly,	on	actually	winning	the	war	in	Europe.	As	the	war	began	to	turn	in	favor	of	Britain	and	her	allies,	the	British	government	paid	more	attention	to	their	interned	POWs,	as	they	began	to	recognize	how	the	relative	success	of	their	mission	would	impact	the	postwar	world.	The	POWs	represented	an	avenue	towards	greater	political	control	in	Germany,	and	sympathies	towards	the	British	government	could	help	create	a	German	society	that	was	not	only	anti-Fascist,	but	anti-Communist	as	well.96		
Conclusion	By	late	1948,	the	role	played	by	the	German	pastors	in	the	POW	camp	system	had	created	a	“very	cooperative”	environment,	with	social	activities	and	intellectual																																																									94	Because	of	the	limited	release	of	National	Archives	surveillance	files,	it	is	unclear	if	German	pastors	were	monitored	during	their	involvement	in	the	POW	camps,	particularly	those	pastors	who	traveled	between	Britain	and	Germany.	It	is	well	documented	that	the	British	monitored	the	POWs,	so	by	extension	it	is	probable	that	they	monitored	the	German	pastors	as	well.		95	Times,	“German	Prisoners	and	B.B.C,”	12	March	1940:1.		96	Wyneken,	Religion	and	the	Cold	War:	19.	
	 	 	45		opportunities	proving	“irresistible.”97	However,	these	gains	were	not	easily	acquired,	with	both	British	officials	and	German	pastors	alike	struggling	with	the	complications	of	supporting	POWs	in	Britain.	For	British	officials,	the	implementation	of	international	and	national	standards	of	POW	treatment,	created	an	environment	of	adequate	treatment	for	POWs,	but	drew	the	ire	of	some	who	thought	that	POWs	were	given	too	much	comfort.	The	camp	system,	while	proving	ineffective	at	reeducating	German	POWs	through	the	tactics	of	British	authorities,	did	provide	an	entry	point	for	German	pastor	aid	and	evangelizing	efforts.	Highly	concerned	about	the	perception	of	themselves	in	the	British	community,	German	pastors	saw	an	opportunity	not	only	to	protect	themselves	and	establish	further	connections	with	the	British	government,	but	to	reeducate	citizens	of	their	homeland.	As	German	pastors	utilized	the	existing	structure	of	the	POW	system,	they	created	a	unique	brand	of	aid	that	provided	the	POWs	with	an	intellectual	engagement	with	democracy,	even	while	they	were	prisoners	during	wartime.	This	critical	intellectual	engagement	helped	German	pastors	make	a	“positive”	impact	in	the	lives	of	POWs,	which	became	of	particular	importance	as	the	war	drew	to	a	close.	For	as	the	war	ended,	even	greater	questions	loomed	on	the	horizon:	how	much	good	had	reeducation	accomplished?	Were	POWs	ready	to	return	to	Germany,	and	was	the	reeducated	German	POW	capable	of	contributing	to	a	rebuilding	of	European	society,	as	the	Soviet	Union	loomed	on	the	horizon?98	
																																																								97	CO	152/3:	5.		98	Tony	Judt,	Postwar:	A	History	of	Europe	Since	1945,	London:	Pimlico,	2007,	and	Wyneken,	Religion	
and	the	Cold	War:	19.		
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As	the	Second	World	War	came	to	a	close,	and	Europe	surveyed	the	destruction	left	in	the	wake	of	a	quarter	century	of	total	war,	the	reconstruction	of	the	German	state	became	a	point	of	particular	concern	for	the	victors.	The	Allied	Powers	became	the	arbiters	of	justice,	seeking	a	denazified	state	while	dealing	with	a	German	population	that	was	only	beginning	to	come	to	terms	with	their	actions	both	before	and	after	the	war.	The	German	word	vergangenheitsbewältigung	is	used	to	describe	a	process	of	coming	to	terms	with	the	past,	which	for	most	of	the	German	populace	did	not	occur	until	the	1960s	and	1970s.	For	most	of	the	immediate	postwar	years,	many	German	citizens	sought	to	ignore	their	actions	during	the	war	and	refocus	on	building	a	new	German	republic.1	However,	the	Protestant	German	pastors	of	the	period,	particularly	Lutherans,	were	forced	to	come	to	terms	with	their	own	actions	under	Nazism	more	quickly	than	other	parts	of	the	German	population.	Under	Hitler’s	reign,	Protestant	churches	or	the	“German	Christian	Movement,”	actively	cooperated	with	and	supported	the	actions	of	the	Third	Reich.2	The	vast	majority	of	Protestant	Churches	supported	the	actions	of	Hitler,	with	the	exception	of	the	Confessing	Church,	which	acted	as	a	resistant	splinter	group	to	the	Nazi	regime.	In	the	aftermath	of	the																																																									1	Anna	Wolff-Poweska,	Memory	as	Burden	and	Liberation:	Germans	and	their	Nazi	Past	(1945-2010),	Frankfurt	am	Main:	Peter	Lang	GmbH,	2015.	There	has	been	much	discussion	among	historians	about	the	role	of	collective	memory	in	German	society	and	how	Germans	responded	to	the	Nazi	state,	the	Second	World	War,	and	the	Holocaust.	It	is	generally	accepted	that	Germans	truly	began	the	process	of	vergangenheitsbewältigung	in	the	1960s-1970s	as	part	of	the	larger	counter-culture	movements	of	the	time.		2	The	motivations	for	this	are	highly	complicated	and	are	still	discussed	by	historians.	Many	argue	that	Protestant	churches	supported	Hitler	out	of	a	sense	of	self-preservation,	a	support	of	a	return	to	what	originally	seemed	to	be	“conservative”	values,	and	out	of	support	for	the	anti-Semitic	polices	of	Hitler.	The	Confessing	Church,	the	exception	to	the	German	Christian	Movement,	was	led	by	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer,	Martin	Niemöller	and	Heinrich	Grüber,	and	acted	in	opposition	to	the	Nazis	after	the	publication	of	the	“Aryan	Paragraph”	in	1933.	The	“Aryan	Paragraph”	was	a	clause	created	by	the	Nazis	that	reserved	membership	in	society	solely	for	members	of	the	"Aryan	race"	and	excluded	from	such	rights	any	non-Aryans,	particularly	Jews	or	those	of	Jewish	descent.	See	A	
Church	Undone:	Documents	from	the	German	Christian	Faith	Movement,	1932-1940,	Minneapolis,	MN:	Fortress	Press,	2015	for	further	reference.			
	 	 	48		war,	the	German	Protestant	churches	faced	a	difficult	period	of	reckoning.	Highly	criticized	for	their	actions	during	the	war	by	other	national	church	groups,	the	German	churches’	international	reputation	was	in	danger	of	being	permanently	scarred.3		As	a	result	of	Deutsche	Christen	action	during	the	war,	German	pastors	who	had	actively	resisted	Hitler’s	regime	recognized	the	perilous	state	of	the	Protestant	Churches	in	the	postwar	period.4	However,	the	Confessing	Church	was	also	plagued	not	only	by	
Deutsche	Christen	action	during	the	war,	but	Confessing	Church	inaction.	While	members	such	as	Martin	Niemöller	and	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer	were	true	heroes	of	the	period,	the	Confessing	Church	was	“marked	by	a	refusal	to	attack	or	even	criticize	the	Nazi	state.”5	In	a	pattern	of	both	acquiescence	and	resistance,	the	Confessing	Church,	while	largely	anti-Nazi,	struggled	to	provide	tangible	resistance	to	the	Nazi	regime.	As	a	result,	the	postwar	legacy	of	both	the	Deutsche	Christen	and	the	Confessing	Church	was	complicated	and	confusing.	Led	by	former	active	resistance	members	of	the	Confessing	Church	and	Lutheran	German	pastors	who	had	fled	to	Britain	before	the	war,	the	anti-Nazi	elements	of	the	German	church	took	up	the	mantle	of	both	denazification,	but	also	the	Christian	Reconstruction	of	Europe.	The	Christian	Reconstruction	of	Europe	became	even	more	critical	with	the	rise	of	
																																																								3	For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	the	Catholic	churches	will	not	be	discussed	in	depth,	but	Catholic	churches	in	Germany	were	by	and	large,	complicit	in	the	Nazi	mission.	See,	Derek	Hastings’	
Catholicism	and	the	Roots	of	Nazism:	Religious	Identity	and	National	Socialism,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2010.		4	Robert	P.	Ericksen,	Complicity	in	the	Holocaust:	Churches	and	Universities	in	Nazi	Germany,	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012:	94-139.	Ericksen	discusses	in	depth	the	“battle	lost	by	the	Confessing	Church	against	Nazism.”	He	argues	that	the	Deutsche	Christen	and	their	pro-Nazi	ideas	overwhelmed	the	smaller	influence	of	the	Confessing	Church,	particularly	as	the	Deutsche	Christen	manipulated	the	usage	of	the	Old	Testament.		5	Ibid:	94.		
	 	 	49		the	Soviet	Union:	as	communist-atheism	threatened	to	engulf	Germany,	and	with	the	split	of	Germany	in	1949,	the	threat	became	even	more	real.6			 For	the	German	pastors	located	in	Britain,	the	POW	situation	in	the	postwar	period	presented	a	perfect	opportunity	not	only	to	become	actively	involved	in	the	process	of	denazification,	but	also	to	raise	their	credibility	among	the	international	community	by	“reforming”	Nazis.	German	pastors	in	the	postwar	period	while	undoubtedly	altruistic	and	proselytizing,	were	also	focused	on	a	second,	and	equally	important	goal:	improving	the	image	of	German	Christianity	worldwide.	For	German	pastors,	those	two	goals	could	not	be	separated:	evangelizing	and	internal	reformation	became	the	mantel	by	which	they	would	reshape	the	postwar	world.7	Furthermore,	in	the	highly	complicated	environment	of	postwar	repatriation,	German	pastors	used	their	evangelical	resources	and	transcontinental	networks	to	convince	British	authorities	of	their	credibility	when	dealing	with	POWs.	In	particular,	German	pastors	helped	run	the	“transition	camps,”	which	the	pastors	designed	to	help	prepare	POWs	for	reentry	into	German	society.	In	these	camps,	pastors	not	only	took	the	opportunity	to	evangelize	the	young,	highly	volatile	POWs,	but	to	also	assess	the	POWs	potential	contribution	to	German	society.	Finally,	as	POWs	returned	to	Germany,	German	pastors	worked	to	ensure	that	the	linkages	created	during	the	war	helped	to	form	a	religious	bridge	between	Britain	and	Germany	into	the	1950s.		
																																																								6	Wyneken,	Religion	and	the	Cold	War:	19.	7	Judt,	Postwar:	229.	The	Stuttgart	Confession	of	Guilt	by	Protestant	leaders	in	1945	further	complicated	matters.	A	declaration	issued	on	October	19,	1945	by	the	Council	of	the	Evangelical	Church	in	Germany,	it	stated	that	the	church	confessed	guilt	for	its	inadequacy	in	opposition	to	the	Nazis	and	the	Third	Reich.	The	Council	faced	the	ire	of	the	German	population,	who	viewed	this	as	a	further	capitulation	to	Allied	demands,	and	by	ardent	church	leaders,	who	perceived	it	as	inadequate.	Recognizing	great	internal	strife	and	the	fading	power	of	the	Protestant	church,	Lutheran,	Reformed,	and	United	Churches	came	together	to	form	the	Evangelical	Church	in	Germany	(EKD)	in	1948.	
	 	 	50		
Motivations	for	Involvement		
	 As	the	process	of	denazification	began	to	encompass	not	only	governmental	officials	but	also	religious	leaders,	the	pastors	of	the	German	Protestant	groups	in	Britain	and	Germany	feared	for	the	survival	of	their	religious	and	moral	authority,	once	the	extent	of	church	complicity	with	the	Nazis	was	revealed.	On	November	29th,	1946,	Pastor	Martin	Böckheler	in	Stuttgart	expressed	particular	concern	over	the	denazification	policy	and	the	representation	of	the	Kirchevorstände,	or	church	executive	boards	in	these	proceedings.8	From	1935	to	1940,	Pastor	Böckheler	was	held	in	the	concentration	camp	of	Flossenbürg,	which	was	designed	primarily	to	hold	“antisocial”	or	“criminal	prisoners.”	After	his	release	and	the	subsequent	death	of	Pastor	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer,	who	was	executed	by	hanging	in	the	Flossenbürg	concentration	camp	on	April	9th,	1945,	Böckheler	fled	to	the	German	evangelical	community	based	in	Sydenham.	There,	he	acted	as	a	permanent	official	who	“marketed”	the	positive	activities	of	the	German	Protestant	churches.	However,	Böckheler	feared	what	would	become	of	the	German	outreach	movements,	particularly	after	the	Allies	won	the	war	and	established	the	various	occupation	zones	of	Germany.9	With	the	war	coming	to	a	close,	even	the	German	pastors	who	resisted	the	Third	Reich	wondered	what	role	they	would	play	in	the	reconstruction	of	their	homeland.	
																																																								8	LMA/4288/A/03/007,	29	November	1946:	16.	9	Ibid,	29	November	1946:	16.	Francis	Graham-Dixon	noted	in	Allied	Occupation	of	Germany	“it	was	the	state,	not	the	Church,	that	had	the	power	to	wield	material	influence	on	any	critical	political	decisions.”	Throughout	the	occupation,	the	government	“appropriated	the	Christian	message	of	peace”	to	combat	the	rising	influence	of	communist	ideas,	particularly	in	the	Eastern	zone.	John	Troubeck,	the	Foreign	Office’s	leading	political	adviser	on	Germany	argued,	“Christian	revival	is	the	only	alternative	to	the	ideal	of	national	socialism,	but	that	impulse	must	come	from	within	Germany.”	However,	as	Wyneken	states	in	Religion	and	the	Cold	War,	the	Protestant	churches	feared	that	the	partition	of	Germany	would	only	bring	greater	isolation	to	their	parishes,	the	majority	of	which	would	lie	in	the	Soviet	occupied	zone.	While	religion	was	viewed	as	an	alternative	to	counter	National	Socialism,	those	concerns	were	second	to	political	considerations.		
	 	 	51			 In	this	period	of	uncertainty,	German	pastors	started	seriously	to	consider	the	perception	of	their	activities	by	the	international	community.	Pastor	Werner	Jentsch,	the	official	head	of	the	German	Young	Men’s	Christian	Association	operating	in	Britain	since	January	of	1946,	described	his	feelings	of	isolation	from	the	Christian	reconstruction	movement	in	Europe.	However,	Jentsch	recognized	that	seeming	active,	and	utilizing	internationally	recognized	anti-Nazi	leaders	involved	in	Christian	reconstruction	could	mitigate	the	isolation	of	German	churches.	Jentsch	recommended	to	Dekan	Rieger	the	recruitment	of	Hanns	Lilje	and	Wilhelm	Stählin	to	their	efforts.10	Hanns	Lilje	was	a	German	Lutheran	bishop	and	pioneer	of	the	ecumenical	movement,	and	eventual	bishop	of	the	Evangelical	Lutheran	Church	of	Hanover	in	1947,	while	Wilhelm	Stählin	was	a	German	Lutheran	theologian,	bishop	of	the	Evangelical	Church	of	Oldenburg,	and	initiator	of	the	Liturgical	Movement	in	German	Protestantism	in	the	20th	century.	Both	men	were	heavily	involved	in	the	Confessing	Church,	and	were	considered	to	be	active	resistors	of	Nazism.	Jentsch	hoped	that	Lilje	and	Stählin	would	not	only	bring	credibility	to	his	work	in	Britain,	but	also	that	their	activism	in	the	Church’s	political	battles	could	translate	into	a	reformed	image	of	the	church.	As	the	German	pastors	sought	to	take	on	a	more	active	role	with	the	reconstruction	of	Europe	and	Christianity,	many	groups	leaned	on	the	credibility	of	former	Confessing	Church	members	to	prove	the	sincerity	of	the	German	pastor	mission.11		Ethical	and	moral	questions	plagued	the	German	pastors	in	the	postwar	period,	as	they	began	to	question	the	role	that	they	had	played,	either	directly	or	indirectly,	in	the	rise																																																									10	“Jentsch,	Pastor	Werner	(Norton	Camp/Willingen):	correspondence	concerning	his	activities	and	his	offer	to	assist	YMCA	work	with	German	prisoners	in	Britain,”	LMA/4288/D/04/028,	19	March	1948:	44.		11	Throughout	the	DBKC,	Pastor	Jentsch	and	Pastor	Rieger	discuss	in	detail	which	pastors	should	be	brought	in	to	support	the	POWs.	Their	credentials	are	always	considered,	and	in	particular,	the	absence	of	an	association	with	National	Socialism.		
	 	 	52		of	Nazism	in	Germany.	Pastor	Jentsch,	of	the	World	Alliance	of	the	Young	Men’s	Christian	Associations,	in	his	own	personal	musings,	argued	that	the	Christian	churches	had	completely	lost	their	way.12	He	argued	that	the	church	“repeatedly	made	the	mistake	to	only	care	for	the	big	problems	without	seeing…the	individual	soul	which	[the	church]	might	lose	or	win.”13	More	often,	the	Christian	worried	little	“of	the	neighbor,”	and	instead	focused	on	the	“front-lines”	of	the	official	world.	As	a	result	of	the	focus	on	the	“official	world,”	he	saw	the	German	Christians	as	losing	sight	of	their	individual	patrons,	and	as	living	in	a	state	of	denial	about	their	neighbor	instead.14	Jentsch	expressed	a	particular	concern	for	what	was	to	come,	both	for	his	church	and	his	homeland:	“Germany’s	dangerous	situation	does	not	let	me	sleep.	The	distress,	the	shameful	misery	with	all	its	horrible	and	humiliating	consequences	are	too	deep-rooted	and	tragic	to	be	forgotten	in	a	single	day.”15	Jentsch	struggled	with	the	depth	of	the	problems	in	the	German	Church,	while	also	grapping	with	his	desire	for	the	churches	“to	deserve	a	Christian	name.”	However	perilous	the	situation,	Jentsch	believed	that	the	presence	of	German	POWs	located	in	Britain,	offered	an	opportunity	not	only	to	reform	members	of	their	populace,	but	also	to	show	the	reformation	of	the	Protestant	Churches.	Jentsch	argued	that	POWs	were	deeply	conflicted	regarding	their	actions	during	the	war,	and	German	pastors	could	provide	both	clarity	and	religious	healing	to	the	young	men	scheduled	for	repatriation.	In	a	
																																																								12	Further	research	in	the	WCC	Archives	and	the	YMCA	archive	could	be	used	to	provide	greater	detail	into	the	activities	of	pastors	such	as	Jentsch	and	Stählin.		13	LMA/4288/D/04/028:	71.		14	Ibid:	71.	“Neighbor”	here	is	used	biblically,	as	if	in	reference	to	a	member	of	the	flock	of	the	clergy.		15	Ibid:	71.	Jentsch	worried	not	only	for	the	state	of	Germany	internally,	but	also	the	international	position	of	the	nation.	Through	the	occupation	and	breakup	of	Germany,	the	nation	faced	a	battle	not	only	for	a	physical	reconstruction,	but	an	emotional	and	spiritual	renewal,	to	which	Jentsch	alludes.		
	 	 	53		letter	written	to	Jentsch,	a	young	POW	stated:	“It	is	not	easy	for	me	to	fight	against	the	hatred,	springing	up	again	and	again.	I	feel	that	hatred	leads	to	nothing,	can	change	and	better	nothing.	But	still	it	threatens	to	break	out	again.	I	do	not	know	if	love	of	our	Germany	is	the	reason,	or	what	else.”16	Jentsch,	moved	by	the	emotional	turmoil	expressed	by	the	young	POW,	saw	the	German	POW	cause	as	a	perfect	opportunity	to	renew	the	soul	of	the	German	people.	Jentsch	confirmed	the	idea	that	by	using	POWs	as	a	spring	board,	German	pastors	could	not	only	begin	their	mission	of	revitalizing	Germany,	but	also	transforming	the	image	of	the	German	Protestant	churches,	who	were	still	so	tainted	by	the	work	of	the	
Deutsche	Christen.		
British	Troubles	with	POW	Management	
	 In	the	aftermath	of	the	passage	of	the	Geneva	Convention	and	the	start	of	the	Second	World	War,	both	the	Allied	and	Axis	powers	struggled	to	maintain	the	standard	of	care	needed	for	POWs,	while	also	managing	the	war	effort.	These	efforts,	unsolved	during	the	war,	would	plague	the	British	government	even	after	the	war’s	end.	In	October	1939,	the	International	Red	Cross	Committee	(IRCC)	offered	to	establish	a	central	agency	for	the	collection	and	distribution	of	information	concerning	prisoners	of	war.17	The	British	accepted	the	offer	and	merged	the	IRCC	representatives	with	other	members	of	government	to	help	monitor	POW	affairs.	The	Under	Secretary	of	State	and	the	Secretaries	of	the	Foreign	Office,	Air	Ministry,	War	Office,	Home	Office,	and	Treasury	were	to	represent	the	primary	branches	of	the	British	government	that	had	a	particular	interest	in	POW	affairs.	In	their	meetings,	this	interdepartmental	cabinet	discussed	the	creation	of	an																																																									16	Ibid:	71.	17		NA,	HO	213/494:	1.	The	International	Red	Cross	archive	would	present	an	opportunity	for	further	research	on	the	subject,	particularly	in	regards	to	their	motivations	for	involvement	in	POW	affairs.		
	 	 	54		official	prisoner	of	war	information	bureau,	but	considered	the	bureau	redundant	because	of	the	offer	put	forth	by	the	IRCC,	and	instead	placed	a	bureau	for	POW	affairs	inside	the	War	Office,	where	information	could	be	easily	communicated	to	the	German	government.18		While	information	about	POWs	could	be	communicated	between	Britain	and	Germany,	in	actuality,	this	rarely	occurred,	and	information	that	was	released	often	faced	bureaucratic	delays.	Home	Office	Representative	Gardner	suggested	that	POW	information	should	not	be	released	unless	a	family	requested	it,	while	Representative	Clayton	took	it	a	step	further	and	argued	that	POW	information	should	always	be	withheld.19	However,	the	representatives	eventually	came	to	the	consensus	that	under	the	practice	of	reciprocity,	it	would	be	in	the	best	interest	of	British	soldiers	if	some	method	of	POW	correspondence	with	the	homeland	could	be	established.	When	the	war	began,	there	was	no	procedure	for	correspondence	with	enemy	territory,	and	during	the	war	a	neutral	channel	was	established	through	Belgium.20	However,	when	the	war	ended	and	the	networks	established	by	both	the	IRCC	and	the	British	government	collapsed	out	of	disuse	and	lack	of	interest,	German	pastors	recognized	an	opportunity	to	reestablish	a	connection	between	Germany	and	Britain.	Particularly	as	the	repatriation	effort	began	in	earnest,	German	pastors	recognized	the	importance	of	establishing	communication	channels	between	governments.	It	was	essential	that	when	German	POWs	began	the	process	of	repatriation	that	their	families	knew	they	were	coming,	in	order	to	prepare	the	home	and	to	help	them	find	employment.	For	instance,	a	POW	wrote	that	he	was	not	averse	to	a	return	to	Germany,	but	worried	if	he	could	make	the	move	without	being	certain	of	employment	in																																																									18	Ibid:	4.		19	Ibid:	5.		20	Ibid:	6.		
	 	 	55		the	homeland.21	Bishop	Dibelius,	an	administrative	supervisor	at	an	internment	camp,	wrote	that	with	the	current	state	of	repatriation	efforts,	a	six	or	seven	month	delay	was	needed	to	ensure	a	resettlement	of	POWs	with	work.22	The	German	pastors	sought	to	avoid	the	confusion	brought	by	a	mass	release	of	prisoners,	a	tactic	employed	by	the	Soviet	Union	in	1946.23	The	German	pastors	alone	had	the	unique	connections	between	both	communities	in	order	to	affect	the	repatriation	process,	after	the	British	largely	abandoned	their	communication	networks	established	during	the	war.		
Transcontinental	Relationship	Between	German	Pastors	and	English	Pastors	
	 Many	of	the	German	pastors	who	sought	to	improve	the	status	of	POWs,	relied	on	their	theological	counterparts,	both	English	pastors	in	Britain,	and	German	pastors	in	Germany.	Throughout	their	efforts	of	rebuilding	the	image	of	the	church,	a	true	camaraderie	emerged	among	these	men.	Dr.	Rieger	and	Reverend	C.O.	Goodchild	of	St.	Michael’s	House	had	a	particular	friendship,	and	Goodchild	wrote	that	he	was	“very	sorry	not	to	see	you	[Rieger]	when	in	London.”24	Their	friendship	was	based	around	efforts	to	connect	family	members,	and	while	their	communication	focused	mostly	on	lost	messages	to	family	members	and	releases	of	POWs,	they	still	often	asked	of	each	other	and	of	their	families.	Once	again	lamenting	a	missed	meeting,	Goodchild	wrote	to	Rieger	that	he	“only	
																																																								21	“Correspondence	after	release	from	internment,	requesting	support	for	his	de-Nazification	hearing,”	LMA/4288/A/04/008:	26.	22	Ibid:	26.	23	Judt,	Postwar:	30.		24	“Correspondence	including	a	memorandum	referring	to	the	extradition	and	treatment	of	war	criminals,”	LMA/4288/A/04/007:	1.	Ronald	Cedric	Osbourne	(C.O.)	Goodchild	was	the	seventh	Anglican	Bishop	of	Kensington	between	1964	and	1980.	He	was	a	wartime	chaplain	with	the	Royal	Air	Force	Volunteer	Reserve,	and	immediately	after	the	war	he	served	as	Warden	of	St.	Michael’s	House	and	Secretary	of	the	Student	Christian	Movement.	
	 	 	56		discovered	your	footsteps	in	some	P/W	[sic]	camps.”25	Often,	interpersonal	connections	turned	into	tangible	gains	for	POWs,	as	Goodchild’s	friendship	with	Rieger	translated	into	a	greater	involvement	by	Rieger	and	his	congregation	in	the	affairs	of	the	POWs.	Interpersonal	connection	most	often	acted	as	a	medium	by	which	pastors	felt	increasingly	more	comfortable	with	contributing	to	the	POW	mission.	Goodchild	took	a	particular	interest	in	both	POW	affairs,	but	also	in	the	personal	connections	that	he	could	forge	among	pastors	from	both	Britain	and	Germany.	Goodchild	brought	a	delegation	of	pastors	to	the	British	zone,	and	took	them	throughout	the	country	on	the	way	to	Berlin	via	Düsseldorf,	Herford,	and	Hamburg,	in	an	effort	to	catch	up	with	old	friends	and	create	a	relationship	between	delegations.26	Goodchild	spoke	with	the	Sydenham	church	board	and	showed	their	representatives,	who	had	donated	furniture,	around	the	St.	Michael’s	House,	located	in	Hamburg.27	He	hoped	to	show	the	church	board	how	their	efforts	aided	the	process	of	repatriation.	As	interpersonal	connection	improved	between	pastors,	requests	for	visitations	to	camps	were	more	quickly	obtained	because	of	the	frequency	and	the	positivity	of	the	interaction.	In	October	1948,	Mrs.	Russell	of	the	German	Education	Department	of	the	Foreign	Office	in	Whitehall	requested	approval	from	the	British	Council	of	Foreign	Workers	Committee	in	order	to	bring	three	German	clergymen	to	Britain	to	work	in	the	POW	camps.28	The	committee	approved	the	request,	citing	Dekan	Rieger’s	authority	on	the	matter,	and	the	clergymen	traveled	to	Britain.29	The	authority	of	many	key	
																																																								25	Ibid:	3.		26	Ibid:	14.		27	Ibid:15.		28	The	Foreign	Workers	Committee	was	actually	part	of	the	British	Council	of	Churches.	The	efforts	of	these	particularly	committees	dealing	with	labor	were	coordinated	by	the	Ministry	of	Labour,	and	was	designed	to	help	in	the	employment	of	foreign	workers.		29	LMA/4288/A/04/008:	59.		
	 	 	57		figures	helped	not	only	to	give	credibility	to	the	mission,	but	also	to	assist	pastors	in	establishing	the	connections	with	each	other	that	could	translate	into	tangible	gains	for	improving	the	position	of	POWs.	
Pastor	Supervision	of	POW	Transition	Stage		 As	the	process	of	repatriation	sped	up,	German	pastors	recognized	the	critical	stage	that	the	POWs	were	entering.	With	more	than	400,000	POWs	needing	to	return	home,	Britain	was	not	equipped	to	prepare	POWs	adequately	for	their	journey	home,	or	their	resettlement	in	Germany.	In	November	1948,	Pastor	Boeckheler,	in	negotiation	with	Rev.	Harland	and	Rev.	Dakin	of	the	Bureau	of	Christian	Reconstruction	in	Europe,	expressed	a	particular	concern	over	the	number	of	POWs	received	from	the	London	Office	in	October.30	Boeckheler	discussed	problems	of	employment	and	housing,	with	over	10,000	former	POWs	traveling	through	shipping	warehouses	to	come	back	to	Germany,	and	staying	at	temporary	hostels	in	London	before	their	final	journey.31	Pastors	recognized	the	ineptitude	of	the	British	government	in	preparing	the	POWs	for	repatriation,	and	pastors	took	it	upon	themselves	to	develop	a	transition	camp	where	POWs	could	not	only	receive	religious	instruction,	but	also	undertake	a	critical	period	of	“processing,”	before	they	returned	to	a	Germany	that	looked	very	different	from	the	home	that	they	had	left.	In	Civilizing	the	
																																																								30	LMA/4288/A/04/007:	68.	Matthew	Hilton	et	al,	A	Historical	Guide	to	NGOs	in	Britain:	Charities,	
Civil	Society,	and	the	Voluntary	Sector	since	1945,	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2012:	128.	The	Bureau	of	Christian	Reconstruction	was	formed	in	1945,	as	the	merger	of	one	of	the	WCC’s	Department	of	Reconstruction	merger	with	the	European	Central	Bureau	for	Inter-Church	Aid.	The	Bureau	of	Christian	Reconstruction	would	later	become	a	department	of	the	BCC.	31	The	housing	shortage	of	postwar	Germany	not	only	affected	POWs,	but	the	average	German	citizen	as	well.	Gareth	Pritchard’s	Niemandsland:	A	History	of	Unoccupied	Germany,	1945-1955,	stories	over	500,000	citizens	cut	off	from	food	and	shelter,	while	trapped	between	the	American	and	Red	Army	lines.	The	housing	shortage	continued	after	the	war.	See	K.C.	Fuhrer’s	“Managing	Scarcity:	The	German	Housing	Shortage	and	the	Controlled	Economy,	1914-1990,”	German	History,	Volume	13,	Issue	3,	1995:	326-354.			
	 	 	58		
Enemy:	German	Reconstruction	and	the	Invention	of	the	West,	Patrick	Jackson	takes	the	creation	of	a	“New	Germany”	a	step	further,	by	arguing	that	not	only	was	society	remade,	but	also	the	creation	of	a	rhetorically	created	“West”	that	was	used	throughout	the	postwar	period	as	a	distinction	from	the	Soviet	Union.	By	“civilizing	the	enemy,”	Germany	now	had	a	postwar	place	in	the	West,	but	unfortunately	for	POWs,	this	transition	would	create	only	seemingly	contradictory	realities	inside	the	new	“western”	Germany.32		As	more	POWs	expressed	a	desire	for	repatriation,	British	officials	faced	a	dilemma:	how	should	they	distinguish	POWs	who	were	soon	to	be	repatriated	from	the	rest	of	the	POW	population,	who	had	either	not	yet	been	approved,	or	who	had	not	expressed	a	desire	to	return?	British	officials	also	faced	enormous	pressure	from	various	Christian	relief	organizations,	particularly	those	involving	German	pastors,	to	create	preparatory	measures	to	ready	POWs	for	their	reintegration	into	German	society.	Designed	as	so-called	“transition	camps”	used	in	the	period	between	the	permanently	established	bases	and	an	eventual	return	to	Germany,	these	camps	were	populated	only	by	those	who	were	to	be	repatriated	in	the	ensuing	month.	They	housed	approximately	1000	POWs	at	a	time,	typically	for	two	weeks,	at	which	point	they	were	shipped	out	and	another	unit	arrived.33	Transition	camps	were	used	with	great	frequency;	in	November	1947,	German	POWs	occupied	several	different	locations	including	Camp	186,	which	could	house	multiple	units	at	one	time.34		
																																																								32	Patrick	Jackson,	Civilizing	the	Enemy:	German	Reconstruction	and	the	Invention	of	the	West,	Ann	Arbor:	University	of	Michigan	Press,	2006.		33	LMA/4288/D/04/032:	12.	For	instance,	one	unit	stayed	in	Camp	186	from	November	16th-23rd	in	1947,	at	which	point	they	were	shipped	to	Germany.		34	Ibid:	12.		
	 	 	59			 The	transition	camps	became	critical	locations	where	German	pastors	could	make	their	mark	on	the	POWs.	German	pastors,	as	part	of	their	mission	to	regain	the	credibility	of	German	churches	in	the	postwar	period,	saw	the	transition	camps	as	an	opportunity	not	only	to	prepare	POWs	for	reentry	into	society,	but	also	as	settings	in	which	to	evangelize	many	of	the	young	POWs.	Pastor	Jentsch	negotiated	with	the	British	Council	of	Churches	and	the	British	War	Office	to	bring	Bishop	Wilhelm	Stählin	to	Britain	to	speak	with	the	POWs.35	As	a	prominent	and	powerful	Confessing	Church	member,	Jentsch	argued	that	Stählin	would	create	not	only	a	positive	representation	of	the	Evangelical	Church	in	Germany	(EKD),	but	credibility	for	the	German	pastor	mission	in	the	POW	camps.36	Furthermore,	Jentsch	argued	that	in	the	current	political	situation,	involving	the	alienation	of	these	German	churches	from	Christian	reconstruction	efforts	by	the	larger	religious	community,	he	hoped	that	proposals	for	greater	cooperation	would	be	heard	and	liked,	particularly	those	that	incorporated	British	church	networks.			 One	of	the	mediums	through	which	pastors	sought	to	get	involved	with	POWs	was	through	their	“young	youth	leaders’	course,”	which	was	designed	to	increase	both	the	moral	and	religious	competencies	of	young	POWs	on	the	list	for	repatriation.37	Jentsch	described	a	timeline	for	the	youth	leader	course	and	the	eventual	examination	period,	which	was	to	be	done	by	various	pastors	that	Jentsch	and	other	officials	had	recruited.	The	examination	period	would	take	place	over	a	period	of	one	month,	and	included	both	written	and	oral	examinations.	The	written	exams,	taking	place	from	March	15-19	required	
																																																								35	LMA/4288/D/04/028:	46.		36	Ibid:	46.		37		Ibid:	46.	Jugendleiter	kurs	means	“young	youth	leaders	course.”	
	 	 	60		that	the	POWs	write	an	essay	every	night,	and	complete	exercises	on	catechesis.38	Furthermore,	POWs	were	instructed	on	cultural	patronage,	dogmatic	theology,	and	exegesis.39	This	period	was	followed	by	oral	exams	from	March	22	to	March	24,	administered	by	pastors	who	were	brought	in	from	Germany.	Pastor	Jentsch	himself	led	the	
Jugendseelsorge	or	“youth	minister”	exam;	Pastor	Stange	led	the	Old	and	New	Testament	exam;	and	Pastor	Burket	led	the	dogmatic	theology	exam.40	Non-church	officials	were	also	involved	in	the	process.	Mr.	Miethke	administered	the	“cultural	patronage”	tests	and	Mr.	Labs	administered	the	“social	questions”	exam.41	The	express	purpose	of	these	exams	was	not	only	to	help	the	POWs	to	improve	their	moral	and	religious	competencies,	but	to	show	the	positive	aspects	of	German	church	programs	to	the	POWs,	and	the	other	religious	groups	watching	the	German	efforts.	Throughout	the	trainings,	German	pastors	began	not	only	to	analyze	POWs	response	to	repatriation,	but	to	plant	the	seeds	of	the	Christian	transcontinental	network	that	would	emerge	in	the	postwar	period.	Led	by	German	pastors,	a	new	network	would	connect	both	British	and	the	West	German	world,	as	the	German	pastors	hoped	to	reshape	Christianity	and	save	immoral	Germany	from	rising	atheist	communism.42																																																										38	Catechesis	is	a	religious	instruction	given	to	a	person	in	preparation	for	Christian	baptism	or	confirmation.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	pastors	use	the	term	“catechesis,”	to	describe	the	lessons	given	to	the	POWs,	as	if	they	viewed	the	POWs	as	unbaptized.	This	was	not	actually	the	case,	as	the	vast	majority	of	Germans	during	this	period	were	baptized	before	adulthood,	suggesting	that	German	pastors	viewed	the	POWs	as	needing	to	be	rebaptized,	before	they	returned	to	Germany.	The	process	of	“rebaptizing”	is	one	employed	by	Protestant	faiths	when	a	member	is	viewed	to	have	lapsed	in	their	religious	commitment.		39	“Dogmatic	theology”	is	the	part	of	theology	dealing	with	the	theoretical	truths	of	faith	concerning	God	and	God’s	works,	while	“exegesis”	is	the	critical	of	scripture.		40	Pastor	Stange	is	likely	Erich	Stange,	a	German	YMCA	leader	later	expelled	from	the	NSDAP	in	1933	when	he	protested	against	the	Hitler	Youth.	He	later	worked	for	the	Universal	Christian	Council	for	Life	and	work.	Pastor	Burket	could	not	be	identified.		41	LMA/4288/D/04/028:	50.		42	Wyneken,	Religion	and	the	Cold	War:	19.	
	 	 	61			 In	order	to	prepare	for	repatriation,	German	pastors	also	included	in	the	curriculum	educational	elements	of	a	more	practical	nature,	designed	to	help	prepare	POWs	for	a	return	to	a	very	different	Germany.	In	lectures	given	by	Padre	Pompe	from	Luebeck	on	request	from	the	YMCA,	POWs	were	forced	to	consider	issues	that	would	plague	the	German	populace	as	they	struggled	to	rebuild	the	German	state.	Pompe	created	lectures	titled,	“Relief	at	Work	in	Postwar	Germany,”	“What	is	Germany	Expecting	from	You?,”	What	Did	We	Learn	From	the	Last	War?,”	and	“What	Do	You	Intend	to	Do	in	the	Future?”43	These	lectures	found	“a	very	strong	interest,”	and	Pompe	acted	at	the	disposal	of	POWs,	who	were	encouraged	to	discuss	problems	with	him	of	a	private	or	general	interest.	POWs	from	eastern	Germany,	or	those	with	families	belonging	in	the	category	of	“refugees,”	such	as	those	from	newly-occupied	Soviet	territory,	were	invited	to	attend	smaller	discussion	sections	in	order	to	help	prepare	them	for	that	new	reality.	German	pastors,	while	highly	focused	on	evangelizing	the	POWs,	still	made	sure	that	pragmatic	considerations	were	taken	for	the	POWs	in	order	to	help	prepare	them	to	be	productive	members	of	German	society.44			 The	response	to	the	transition	camps,	particularly	those	for	the	younger	POWs,	was	fairly	positive.	Director	John	Barwick	of	the	War	Prisoners’	Aid	for	Great	Britain	stated	that	he	“had	heard	quite	a	lot	about	the	importance	of	this	Youth	camp,”	and	that	he	“was	not	disappointed	in	his	expectations,”	upon	visiting	from	July	16	to	18	in	1947.45	Barwick	remarked	that	while	the	POWs	did	not	voluntarily	come	to	the	camp,	“the	astonishing																																																																																																																																																																																				43	LMA/4288/D/04/032:	8.		44	Ibid:	8.		45	LMA/4288/D/04/028:	69.	The	War	Prisoners’	Aid	for	Great	Britain	was	part	of	the	YMCA,	and	John	Barwick	would	later	serve	as	secretary	for	the	War	Prisoners’	Aid	fund.		
	 	 	62		success	of	sound	re-education	that	has	been	reached.”	Barwick’s	opinions	were	not	entirely	echoed	by	the	pastors	who	were	directly	involved	in	the	camp,	particularly	Pastor	Jentsch,	who	stated	that	“as	a	German,”	he	expected	“to	find	open	ears.	But	at	first…	[he	found]	disappointment.”46	Jentsch,	who	was	responsible	for	assessing	the	success	of	the	camp	and	leading	some	of	the	discussion	sections	in	the	camps,	tried	to	“demonstrate	some	of	the	problems”	that	he	had	observed	in	German	youth	at	home.	However,	he	was	met	by	“cold	silence	and	icy	reserve.”	Jentsch	did	not	totally	blame	the	POWs,	instead	noting	that	they	probably	feared	an	interrogation	or	even	worse,	a	new	ideological	captor.	Jentsch	stated,	“nobody	wants	to	be	taken	in	by	new	ideologies	after	having	been	disappointed	so	bitterly	by	National	Socialism.”47	While	the	POWs	displayed	some	initial	resistance	to	Jentsch’s	methods,	he	did	experience	greater	success	as	he	built	a	personal	relationship	with	the	camp.	Jentsch	barely	scratched	the	surface	of	the	complications	of	the	German	soldier	psyche,	and	this	topic	has	been	a	source	of	debate	for	historians	throughout	the	past	fifty	years.	Psychologists	themselves	have	gotten	involved	in	the	debate,	arguing	that	German	soldiers	in	the	postwar	period	experienced	a	form	a	paranoid	psychosis	delirium,	in	which	a	subject’s	ideological	fanaticism	“cannot	handle	criticism	and	leads	them	to	commit	against	the	prevailing	social	norm.”48		 The	transition	camps,	designed	as	processing	facilities	for	POWs,	provide	a	unique	look	into	the	psyche	of	younger	POWs,	particularly	as	they	experienced	the	religious	teachings	of	the	German	pastors.	Jentsch	worked	to	disprove	the	notion	that	the	young	Germans	were	“nihilists,”	and	that	National	Socialism	had	left	them	too	damaged.	Jentsch,																																																									46	Ibid:	69.		47	Ibid:	69.	48	SM	Lopez	and	G	Jemar,	“Speaking	of	Delusions	and	Passion	of	Clearambault:	the	Nazi	Soldier,”	
European	Psychiatry,	Volume	30,	2015:	1.		
	 	 	63		on	the	contrary,	argued	that	the	POWs	had	questions,	and	“only	should	be	awakened…to	be	taken	seriously,	as	men,	in	their	own	private	humanity.”49	Jentsch	believed	that	if	the	POWs	were	placed	in	the	“light	of	God,”	their	humanity	could	be	returned.	It	was	impossible	to	ignore,	according	to	Jentsch,	“that	in	the	Third	Reich	the	individual	and	his	private	life	were	not	taken	seriously	by	any	means,	for	ideological	reasons.”50	When	asked	about	their	experiences	under	the	Third	Reich,	POWs	stated	that	they	often	experienced	guilt,	which	Jentsch	attributed	to	“a	feeling	for	Good	or	Evil	that	is	obviously	not	dead	among	young	men.”51	The	German	pastors	believed	that	through	“spiritual	radicalization,”	POWs	could	break	through	to	a	greater	honesty	towards	their	own	guilt.	Jentsch	wrote	in	July	1947,	“the	younger	he	is	[the	POW]	the	more	open	for	a	Christian	explanation	of	history.	If	you	explain	it	in	a	comprehensive	manner,	he	will	be	spared	the	danger	of	cheap	nihilism.”52	Jentsch	did	not	speak	of	a	spiritual	absolution	of	the	soldiers’	actions,	which	would	have	likely	infuriated	his	British	counterparts.	Instead,	Jentsch	seems	to	argue	that	the	only	hope	for	POWs	was	an	acknowledgement	of	the	savagery	of	their	actions,	and	a	tangible	desire	to	move	forward	and	reshape	the	world	in	a	more	positive	way.	POWs	still	retained	the	
																																																								49	LMA/4288/D/04/028:	70.		50	Ibid:	70.	51	Ibid:	72.	When	Jentsch	conducted	these	surveys	in	July	1947	in	the	POW	youth	transition	camps,	names	were	not	requested	in	order	to	preserve	a	degree	of	privacy	for	the	POWs.	This	adds	a	greater	credibility	to	the	POW	responses,	because	there	was	not	a	potential	for	punishment	based	on	their	answers.	It	is	also	worth	noting	here	that	much	of	the	“German	guilt”	was	attributed	to	“survivor’s	guilt.”	One	POW	described	in	great	detail	the	sinking	of	the	Scharnhorst,	a	German	capital	ship	of	the	German’s	Kriegsmarine,	which	was	sunk	by	the	British	Royal	Navy’s	HMS	Duke	of	York	in	1943.	The	POW	wrote,	“my	salvation	from	the	death	of	drowning	which	I	could	not	grasp	with	my	mind,	appeared	a	miracle	to	me.	Why	did	he	save	me,	just	me,	as	one	of	36	out	of	2,000?”	Guilt	over	atrocities	committed,	as	discussed	in	Christopher	Browning’s	Ordinary	Men,	often	did	not	occur	during	the	war	or	during	the	immediate	postwar	period,	if	at	all.	That	guilt	would	only	emerge	later	on	during	the	German	period	of	vergangenheitsbewältigung	in	the	1960s	and	on.	See	also	Raphael	Gross,	“Relegating	Nazism	to	the	Past:	Expressions	of	German	Guilt	in	1945	and	Beyond,”	German	History,	Volume	25,	Issue	2,	2007:	219-238.		52	Ibid:	73.	
	 	 	64		capacity	to	ask	questions,	“of	the	deepest	problems	of	heaven	and	earth,”	leading	pastors	to	believe	that	“there	is	still	hope	for	an	inner	regeneration	of	German	youth.”	The	pastors	believed	that	it	was	their	duty	to	take	the	situation	of	the	POWs	seriously,	because	Christianity	had	something	to	offer	POWs:	hope	“given	to	him	in	the	right	form.”53	There	is	an	undeniable	political	element	to	the	statement	of	“hope	given	in	the	right	form.54”	For	German	pastors,	they	saw	their	spiritual	message	as	the	only	way	to	not	only	redeem	soldiers,	but	to	redeem	Europe	in	the	face	of	atheistic	communism.	Because	of	the	atrocities	of	fascism,	communism	was	an	attractive	option	to	the	disillusioned	youth	of	Europe.55	The	pastors	aimed	to	reshape	the	direction	of	that	hope.		
Pastor	Involvement	in	POW	Reintegration	into	Germany	Although	Anglo-German	pastors	often	supported	the	repatriation	of	interned	Germans,	many	pastors	harbored	serious	concerns	about	what	would	happen	to	these	soldiers	once	they	returned	to	Germany,	and	with	good	reason.	In	a	letter	from	the	German	Church	Chancellery	in	April	1947,	pastors	worried	that	“those	whose	home…no	longer	existed,	or	exists	in	the	Russian	Zone,	would	be	excluded	from	exchange,	or	very	unfairly	placed.”56	The	creation	of	the	Soviet	zone	of	occupation,	and	the	subsequent	severing	of	relations	led	to	hunger,	mass	violence,	and	a	stagnation	of	development.	Combined	with	the	ill	treatment	of	German	soldiers	in	the	Soviet	Union,	German	pastors	were	extremely	hesitant	about	trying	to	send	POWs	back	to	their	Eastern	homes;	those	concerns	were	
																																																								53	Ibid:	75.	54	Ibid:	75.	55	The	German	film,	Das	Wunder	von	Bern	created	by	Sönke	Wortmann	in	2003	details	the	appeal	of	communism	to	the	disillusioned	youth	of	Germany,	particularly	to	those	that	had	parents	who	supported	the	Nazis	or	fought	in	the	war.			56	LMA/4288/A/03/003,	11	April	1947:	55.	This	in	particular	refers	to	the	challenges	faced	by	German	pastors	attempting	to	restart	their	parishes	in	Germany.		
	 	 	65		amplified	as	the	prospect	of	dividing	Germany	seemed	to	be	more	of	a	reality	in	1947.57	Instead,	the	pastors	decided	to	try	and	resettle	them	in	the	west.		The	lack	of	an	“evident	central	authority”	also	led	to	huge	challenges	in	repatriation	efforts,	which	the	British	Council	of	Churches,	Inter-Church	Aid	and	Refugee	Service	attempted	to	eliminate.	Under	the	guidance	of	Pastor	Bethge,	an	informal	British-German	Conference	was	held	in	London	to	assess	“what	has	been	done	during	the	year	on	British-German	relations,”	in	an	attempt	to	remedy	difficulties	of	settling	prisoners	back	in	Germany.	Pastor	Höckheler	expressed	deep	concerns	over	the	23,000	German	POWs	who	arrived	to	Germany	in	July	1948,	who	were	given	“civilian	status.”	The	British	Council	of	Churches	and	other	pastor	groups	supervised	many	of	the	men,	but	Höckheler	worried	about	how	well	they	could	continue	to	provide	for	POWs	at	the	rate	of	repatriation.	As	repatriation	increased,	the	demands	on	pastors	grew,	spreading	thin	their	resources.58		In	The	Bitter	Road	to	Freedom:	A	New	History	of	the	Liberation	of	Europe,	William	Hitchcock	writes	“however	much	we	wish	to	assign	[Allied	victory]	a	benevolent	nature,	liberation	came	to	Europe	in	a	storm	of	destruction	and	death.”	The	postwar	homeland	to	which	German	POWs	returned	was	one	ransacked	by	violence,	shelled	and	bombed,	with	towns,	cities,	schools,	hospitals,	and	ports	all	annihilated	by	the	Allied	force.	The	difficulty	of	the	transition	was	unimaginable.	An	example	of	this	is	the	case	of	a	prisoner	named	Erich	Engers,	who	was	released	and	repatriated	by	the	British	government	back	to	Germany	in	1948.	In	a	letter	from	Reverend	Burlingham	to	Dekan	Rieger,	Burlingham	discussed	his	fears	of	what	would	happen	to	Engers.	He	described	Engers	as	having	not	seen	his	German	family	for	nine	years;	“he	professed	a	strong	desire”	to	“remain	in	this	country	[Britain]	and																																																									57	Wyneken,	Religion	and	the	Cold	War:	19.	58	LMA/4288/D/04/019,	23	February	1948:	13.		
	 	 	66		convert	to	the	Anglican	Church.”59	Engers	clearly	responded	positively	to	the	involvement	of	the	German	immigrant	community	and	wanted	to	remain	in	Britain.	However,	the	British	government	would	eventually	force	him	to	return	to	Germany;	still,	the	support	for	Engers	did	not	end	at	that	point.	Instead,	Burlingham	noted	Engers’	exact	address	in	the	American	zone,	and	encouraged	Rieger	to	send	what	aid	he	could.	Rieger	offered	detail	that	he	had	written	to	the	pastor	in	the	Wiesbaden-Bieberich	area	where	Engers	lived,	and	had	arranged	a	“hearty	welcome	from	the	local	congregation.”60	Instead	of	abandoning	Engers	once	he	landed	on	German	soil,	the	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer	Kirche	and	other	German	congregations	located	in	Britain	continued	to	support	the	POWs	throughout	their	reintegration	process.		Visits	to	Germany	by	London	pastors	proved	that	the	POW	mission	did	not	end	on	the	British	Isles.	Rev.	Birger	Forell	visited	Germany	from	April	29th	to	May	26th	of	1947,	visiting	different	hotspots	of	repatriation	including	Hamburg,	Stuttgart	and	Munich,	and	garnering	the	support	of	international	relief	organizations	such	as	the	War	Prisoners	Aid	of	the	YMCA,	the	World	Alliance	of	the	YMCA,	the	United	States	Religious	Affairs	Branch	of	Berlin,	and	various	pastoral	groups.	He	also	met	with	various	POWs,	such	as	Admiral	Lohnmanr	who	was	resettled	in	Cuxhaven	in	January	1947,	in	order	to	discuss	his	transition	back	into	German	society.	Throughout	his	trip,	Forell	was	struck	by	the	problems	of	searching	for	relatives,	a	general	absence	of	jobs,	and	a	sense	of	depression	and	unhappiness.61	Forell	visited	one	London-German	attempt	to	combat	these	problems:	the	Espelkamp,	located	in	North	Rhine-Westphalia.	Espelkamp	was	a	renovated	munitions																																																									59	Ibid,	23	February	1948:	14.	60	Ibid,	23	February	1948:	14.	61	LMA/4288/D/04/025,	25	May	1947:	10.	
	 	 	67		factory	in	which	London	and	German	donors	had	contributed	over	two	million	Reichmarks	to	create	a	working	and	recuperation	center	for	interned	German	POWs.	This	center	was	designed	to	bolster	the	previously	fragile	networks	that	had	connected	London’s	German	migrants	to	various	different	parts	of	the	country.	By	providing	the	backbone	necessary,	Forell	hoped	that	Espelkamp	would	be	able	to	recreate	the	bonds	that	existed	between	the	German	camps	and	Anglo-German	society	in	Britain,	once	the	German	POWs	returned	home.62	Those	connections	continued	once	various	soldiers	were	repatriated,	creating	a	basis	for	communication	established	as	the	Cold	War	loomed.	This	critical	communication	network	would	also	provide	information	about	opportunities	in	Britain	and	London,	which	would	encourage	the	mass	migration	networks	that	show	up	in	the	coming	decades.	That	network	would	give	Germans	the	confidence	to	uproot	their	lives	and	move	to	London	with	the	aid	of	groups	like	the	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer	Kirche.63		The	critical	communication	can	be	seen	most	poignantly	in	a	letter	to	Reverend	Burlingham	from	Dekan	Rieger	during	a	visit	to	Germany	in	1948.	He	wrote	on	one	of	the	most	extraordinary	parts	of	his	journey	to	Germany;	“I	met	everywhere	people	who	had	belonged	to	a	camp	congregation,”	and	they	“remembered	the	special	kind	of	Christian	fellowship	with	which	they	had	enjoyed	in	this	country”.64	Critically,	German	POWs	not	only	received	favorable	treatment	in	the	camps,	but	they	also	remembered	that	treatment	once	they	returned	to	Germany.	While	undoubtedly	experiencing	anger	and	frustration	with	their	internment	experience,	POWs	instead	focused	on	the	positive	support	from	the	British-German	communities.	Unquestionably	self-serving	and	potentially	disingenuous,																																																									62	Ibid,	25	May	1947:	11.	63	Weber-Newth	and	Steinert,	German	Migrants	in	Postwar	Britain.		64	LMA/4288/D/04/019,	4	June	1948:	18.	
	 	 	68		the	evidence	seems	to	support	the	notion	that	the	POWs	did	have	some	positive	memories	and	associations	with	Britain.	Rieger	would	continue	on	to	write	about	his	trip	to	Göttingen,	where	he	met	“no	less	than	twelve	former	students	at	Norton	Camp,”	including	a	student	of	theology	from	Camp	147	whom	he	encountered	on	a	train	to	Berlin.65			These	encounters	were	not	limited	to	one	singular	community	in	Germany,	but	instead	reinforce	the	idea	that	these	kinds	of	networks	spread	from	London	across	the	entirety	of	Germany,	even	in	the	more	difficult	east.		Those	bonds	would	continue	to	be	reinforced	by	Rieger,	who	said	himself	that	it	was	of	the	utmost	importance	to	strengthen	“the	invisible	but	real	bonds,”	in	his	letter	to	Burlingham.	Rieger	encouraged	the	immediate	creation	of	a	list	with	the	names	of	all	camp	chaplains	who	were	now	living	in	Germany	to	be	sent	back	to	London	in	order	to	reinforce	the	network	they	had	created.	Burlingham	replied	almost	immediately,	with	an	effusive	enthusiasm	for	the	list,	which	would	come	to	include	over	500	pastors	who	could	act	as	contacts	for	various	German	communities	across	the	Continent.	This	letter	proves	that	the	linkages	between	German	POWs	and	their	British	church	benefactors	did	not	end	after	the	war,	but	continued	into	the	rebuilding	efforts	of	the	Cold	War.	These	efforts	were	sustained	and	expanded	vastly	beyond	the	initial	scope	of	the	POW	camps	in	Britain.		However,	the	prisoners	who	did	decide	to	return	to	Germany	took	with	them	not	only	a	positive	response	towards	the	community	they	encountered,	but	also	memories	of	the	systems	put	in	place	to	help	them.	Those	connections	did	not	stop	once	the	prisoners	returned	to	Germany,	but	rather	continued	as	Anglo-German	pastors	helped	the	men	get	reestablished	in	their	homes.																																																									65	Ibid,	4	June	1948:	18.	
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Conclusion		 Inside	the	uncertainty	of	the	postwar	period	sat	the	German	pastors,	whose	credibility	with	their	British	Anglican	and	Western	allies	was	damaged	in	the	aftermath	of	German	Protestant	complicity	in	the	Nazi	Regime.	In	this	turmoil	and	external	disapproval,	bordering	on	disgust,	the	pastors	recognized	that	a	dramatic	effort	would	be	needed	to	change	the	global	perception	of	German	Protestant	Christianity	internationally.	Led	by	German	Lutherans,	members	of	the	Confessing	Church,	pastors	who	fled	Nazi	persecution	and	allies	of	a	Protestant	renewal,	German	pastors	saw	one	opportunity	to	revitalize	their	church	and	German	society	through	the	evangelizing	of	POWs.	The	German	pastors	worked	to	prepare	POWs	not	only	for	life	in	Germany,	and	spread	their	religious	teachings	among	them.	As	the	POWs	returned	home,	German	pastors	with	the	aid	of	British	networks,	created	a	system	of	aid	to	help	ease	the	transition	into	society,	by	providing	dislocated	POWs	with	employment,	shelter,	and	food.	Through	their	aid	networks,	German	pastors	would	also	create	the	avenues	for	communication	and	connection	between	Britain	and	Germany	that	would	be	essential	during	the	Cold	War.	When	the	war	ended,	the	real	fight	began	for	German	pastors:	remaking	the	image	of	German	Protestantism	into	something	that	could	be	a	force	for	positive	change	in	the	postwar	world.		As	the	threat	of	communism	continued	to	loom,	pastors	made	every	effort	to	use	a	theological	argument	to	heal	POWs	and	reshape	German	Protestantism.			 		
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	 In	May	1947,	Pastor	Werner	Jentsch	had	a	front	row	seat	at	one	of	the	largest	ecumenical	events	of	the	year	in	Britain	as	pastors,	politicians,	and	human	rights	activists	converged	on	the	Norton	Camp	to	discuss	the	state	of	German	POW	treatment.	In	his	reports	back	to	the	German	Young	Men’s	Christian	Association,	which	he	headed,	making	him	part	of	the	official	German	delegation	invited	to	the	meeting,	he	described	the	influx	of	Allied	personnel,	headed	by	the	British	Young	Men’s	Christian	Association	and	General-Secretary	Sir	Frank	Willis.1	The	General	Secretary	arrived	with	“great	ceremony”	and	led	an	entourage	of	well-connected	people,	which	contrasted	with	the	comparatively	small	German	delegation.2	Clearly	put	off	by	the	fanfare,	Pastor	Jentsch	instead	began	speaking	with	Pastor	Rieger,	his	close	friend,	who	then	introduced	him	to	Reverend	Burlingham	and	Dr.	Hirschwald	of	the	British	Council	of	Churches.3	The	event	was	a	who’s	who	of	religious	personnel,	and	even	included	various	professors	such	as	Professor	K.L.	Schmidt	and	representatives	of	the	YMCA	at	the	North	Camp.	However,	by	far	the	most	distinguished	guest	was	Dr.	John	Mott,	the	long-serving	leader	of	the	YMCA,	who	had	just	received	the	Nobel	Peace	Prize	in	1946	for	his	work	on	establishing	and	strengthening	international	Protestant	Christian	organizations	to	promote	peace.	As	the	last	guests	arrived	at	the	event,	the	real	work	could	begin:	discussing	the	state	of	German	POW	treatment	in	Britain.			 The	speakers	during	the	Norton	Camp	meeting	began	by	acknowledging	the	treacherous	situation	in	Germany.	With	deep	concerns	regarding	employment,	denazification,	and	scattered	families,	Pastor	Jentsch	recognized	the	seemingly	
																																																								1	The	German	acronym	for	YMCA	is	CVJM,	but	for	the	ease	of	reading	and	translation,	I	will	use	the	English	“YMCA.”	The	British	YMCA	supported	displaced	people,	refugees,	and	prisoners	of	war	during	the	Second	World	War,	and	had	been	in	operation	for	over	one	hundred	years.		2	LMA/4288/D/04/028:	5.		3	Ibid:	5.		
	 	 	72		insurmountable	challenges	involved	in	rebuilding	Germany.4	However,	Pastor	Jentsch	argued,	if	the	British	YMCA	and	other	Christian	groups	worked	together	to	support	the	mission	of	helping	prepare	POWs	for	an	eventual	return	home,	they	could	begin	to	repair	the	linkage	between	Britain	and	Germany.5	Critically,	Pastor	Jentsch	stated	that	Germany	was	in	no	position	to	support	the	incoming	POWs	and	that	for	the	time	being,	Britain	must	continue	to	support	the	German	POWs	and	begin	to	truly	integrate	them	into	society	for	the	first	time.			 This	chapter	contends	that	while	some	German	POWs	expressed	a	desire	to	stay	in	Britain,	they	faced	many	challenges	in	the	postwar	period;	however,	German	pastors	stepped	into	the	dislocation	of	the	postwar	world	to	help	rebuild	the	POWs	humanity	within	Britain.	In	Group	Captives,	Henry	Faulk	writes	that	the	pastors’	feared	the	“militarism	bred	in	[the	POWs’]	soul.”6	The	pastors	deepened	their	assessment	of	POWs	by	not	just	preparing	them	for	repatriation,	but	by	trying	to	understand	their	feelings	and	expectations	about	the	process.	With	conflicted	feelings	for	both	Britain	and	their	German	homeland,	POWs	expressed	strong	feelings	of	dislocation,	trapped	between	a	British	government	that	no	longer	wanted	them,	and	a	highly	uncertain	homecoming.	For	many	German	POWs,	isolation	from	home	and	a	lack	of	desire	to	return	to	Germany	motivated	them	to	stay	in	Britain	and	become	part	of	the	British	rebuilding	era.	However,	the	British	authorities	believed	the	German	POWs	were	overstaying	their	welcome,	and	put	up	many	barriers	that	made	it	difficult	for	POWs	to	find	permanent	employment.	Into	this	void	stepped	the	German	pastors	once	again,	in	order	to	aid	German	POWs	with	adjustment	to																																																									4	Ibid:	6.	Judt,	Postwar:	52-61.		5	Ibid:	6.		6	Faulk,	Group	Captives:	14.		
	 	 	73		British	society.	Furthermore,	the	next	section	will	argue	that	the	populations	of	Britain	with	a	stake	in	the	“POW	question,”	such	as	German	migrants,	politicians	working	on	the	POW	issue,	labor	unions,	and	British	citizens	who	had	interacted	with	the	POWs,	had	highly	varied	and	heated	opinions	on	the	future	of	German	POWs	in	Britain.	Editorials	from	prominent	British	national	and	local	newspapers	reveal	not	only	a	strong	group	of	support	for	German	POW	integration	into	British	society,	but	also	a	questioning	by	some	parts	of	the	British	population	of	the	morality	of	continuing	to	employ	POWs	without	pay.		As	the	atrocities	of	the	Second	World	War	came	to	light,	some	British	citizens	began	to	question	their	own	complicity	because	of	the	mistreatment	of	POWs.	On	the	opposing	side,	the	landslide	victory	of	the	Labour	Party	in	1945	seemed	to	bring	a	mandate	for	raised	wages	and	employment	standards,	causing	large	agricultural	industries	to	turn	once	again	to	unemployed	POWs	willing	to	work	for	lower	earnings	as	temporary	workers	as	a	way	to	avoid	these	new	coming	standards.7	These	economic	and	moral	considerations	were	coupled	with	a	still	hostile	attitude	towards	the	“ethnic	German,”	and	whether	or	not	a	German	could	have	a	place	in	British	society.8	However,	these	two	conversations	took	place	inside	two	larger	debates	occurring	in	British	society	at	the	time.	In	Now	the	War	is	Over,	Paul	Addison	describes	the	public	debate	in	Britain	post-1945	as	centering	in	two	main																																																									7	Arthur	Marwick,	British	Society	Since	1945,	London:	Pelican	Books,	1982:	27-39.	Kynaston,	
Austerity	Britain:	454-56.	The	Labour	Party,	while	having	a	historically	intimate	link	with	trade	unions,	did	have	to	fend	off	fairly	consistent	internal	threats	from	communist	sympathizers,	particularly	in	the	electrical	industry.	The	perception	of	communist	influences	seemed	to	“weaken	the	authority	of	the	trade	unions,”	especially	after	1950.		8	Berghahn,	Continental	Britons:	127.	These	considerations	were	further	complicated	by	the	status	of	Jewish	refugees.	At	first,	Western	states	treated	Jewish	displaced	persons	like	other	refugees,	corralling	them	at	times	in	camps	with	their	former	persecutors.	However,	after	1945,	President	Roosevelt	of	the	United	States	led	the	call	for	separate	Jewish	camps	because	the	“refusal	to	recognize	the	Jews…has	the	effect…of	closing	one’s	eyes	to	their	former	and	more	barbaric	persecution.”	See	“Letter	from	President	Truman	to	General	Eisenhower	on	the	Treatment	of	displaced	Jews	in	the	U.S.	Zone,”	29	September	1945.	Coupled	with	the	inability	to	return	Jews	to	the	east,	Britain,	the	United	States,	and	Israel	would	bear	the	majority	of	the	displaced	Jews.		
	 	 	74		veins:	the	war	itself,	and	the	peacetime	future	at	home.9	German	POWs	were	unique	in	that	they	straddled	both	of	these	discussions,	making	them	a	point	of	interest	for	the	British	population.		This	tumultuous	debate	not	only	reflected	a	British	population	concerned	with	their	postwar	legacy,	but	also	their	increasing	concerns	about	Britain’s	moral,	economic,	and	political	authority	in	the	postwar	world.10	Finally,	beneath	the	heated	debate	of	the	British	populace,	German	POWs	struggled	to	find	a	place	in	the	postwar	world.	For	many	of	the	POWs,	life	outside	of	the	camp	was	shocking	and	dislocating,	and	while	an	improved	economic	status	may	have	alleviated	the	pain,	the	German	POWs	still	struggled	to	identify	Britain	as	a	“homeland”	as	opposed	to	Germany.	Particularly	after	the	emergence	of	a	divided	Germany	in	1948,	with	American	influence	dominating	the	larger,	western	segment	and	Soviet	influence	in	the	East,	the	POWs	would	return	to	a	home	totally	different	from	the	one	they	left.11	Once	again,	German	pastors	stepped	into	the	void,	to	begin	to	assess	the	damage	done	to	the	POWs.	Through	both	individual	interviews	and	familial	reconnection,	German	pastors	began	to	rebuild	German	humanity	inside	of	Britain	and	give	the	coming	waves	of	German	migration	a	waypoint.		For	German	migrants,	including	German	Jews,	and	German	POWs	in	Britain,	London	offered	an	opportunity	to	start	a	new	life.12	Over	60,000	Germans	migrated	to	Britain	from	1945	to	1951,	and	an	additional	15,000	ex-POWs	decided	to	remain	in	the	United	
																																																								9	Paul	Addison,	Now	the	War	is	Over,	London:	British	Broadcasting	Corporation,	1985:	1.		10	Judt,	Postwar:	206.		11	Ibid:	206.			12	See	previous	discussion	from	19-21	on	German	Jewish	migration	and	German	migrants.		
	 	 	75		Kingdom.13	The	German	POWs	who	arrived	in	Britain	during	the	war	and	were	interned	through	the	immediate	post-war	years,	experienced	a	hint	of	what	the	British	community	had	to	offer	them.	With	a	high	demand	for	labor	and	an	established,	ethnic	German	community	of	over	300,000	people,	70,000	of	which	had	been	in	Britain	since	before	the	First	World	War,	many	POWs	questioned	if	repatriation	to	Germany	would	be	a	step	forward,	and	instead	could	lead	to	an	even	more	uncertain	future.14	German	POWs	began	to	weigh	their	options,	setting	an	uncertain	return	to	a	ruined	Germany,	against	a	permanent	relocation	in	a	divided	Britain.		
Legal	and	Political	Concerns	of	the	British	Government	for	Remaining	POWs			 As	the	war	ended,	the	British	faced	a	huge	manpower	problem.	With	over	400,000	German	POWs	interned	in	Britain,	the	Government	had	to	reconcile	this	foreign,	unpaid	manpower,	with	the	returning	British	soldiers	who	were	demanding	employment.	Desperate	to	promote	repatriation	while	not	crippling	the	economy	by	removing	labor	too	fast,	the	British	government	began	to	expedite	the	process	of	POW	return	to	Germany.	In	a	transcript	of	a	Parliamentary	debate	about	the	German	POWs	published	in	The	Manchester	
Guardian	on	January	21st,	1948,	Secretary	for	War	Emanuel	Shinwell	stated	“repatriation	has	been	going	at	a	rate	of	about	15,000	a	month	for	over	a	year,	and	all	those	who	desire	
																																																								13	Weber-Newth	and	Steinert,	German	Migrants	in	Post-War	Britain:	18.	The	number	of	migrants	included	both	Jewish	displaced	persons	and	German	refugees	throughout	Europe	fleeing	the	destruction	of	the	continent.		14	See	Judt,	Postwar:	19,	for	his	comments	on	the	“humiliated,	diminished	status	of	German	males	–	reduced	from	the	supermen	of	Hitler’s	burnished	armies	to	a	ragged	group	of	belatedly	returning	prisoners.”	Coupled	with	a	tense	local	situation	in	which	all	ethnicities	and	religions	continued	to	fight	each	other,	exemplified	in	the	Massacre	of	Jedwabne,	where	Poles	massacred	Jews,	there	was	not	a	stable	home	to	which	POWs	could	return.	Jan	Gross	detailed	this	massacre	in	Neighbors,	Princeton	University	Press,	2004.		
	 	 	76		to	remain	are	likely	to	have	left	by	the	end	of	July.”15	For	those	who	decided	to	remain,	their	livelihood	would	continue	to	be	tied	to	ration	books,	clothing	coupons,	and	identity	cards,	a	continuation	of	the	previous	internment	system.	Indeed,	reflecting	a	disturbing	lack	of	a	change	of	official	status,	POWs	had	a	standard	wage	of	only	four	pounds	and	ten	pence	a	week,	identical	to	their	“wage”	during	internment.	However,	around	15,000	German	POWs	decided	to	remain	in	Britain,	posing	a	particular	problem	for	a	British	government	that	no	longer	had	a	clear	place	for	them.		The	political	hurdles	to	remain	in	Britain	were	numerous	in	the	postwar	period,	and	reflected	the	discontent	of	the	British	government	with	the	continued	employment	of	POWs.	The	British	authorities	were	very	wary	of	POWs	remaining	in	the	country	as	permanent	residents	or	even	citizens:	a	Home	Office	White	Paper	from	June	13th,	1945	stated	the	“primary	consideration…is	that	nothing	shall	be	done	which	carries	with	it	an	implication	or	may	be	used	as	an	argument	for	permanent	residence	in	this	country.”16	The	British	government,	content	with	using	the	German	POWs	as	labor	during	the	Second	World	War,	expressed	significant	discomfort	with	integrating	Germans	into	British	society.	The	British	authorities	voiced	particular	unease	when	POWs	attempted	to	work	on	issues	of	“national	importance,”	which	during	the	war	meant	defense	projects	but	increasingly	in	the	postwar	period,	meant	projects	that	took	the	jobs	of	wage	laborers.17	In	order	to	
																																																								15	Manchester	Guardian,	21	January	1948.	Emanuel	Shinwell	was	a	British	trade	union	official,	Labour	politician	and	Secretary	of	State	for	War	from	1947-	1950.	Shinwell	was	an	important	Jewish	figure	who	served	in	the	House	of	Lords	until	shortly	before	his	death	in	1986.		16	NA,	HO	213/500,	13	June	1945:	1.		17	This	stance	did	not	seem	to	soften	over	time.	Throughout	the	NA	records,	the	British	government	officials	continuously	expressed	their	preference	to	move	POWs	into	positions	in	Germany,	rather	than	having	them	involved	in	home	industry.	Even	as	the	British	actively	recruited	displaced	persons,	ethnic	Germans,	and	migrating	Germans	to	help	fill	the	demand	for	labor	in	Britain,	the	
	 	 	77		ascertain	exactly	which	fields	the	POWs	were	allowed	to	work	in,	the	British	authorities	transferred	responsibility	to	the	Board	of	Trade,	who	actually	gave	out	a	license	for	work	inside	Britain.18			 The	license	for	work	inside	of	Britain	also	varied	greatly	depending	on	whether	the	POWs	were	contracted	out	to	private	individuals.	Only	the	Ministry	of	Labour	had	the	right	to	contract	out	labor	to	private	individuals,	entities,	and	companies,	often	to	work	for	firms	in	agricultural	or	industrial	production.	If	the	POWs	worked	through	a	public	company	that	received	funds	from	the	British	government,	their	employment	could	be	terminated	if	the	government	deemed	the	company	“unsuccessful”	or	“unnecessary.”	If	the	company	was	terminated,	POWs	had	no	guarantee	of	receiving	another	job,	and	could	instead	be	trapped	in	limbo,	unable	to	leave,	but	also	unable	to	find	employment	in	Britain.	The	labor	contracts	that	POWs	signed	also	were	subject	to	review	each	year,	in	order	to	deem	the	industries	in	which	they	worked	as	“luxury”	or	“non-essential”	industries.	If	the	industry	was	deemed	“luxury”	or	“non	essential,”	the	British	government	reserved	the	right	to	deem	those	industries	“a	charge	on	public	funds,”	and	to	force	the	POW	to	seek	another	form	of	employment.19	The	muddled	bureaucratic	system	not	only	discouraged	POWs	from	remaining,	but	kept	those	who	wanted	to	stay	trapped	in	low	paying	jobs,	where	working	conditions	were	largely	unmonitored	and	unregulated.	POWs	also	never	truly	transitioned	out	of	their	“prisoner	of	war”	status,	with	the	term	“POW”	used	to	describe	them	through	the	mid-1950s.	While	the	war	was	over,	their	status	was	unchanged;	German	POWs	were	forced	to	live	and	work	as	prisoners,	without	ever	fully	entering	the	employment	world	of																																																																																																																																																																																			authorities	simultaneously	worked	to	return	POWs	to	Germany.	See	Weber-Newth	and	Steinert,	
German	Migrants	in	Post-war	Britain:	23-50.					18	NA,	HO	213/500,	13	June	1945:	2.		19	Ibid:	2.	
	 	 	78		Britain.	For	prisoner	“18”	the	concern	for	the	future	was	“when	will	it	be,	and	how	will	it	be?	This	is	what	worries	not	only	me	but	most	of	us…when	shall	the	day	come	that	the	gate	opens	to	us?20		 Beyond	the	initial	hurdles	of	permission	for	employment,	the	Government	also	required	POWs	to	submit	an	application	through	the	Refugee	Committee.	The	Refugee	Committee	posed	a	particular	challenge	for	POWs	because	it	was	designed	for	dealing	with	refugees	or	aliens	interned	during	the	war.21	During	the	immediate	postwar	years,	the	POW	application	for	refugee	status	was	so	slowed	because	of	competition	among	refugees,	alien	migrants,	and	POWs	for	access	to	applications.	The	application	requirements	were	also	stringent,	with	POWs	needing	to	have	some	claim	to	skills	or	experience	in	the	work	they	desired	to	undertake,	and	their	employment	could	be	taken	away	if	they	were	deemed	to	be	in	ill	health.22	Many	of	the	POWs	who	wanted	to	remain	in	Britain	were	stuck	in	a	sort	of	refugee	limbo,	unable	to	access	the	resources	necessary	to	prepare	them	to	leave	the	camps,	while	also	unable	to	remain	in	the	camps	much	longer.	Exploited	by	a	British	government	that	reached	a	critical	labor	shortage,	German	POWs	faced	huge	hurdles	to	remain	in	the	country	in	the	postwar	period.	German	POWs	did	not	know	what	to	expect	in	the	postwar	period,	but	the	continued	status	as	a	“prisoner”	proved	to	be	unbearable.	Prisoner	“46”	wrote,	“I	now	know	very	well	that	the	English	people	would	like	to	send	us	all	home,	if	we	were	not	cheap	labour.	I	have	talked	to	a	few	civilians	and	all	they	say	that	they	
																																																								20	“Report	by	Pastor	Werner	Jentsch,	Psychological	Tests	in	Youth	Camp	180,”	LMA/4288/D/04/028:	May	1945:	40.		21	NA,	HO	213/500,	13	June	1945:	1.		22	Ibid:	1.		
	 	 	79		are	very	“sorry”	because	we	have	to	remain	here	for	so	long.23	Instead	of	becoming	members	of	British	society,	German	POWs	were	passed	around,	unable	to	fit	anywhere.	
The	British	Populace	Debates	“the	German	POW	Question”	
	 Throughout	most	of	the	Second	World	War,	Britons	with	a	stake	in	the	POW	experience	expressed	alarm	over	the	treatment	of	POWs	interned	on	the	Isles,	but	their	concerns	were	stifled	because	of	concerns	for	winning	the	war.	However,	in	the	postwar	period,	Anglo-German	citizens,	some	concerned	Britons	and	left-leaning	politicians	demanded	greater	care	given	to	POW	affairs,	and	those	demands	translated	into	a	larger	national	conversation	about	the	role	of	Germans	in	Britain.		Despite	the	assurances	from	governmental	officials	that	German	POWs	were	being	taken	care	of,	British	citizens,	either	acting	independently	or	in	conjunction	with	German	church	organizations,	demanded	higher	quality	care	of	POWs,	and	proof	of	that	improved	treatment.	The	earliest	records	of	a	debate	on	POW	treatment	appearing	in	a	public	forum	occurred	on	January	31st,	1940,	when	Mr.	Thorne,	identified	only	as	a	“British	citizen,”	questioned	British	Secretary	of	State	for	War	Oliver	Stanley	on	the	treatment	of	German	POWs	in	Britain,	due	to	rumors	of	alleged	mistreatment	of	POWs.24	Stanley	informed	Thorne	that	in	accordance	with	the	provisions	of	the	international	convention	of	1929,	
																																																								23	“Report	by	Pastor	Werner	Jentsch,	Psychological	Tests	in	Youth	Camp	180,”LMA/4288/D/04/028,	May	1945:	42.		24	Oliver	Stanley	was	a	prominent	British	Conservative	politician,	who	was	extremely	active	in	the	British	government.	He	served	as	Secretary	of	State	for	War	from	January	1940	through	May	of	that	same	year.	Stanley	experienced	a	fall	from	favor	upon	the	appointment	of	Winston	Churchill,	possibly	because	Stanley’s	father-in-law	Lord	Londonderry	was	a	prominent	Nazi	sympathizer.	His	political	fortunes	returned	when	Churchill	appointed	Stanley	as	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Colonies	in	1942,	a	post	he	held	until	the	end	of	the	war.	After	the	Conservative	defeat	in	1945,	Stanley	worked	to	rebuild	the	party.	
	 	 	80		“German	POWs	were	supplied	daily	with	the	same	rations	as	British	troops	at	home.”25	However,	reassurances	in	Parliament	did	not	seem	to	translate	to	the	ethnic	Anglo-German	community,	whose	members	continued	to	express	outrage	over	the	internment	of	German	POWs	in	what	they	deemed	to	be	“slave	labor.”26		A	prominent	example	of	this	outrage	was	the	action	of	Helmut	W.B.	Schroeder,	of	German	and	English	descent,	who	set	up	a	relief	committee,	which	“sent	out	circulars	to	a	number	of	English	people	asking	them	to	send	donations	for	the	assistance	of	German	prisoners	of	war	and	internees	in	this	country.”	The	local	publicity	given	to	Schroeder’s	activities	was	so	high,	that	his	behavior	was	eventually	brought	to	the	attention	of	Secretary	Stanley,	in	March	of	1940.	While	Stanley	continued	to	assure	the	populace	for	several	months	about	the	quality	of	POW	care,	many	Anglo-Germans	remained	skeptical	of	Stanley’s	assurances,	including	Schroeder,	who	wrote	that	he	would	forbid	sending	comforts	to	POWs	if	the	care	proved	to	be	of	an	adequate	standard,	in	which	case	“the	money…may	be	diverted	to	better	uses.”27	After	Schroeder’s	comments,	Secretary	Stanley	stated	that	while	he	has	no	power	to	forbid	the	sending	of	comforts	to	German	POWs,	he	“[thought	that]	such	a	practice	[was]	both	unnecessary	and	undesirable.”	His	response	was	reportedly	met	with	cheers	from	the	British	government	officials	witnessing	the	exchange,	which	took	place	in	an	open	forum	with	Secretary	Stanley,	showing	a	seeming	divide	between	the	motivations	of	those	in	Government,	and	those	with	a	stronger	connection	to	the	ethnic	German	population.28																																																										25	“Mr.	Oliver	Stanley	Responds	to	Questions	about	German	POWs,”	The	Times,	31	January	1940.		26	Ibid.		27	“Relief	Committee	Brought	to	the	Attention	of	Secretary	for	War	Stanley,”	Times,	6	March	1940.		28	“Comforts	for	German	Prisoners,”	Times,	13	March	1940.	The	actions	of	Schroeder	were	brought	to	the	attention	of	Secretary	Stanley	in	an	open	forum	by	Mr.	Vyvyan	Adams	of	Leeds.		
	 	 	81			 Some	members	of	the	British	populace	chose	to	frame	the	German	POW	debate	in	the	context	of	Nazi	treatment	of	British	POWs.	This	debate	in	the	press	stemmed	from	concerns	about	the	treatment	of	British	POWs	by	Nazi	Germany,	and	whether	or	not	that	treatment	should	impact	how	the	British	treated	their	prisoners	in	turn.	In	The	Evening	
Telegraph	and	Post,	Violet	Barbour	in	her	December	1940	article	“Are	They	Getting	a	Fair	Deal?:	Our	Prisoners	–	and	Theirs,”	delved	deep	into	the	issue	of	German	POW	treatment.	She	first	began	by	describing	the	rumors	that	had	reached	the	British	citizenry	concerning	British	POW	treatment	in	Germany,	contending	that	they	were	not	being	cared	for	“with	the	consideration	and	respect	prescribed	by	international	law.”	While	Barbour	stated	that	there	is	“no	doubt	considerable	truth	in	the	allegation	of	bad	treatment,”	she	argued	that	it	does	not	alleviate	the	moral	obligations	the	British	have	toward	German	POWs.	Upon	her	investigations	into	the	camps,	she	discovered	while	German	POWs	had	rationed	food	and	clothing,	they	have	“no	legal	ground	for	complaint,”	and	POWs	“admitted	they	are	better	fed	than	they	had	ever	been	while	on	active	service.”29	When	given	bacon	and	eggs	for	breakfast,	one	German	POW	divided	the	food	with	the	intention	of	giving	half	to	a	fellow	prisoner,	and	could	not	believe	that	he	was	given	a	whole	egg	to	himself.	He	stated,	“he	had	never	enjoyed	such	a	luxury	while	serving	in	the	Wehrmacht.”	In	German	Migrants	and	
Post-War	Britain:	An	Enemy	Embrace,	Inge	Weber-Newth	and	Johannes-Dieter	Steinert	detail	the	continuous	reporting	on	the	treatment	of	POWs	in	the	camps.	From	1946	to	1948	various	newspapers	including	The	Lancashire	Daily	Post,	The	Manchester	Guardian,	and	The	
																																																								29	The	Evening	Telegraph	and	Post,	6	Dec	1940.	While	the	German	POWs	experienced	rationing,	so	did	the	rest	of	the	British	population,	and	this	rationing	would	continue	after	the	war.	See	Kynaston,	
Austerity	Britain,	19.		
	 	 	82		
Edinburgh	Evening	News	often	published	information	about	the	condition	of	German	POWs,	reflecting	a	clear,	albeit	isolated,	public	interest	in	POW	affairs.30	Barbour	represented	an	early	concern	over	the	morality	of	interning	German	POWs	and	using	them	as	part	of	the	labor	force.	Both	the	British	government	and	its	citizens,	out	of	a	belief	that	the	war	was	the	first	priority,	coupled	with	a	huge	demand	for	labor,	ignored	many	of	the	early	concerns	in	the	1940s.	Moreover,	many	members	of	the	British	populace	undoubtedly	viewed	the	German	POWs	as	simply	an	extension	of	Nazism,	and	not	worthy	of	any	significant	protections	under	the	law,	as	evidence	by	the	anti-Nazi	propaganda	of	the	period.			 However,	as	the	war	came	to	a	close	in	1945,	some	citizens	grew	uneasy	about	the	morality	of	holding	so	many	German	POWs	as	a	labor	force,	with	an	unclear	timetable	for	repatriation,	and	seemingly	insufficient	guarantees	by	the	British	authorities	for	adequate	treatment.	An	editorial	in	the	Manchester	Guardian	on	August	16th,	1946	stated	the	“greatest	injury	ever	done	by	the	Allies	to	Germany	since	the	fighting	ended	is	not	in	the	severity	of	our	demands	upon	her,	but	in	the	haphazard,	indefinite,	and	opportunist	way	their	fulfillment	is	exacted.31”	Specifically,	the	unnamed	writer	attacked	the	Allied	demand	for	German	labor	to	repair	the	damage	done	to	the	British	economy,	through	“no	systematic	programme	but	through	the	expedient	of	retaining	prisoners	of	war	to	labour	in	the	country	which	happens	to	hold	them.”	Furthermore,	the	writer	maintained	that	this	injustice	could	not	be	sustained	as	the	public	awakened	to	the	moral	crisis	before	them,	
																																																								30	Weber-Newth	and	Steinert,	German	Migrants	in	Post-war	Britain:	51-70.		31	“Letter	to	the	Editor	on	POW	Treatment,”	The	Manchester	Guardian,	16	August	1946.	“Fulfillment”	here	refers	to	the	fulfillment	of	German	debt	to	the	Allies	in	the	postwar	period.	While	the	reparations	expected	of	Germany	were	nothing	like	those	issued	after	the	First	World	War,	the	Germans	were	still	expected	to	contribute	significantly	to	the	rebuilding	effort.		
	 	 	83		with	over	half	a	million	POWs	remaining	in	the	United	Kingdom.		The	implications	of	using	German	POWs	as	forced	labor	for	the	rebuilding	of	economies	even	led	to	POWs	being	contracted	out	to	the	United	States	and	France	as	repatriations	labor,	whose	value	should	be	credited	to	their	account.32	While	people	like	Barbour	argued	that	the	POWs	were	better	off	in	Britain	than	in	Germany,	supporters	of	POW	rights	argued	that	Britain	needed	volunteers	who	could	benefit	from	the	standard	of	living	offered	in	Britain,	and	not	those	who	had	no	choice	in	the	matter33.	Former	Labour	Member	of	Parliament	Noel-Baker	wrote,	“now	[we	are]	forcing	to	make	special	expiation	of	Germany’s	guilt.”34		 However,	a	conflicting	line	of	argumentation	stated	that	the	Soviets’	substandard	treatment	of	POWs	allowed	Britain	to	lower	POW	wages	and	living	conditions	in	the	postwar	period.	Citing	the	USSR’s	status	as	an	ally,	British	officials	asserted	that	they	only	had	to	maintain	the	standard	of	POW	care	provided	by	other	Allied	nations.	This	line	of	argumentation	was	widely	rejected	by	supporters	of	German	POWs,	who	vehemently	scorned	using	comparative	morality	to	absolve	the	British	government	of	protection	of	POW	rights.35	Noel-Baker	wrote	that	“the	dinginess	of	the	neighbour’s	washing	does	not,	however,	absolve	us	from	looking	to	our	own,”	after	news	broke	that	the	Soviet	Union	had	released	over	two	million	Germans	with	no	notification	of	their	families	nor	transportation	home.	Noel-Baker	argued	that	the	British	government	forced	POWs,	who	either	wished	to																																																									32	Ibid.		33	Ibid.		34	Noel-Baker	was	a	British	politician,	diplomat,	academic,	and	renowned	campaigner	for	disarmament.	At	the	period	when	he	wrote	this	editorial,	Noel-Baker	was	a	former	Labour	Member	of	Parliament,	who	would	rise	to	the	position	of	Secretary	of	State	for	Commonwealth	Relations,	which	he	would	hold	from	October	7th,	1947	to	February	28th,	1950.	He	is	the	only	person	to	have	received	both	a	Nobel	Prize	and	an	Olympic	Medal	(silver	in	the	1500	m).	Noel-Baker	also	wrote	frequently	to	the	Manchester	Guardian	regarding	disarmament,	nuclear	deterrence,	and	reunification.		35	Manchester	Guardian,	16	August	1946.	
	 	 	84		remain	in	Britain	or	were	on	the	waiting	list	for	repatriation,	to	work	“with	no	stated	time	limit”	and	they	could	only	be	repatriated	to	Germany	if	they	became	physically	ill.36	While	acknowledging	that	agricultural	and	housing	developments	were	absolutely	necessary,	men	like	Noel-Baker	wondered	if	“a	German	held	here	in	captivity	would	work	with	the	same	will	as	one	who	tills	the	home	land	for	the	livelihood	of	his	own	dependents?”37	Furthermore,	in	an	editorial	written	on	February	17th,	1945,	Vernon	Bartlett,	J.C.	Flügel,	Hans	Gottfurcht,	C.E.M.	Joad,	Michael	Redgrave	and	Olaf	Stapledon	raised	the	concern	that	“under	the	present	official	policy	most	of	[the	POWs]	seem	to	be	barred	from	access	to	outside	influences	which	might	help	them	discard	their	Nazi	ideas.”38	The	writers	continued	that	in	the	name	of	increased	socialization,	“the	organizations	of	political	and	trade	union	refugees	have	repeatedly	offered	their	assistance	in	the	matter…and	we	feel	that	their	assistance	should	be	welcomed	and	encouraged	in	every	way.”	While	many	expressed	valid	concerns	in	the	postwar	treatment	of	POWs,	it	is	clear	that	Bartlett,	Flügel,	Gottfurcht,	Joad,	Redgrave,	and	Stapledon,	were	unaware	of	the	efforts	of	German	pastors	in	matters	of	socialization	and	denazification,	who	had	been	working	towards	many	of	the	described	goals	of	“socialization.”	In	Postwar:	A	History	of	Europe	Since	1945,	Tony	Judt	
																																																								36	Ibid.	Judt,	Postwar:	23-26.	The	Soviets	also	executed	many	of	their	German	prisoners,	or	left	them	in	horrific	prisons	where	POWs	would	die	of	starvation,	dehydration,	torture	and	disease.	37	Noel-Baker,	“Letter	to	the	Editor:	British	Treatment	of	POWs,”	Manchester	Guardian,	March	1946.		38	Vernon	Bartlett,	English	journalist,	Member	of	Parliament	and	Independent	Progressive;	J.C.	Flügel,	British	experimental	psychologist;	Hans	Gottfurcht,	German	and	international	trade	union	official	and	founder	of	the	National	Group	of	German	Trade	Unionists	in	Britain;	C.E.M.	Joad,	English	philosopher	and	broadcasting	personality;	Michael	Redgrave,	English	stage	and	film	actor,	director,	and	author;	and	Olaf	Stapledon,	British	philosopher	and	author	of	science	fiction,	The	Times,	17	February	1945.	
	 	 	85		argues	that	the	importance	of	denazification	did	not	escape	the	British,	but	did	have	“a	greater	skepticism	and	fewer	resources	[than	the	Americans].”39		 In	response	to	many	of	these	queries	about	the	treatment	of	German	POWs,	the	
Manchester	Guardian	ran	a	piece	from	their	Special	Correspondent	concerning	the	treatment	of	POWs	in	May	of	1947.	The	Special	Correspondent	wrote	that	while	the	German	Section	of	the	Foreign	Office,	the	point	of	contact	that	organized	a	visit	to	an	unnamed	POW	camp,	was	short	on	staff	and	money,	the	“spirit	of	political	enterprise”	was	strong	in	the	camps.	He	described	camps	with	plentiful	books,	monthly	digests,	lecture	series,	tools	for	free	discussion	and	self-education,	and	an	“exceptionally	happy	atmosphere,”	with	a	“more	than	cordial	relationship”	between	the	British	and	Germans.40	While	this	picture	seemed	to	be	exceptionally	rosy,	it	is	interesting	that	the	only	mention	of	the	work	of	German	pastors	came	briefly	at	the	end	of	the	piece:	“one	becomes	increasingly	aware	of	the	importance	of	the	personal	factor	in	political	and	religious	education,”	a	seeming	nod	to	the	work	of	German	pastors	in	both	reeducation	and	evangelizing	works,	who	remained	largely	invisible	to	much	of	the	British	population.	The	visit	by	the	Special	Correspondent	was	likely	heavily-controlled	by	the	British	authorities,	but	evidence	from	the	pastors,	as	presented	above,	confirms	that	description	of	the	lectures,	books,	and	atmosphere	of	reeducation	reflect	the	evidence	of	the	article.41			However,	accounts	diverge	in	further	analyses	of	the	ways	in	which	German	POWs	received	reeducation	tactics.	While	results	seemed	to	be	somewhat	“positive”	based	on	the	pastors’	accounts,	it	seems	to	have	been	a	stretch	for	the	Special	Correspondent	to	write																																																									39	Judt,	Postwar:	56.		40	Manchester	Guardian,	22	May	1947.		41	See	chapter	“Camps	Without	Walls”	for	more	information	of	the	reeducation	program	implemented	by	the	pastors.		
	 	 	86		that	German	POWs	were	“exceptionally	happy.”	The	Special	Correspondent’s	exaggeration	was	suggested	by	the	Manchester	Guardian’s	letter	to	the	editor	of	the	same	month;	an	anonymous	writer	stated:	“to	my	personal	knowledge,	the	Germans	have	nothing	but	praise	for…the	camp	newspaper,	occasional	lectures,	and	library…but	as	political	education,	it	has	been	a	pathetic	failure.”42	British	officials	such	as	Duncan	Sandys,	Minister	for	Works	and	Emanuel	Shinwell,	Secretary	of	State	for	War,	apparently	had	varying	opinions	on	the	status	of	reeducation,	and	the	importance	of	the	project;	with	Sandys’	arguing	that	this	project	was	“unique,”	and	not	capable	of	assessment.43	Even	in	the	midst	of	“exposing”	the	POW	camps,	the	press	at	the	time,	and	the	citizens	writing	in	to	the	press,	seemed	to	understand	only	parts	of	the	total	picture,	struggling	between	what	was	“known”	and	“unknown.”	But	in	the	midst	of	the	immediate	postwar	years,	Anglo-German	citizens,	the	editorial	staff	of	The	Manchester	Guardian,	and	some	Left	politicians	expressed	a	great	concern	over	the	fate	of	German	POWs,	in	particular,	their	ability	to	become	productive,	pro-democratic	members	of	society.			 Further	concerns	by	some	British	citizens	referenced	the	treatment	of	those	POWs	who	decided	against	repatriation,	particularly	in	regards	to	working	conditions	and	wage	rates.	A	letter	to	the	editor	of	The	Times	titled	“’Civilian’	Agricultural	workers”	argued,	“many	[POWs]	signed	on	in	the	belief	that	they	would	be	allotted	to	individual	farmers	and	enabled	to	lead	a	more	or	less	normal	life.”44	Instead,	the	writer	continued,	many	found	themselves	tied	to	war	agricultural	committees,	being	drafted	to	jobs	at	the	will	of	the	committee,	and	still	living	in	dreary	camps	and	working	in	gangs.	Under	these	committees																																																									42	Manchester	Guardian,	21	May	1947.		43	“Employing	German	Prisoners	at	Work,”	The	Manchester	Guardian,	16	May	1945.		44	“’Civilian’	Agricultural	Workers,”	The	Times,	2	February	1948.		
	 	 	87		designed	to	regulate	POW	labor	with	greater	efficiency,	POWs	were	denied	the	privilege	of	working	on	personal	farms	with	considerable	responsibility.	Instead,	POWs	were	forced	to	work	in	gang	labor	groups,	their	output	“nearly	half”	that	of	the	production	levels	of	small	farms.45	The	writer	stated,	“a	man	cannot	be	expected	to	give	his	best	when	he	may	be	suddenly	transferred,”	and	critically	reframed	the	central	question	flowing	throughout	much	of	the	debate	surrounding	POWs	in	the	late	1940s:	“if	these	men	are	not	given	a	reasonable	degree	of	freedom,	how	can	they	shed	the	outlook	of	the	prisoner	of	war	or	regard	this	as	a	free	and	democratic	country?”46	As	members	of	the	British	public	became	aware	of	the	conditions	that	German	POWs	faced,	they	began	to	worry	that	POWs	would	fall	back	on	Nazism.	In	an	editorial	of	The	Manchester	Guardian,	the	editorial	argued	that	with	“starvation,	misery,	and	bureaucratic	ineptitude…[the	POWs]	look	back	to	the	golden	age	of	Hitler’s	pre-war	period.”47	Just	as	some	began	to	worry	about	the	trials	faced	by	POWs	in	the	postwar	period,	they	may	have	begun	to	examine	their	own	morality	and	their	own	obligations	towards	POWs	in	the	postwar	period.	
Reestablishing	the	Connection	Between	POWs	and	Germany		 German	pastors	continued	to	focus	their	attention	on	the	experience	of	German	POWs	in	Britain,	and	in	particular,	the	pastors	now	began	one	of	the	greatest	challenges	of	the	period:	reconnecting	German	families	dislocated	by	war,	in	both	Britain	and	Germany.	In	September	of	1948,	a	letter	to	Reverend	J.B.	Dakin	discussed	two	pastors	who	were	planning	to	make	the	journey	from	Germany	to	Britain,	“in	order	to	help	with	ministering	
																																																								45	It	is	unsurprising	that	output	was	less	than	wartime	efforts,	due	to	the	postwar	shortages.	See	Kynaston,	Austerity	Britain,	for	more	information.		46	Ibid.		47	“The	Failures	of	Reeducation,”	Manchester	Guardian,	21	May	1947.		
	 	 	88		to	Germany	voluntary	workers	for	several	months.”48	Pastor	Dr.	Kurt	August	Julius	Thuda,	who	worked	in	Hope-Eickel	inside	of	the	British	occupation	zone	in	Germany	arrived	in	England	in	later	1948	with	Martin	Boeckhelor,	of	Stuttgart,	a	city	under	the	US	zone	of	occupation.	Both	Boeckhelor	and	Thuda	were	in	England	before	the	war	and	agreed	to	come	for	a	limited	period	in	order	not	only	to	perform	ministering	to	POWs,	but	also	to	help	to	reconnect	POWs	with	their	German	families,	who	had	been	searching	for	them	since	the	end	of	the	war	in	1945.	In	a	letter	to	Rev.	Dakin,	who	was	assistant	general	secretary	to	Reverend	L.W.	Harland	of	Christian	Reconstruction	in	Europe,	he	thanked	Dr.	Julius	Rieger,	for	his	“spiritual	duties	amongst	German	workers	in	this	country.”49	Dr.	Rieger	would	gain	a	powerful	reputation	for	reuniting	families	in	the	late	1940s,	because	his	constant	travel	between	Britain	and	Germany	allowed	him	to	become	intimately	familiar	with	both	populations,	particularly	those	with	strong	ecclesiastical	ties.				 A	letter	written	February	9,	1946	to	Herr	Amtsbruder	from	St.	Andrews’s	Presbyterian	Church,	which	sponsored	large	numbers	of	POWs,	began	by	discussing	the	huge	financial	opportunities	to	work	in	England,	while	acknowledging	the	serious	obstacles	keeping	POWs	in	Britain.50	The	Presbyterian	Church’s	letter	stated	that	many	POWs	had	no	news	of	their	family,	and	the	Church	itself	had	been	getting	requests	for	information	concerning	family	members	interned	in	Britain.51	The	information	provided	to	Amtsbruder	was	very	specific,	and	included	people	from	many	different	parts	of	Germany.	For	instance,	“Frau	Martel	Loick”	of	Berlin	was	looking	for	her	husband	Rudi	Loick;	the	Heinz-Michalsky	
																																																								48	LMA/4288/A/04/008:	48.		49	Ibid:	49.		50	Amtsbruder	worked	on	behalf	of	the	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer	Kirche	in	London.	51	LMA/4288/D/04/026:	20.	This	text	read,	“es	handelt	sich	um	einige	Kriegsgefangene	hier,	die	keinerlei	Nachricht	von	ihren	Angehörigen,	die	in	Berlin	lebten,	haben.”	
	 	 	89		family	was	looking	for	their	son	Hermann;	and	Christian	Friedrich	was	looking	for	his	brother	Mark.	The	Church	requested	that	when	Amtsbruder	had	some	information	about	the	POWs	and	their	locations,	that	he	deliver	this	information	to	a	church	employee	who	would	convey	it	accordingly.52		 Often,	the	pastors	themselves	were	responsible	for	delivering	messages	from	POWs	to	their	families	in	Germany.	For	instance,	Pastor	Heinrich	Grüber	announced	his	upcoming	trip	to	Germany	in	February	of	1946,	and	alerted	churches	that	he	would	take	messages	to	relatives	on	that	particular	journey.53	The	messages	were	often	very	personal	and	very	specific;	one	even	included	a	hand	drawn	map	from	a	POW	of	the	exact	location	to	which	the	letter	should	be	delivered.	From	1948	until	late	1952,	one	of	the	primary	tasks	of	the	pastors	was	to	act	as	couriers,	bringing	information	and	messages	from	family	members	in	Germany	to	the	POWs	who	decided	to	stay	in	Britain	either	for	employment,	or	because	their	repatriation	had	not	yet	been	approved.	Frau	Lieschen	and	her	children	wrote	to	her	POW	husband,	Alfred	Butsch	of	Ashley	Road,	Tottenham	Hale	in	London,	to	say	that	though	their	house	was	totally	destroyed	and	they	had	few	material	possessions,	God	had	not	forsaken	them,	and	they	hoped	to	be	reunited	with	him	in	Britain	as	soon	as	possible.54		 As	the	work	of	the	pastors	spread	throughout	Germany	and	Britain,	news	of	their	services	spread	as	well,	and	even	families	who	were	not	searching	for	POWs	per	se,	began	to	use	the	networks	created	by	pastors	in	order	to	search	for	their	missing	family	members.	In	a	letter	to	Pastor	Grueber	of	the	Church	of	England	Committee	at	Bloomsbury	House,																																																									52	Ibid:	20.	The	information	is	very	specific	and	included	the	street	address	of	every	individual	listed.	For	instance,	“Frau	Martel	Loick”	of	Berlin,	could	be	located	at	N.W.	7	Albrechstraße	22.	The	pages	of	families	searching	for	information	went	across	almost	ten	pages,	easily	numbering	over	one	hundred	families	in	one	file	alone.			53	Ibid:	27.		54	Ibid:	59.		
	 	 	90		Marie	Rausch	von	Trauenberg	of	Swansea	wrote	that	upon	a	visit	to	Berlin,	she	discovered	that	her	parents	had	disappeared,	and	she	hoped	that	they	had	perhaps	fled	to	Britain	to	stay	with	cousins,	and	she	requested	Pastor	Grueber’s	help	in	locating	them.55	In	1946,	Mrs.	E.	Wassermann	wrote	to	the	British	Council	of	Churches	in	the	hopes	that	they	could	give	a	letter	to	her	friend	located	in	Berlin.	Reverend	E.	Burlingham,	wrote	in	late	February	to	his	counterpart	in	Britain	to	say	that	he	hoped	that	the	pastor	had	“any	means	of	helping	Mrs.	Wassermann	with	the	information	she	so	sadly	needs,”	and	had	received	the	letter.56		 In	the	1945	aftermath	of	the	release	of	information	about	the	extermination	of	the	Jews,	German	pastors	began	to	take	an	especially	active	role	in	reuniting	German	Jews	with	their	family	members	who	had	fled	to	England	before	the	war.57	For	instance,	Marie	Blass	of	Dahlem,	Berlin	wrote	to	Heroert	Whel	that	her	husband	had	been	killed	when	the	Gestapo	took	him	in	in	August	of	1944.58	She	and	her	daughter	were	forced	into	the	concentration	camp	Ravensbrück,	while	her	son	was	separated	from	them	and	placed	in	Buchenwald.	She	wrote	that	while	they	had	miraculously	all	survived,	they	were	in	desperate	hope	to	reconnect	with	family	and	friends	in	Britain.59	At	this	point,	German	pastors	began	expanding	their	network	of	contacts	in	order	to	aid	not	only	German	POWs	and	German	migrants,	but	also	those	of	Jewish	descent.	This	is	a	break	from	much	of	their	earlier	work,	which	focused	only	on	German	POWs	and	migrants,	because	the	pastors	created	a	committee	distinction	between	the	German	POWs	and	the	Jews,	in	order	to	more																																																									55	Ibid,	14	February	1946:	50.	56	Ibid,	27	February	1946:	55.	57	Judt,	Postwar,	54.	The	investigations	and	trials	from	1945-1948	(both	the	UN	War	Crimes	Commission	and	the	Nuremberg	Trials)	“put	an	extraordinary	amount	of	documentation	and	testimony	on	record	(notably	concerning	the	German	project	to	exterminate	Europe’s	Jews),	at	the	very	moment	when	Germans…were	most	disposed	to	forget	as	fast	as	they	could.”		58	Heroert	Whel	was	a	pastor	that	worked	in	conjunction	with	the	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer	Kirche.		59	LMA/4288/D/04/026:	58.		
	 	 	91		effectively	help	both	groups.	It	is	unclear	what	exactly	prompted	the	German	pastors	to	take	such	an	active	role	in	the	plight	of	the	German	Jews,	but	it	may	have	stemmed	not	only	from	guilty	consciences	about	the	role	of	Christian	churches	turning	a	blind	eye	to	the	plight	of	the	Jews,	but	also	from	the	strong	networks,	of	both	pastors	and	physical	locations	of	refuge	in	Germany	and	Britain,	built	up	in	support	of	the	German	POWs.	The	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer	Kirche	helped	set	up	a	Jewish	Refugee	Committee	in	April	1946,	where	Jewish	refugees	could	come	and	request	information	about	their	family	and	friends	in	Germany,	and	pastors	during	their	trips	would	make	enquiries	on	their	behalf.60	At	a	time	when	most	of	Germany	was	striving	to	forget	about	the	actions	of	the	Nazis	and	the	extermination	of	the	Jews,	German	pastors	instead	got	more	involved	in	the	plight	of	Jewish	suffering.	This	reflected	their	strong	connections	to	more	liberal,	Labor	and	Left	optimism	about	how	to	approach	the	postwar	period:	the	pastors	hoped	to	bring	forgiveness	to	the	postwar	period,	not	further	punishment.61		 From	1948	to	1952,	German	pastors	acted	as	couriers	between	POWs	and	their	families	abroad,	reestablishing	a	connection	lost	during	the	war.	That	connection	would	be	critical	as	POWs	decided	to	remain	in	Britain,	with	many	of	their	families	eventually	joining	them	in	the	postwar	period.	The	dislocation	experienced	by	many	groups	during	this	period,	including	German-Jewish	refugees,	was	somewhat	eased	by	German	pastors	carrying	messages	and	taking	part	in	the	massive	movement	to	reconnect	families	after	the																																																									60	Ibid:	90.	The	files	contain	huge	numbers	of	charts	that	show	the	sender	on	one	side,	and	the	person	they	wanted	to	contact	on	the	other.	The	files	included	a	mix	of	POWs	who	wanted	to	locate	family	and	also	German-Jewish	refugees.	For	example,	Günther	Stallner,	GEF-NR	B.	556600	located	in	174	Norton-Camp,	Cuckney	nr.	Mansfield	Notts,	written	to	Fritz	Stallner	Krakow	amSee/Mecklenbg.	Ziegelburch	13	or	Willi	Stallner	Berlin-Charlottenbg	Knesebeck	68/69.	Also	Lothar	Kalleberg	GEF-NR	B110688	174	Norton	Camp,	same	address	to	Willi	Kalleberg	15	Erfurt	Gartenstr	442,	Gehrard	Last	B.	39454	to	Otto	Last	in	Berlin	n.	20	Soldierstr.	61	Faulk,	Group	Captives:	16.		
	 	 	92		war.	With	their	efforts,	German	pastors	were	able	to	take	their	POW	networks	a	step	further,	and	begin	impacting	not	only	German	migrants,	but	Jewish	refugees	as	well.	In	this	way,	German	pastor	influence	now	began	to	expand	from	dealing	specifically	with	POWs,	to	feed	into	other	areas	of	postwar	migration.		
POW	Reactions	to	Staying	in	Britain	Postwar		 Through	interviews	with	German	POWs	and	personal	journals	kept	by	pastors,	it	is	possible	to	get	a	much	more	unfiltered	look	at	the	true	reactions	of	POWs	to	their	experience	in	Britain.	In	many	interviews	that	were	given	to	British	officials	or	newspapers,	the	POWs	expressed	happiness	with	their	experiences,	but	this	information	cannot	be	taken	literally,	given	that	British	officials	largely	dictated	how	their	internment	would	go,	and	the	interviewers	had	a	clear	relationship	with	these	officials.	Pastor	Werner	Jentsch	of	Waldeck	wrote	that	while	there	was	important	work	that	needed	to	be	done	both	by	POWs	and	by	British	citizens,	the	work	that	POWs	were	doing	involved	a	great	deal	of	contact	with	British	society,	and	the	POWs	“[were]	going	through	all	the	pains	and	contractions	of	trying	to	adjust	to	a	new	life.”62	He	argued	that	the	interests	and	issues	of	POWs,	in	addition	to	their	role	as	forced	laborers,	must	be	taken	into	consideration	when	linking	organizations	to	them.	As	the	representative	of	the	German	YMCA	in	Britain,	and	director	of	the	Religious	Department	for	War	Recovery,	he	expressed	particular	concern	for	the	POW’s	ability	to	get	better	jobs	after	the	experience,	and	throughout	Jentsch’s	camp	visitations,	he	wrote	that	he	had	seen	not	only	religious	introversion,	but	resignation,	and	skepticism.63	While	the	German-British	relationship	had	“improved	because	of	the	POW	experience,”	he																																																									62	Ibid:	2.	This	statement	applied	to	German	veterans	at	large.		63	Ibid:	3.	The	German	quotation:	“resignation,	Skepsis,	verletztes	Geschtigkeitsempfinden,	religiöse	Introversion,	Kompetenzstreitigkeiten	und	Gersiztheiten	waren	die	Folge	der	tragisch	langen	Dauer	des	Gefangenendassins	(prison	assassination).”	
	 	 	93		stated	in	May	1947	that	there	were	no	words	to	describe	the	potential	negative	impact	of	the	experience	on	the	POWs.		 Because	of	his	concerns	about	the	mental	health	of	the	POWs,	Pastor	Jentsch	developed	a	psychological	survey	used	to	assess	various	different	“types”	of	personalities	and	to	examine	ways	in	which	the	POWs	were	reacting	to	the	internment	experience,	and	particularly	their	remaining	in	Britain.	He	was	given	authorization	to	complete	this	survey	because	of	his	status	as	the	official	German	head	of	the	YMCA	in	Britain,	and	the	YMCA’s	concerns	over	POW	reaction	to	either	repatriation,	or	deciding	to	remain	in	Britain.	Jentsch’s	work	largely	took	place	in	1947	and	1948	during	which	time	the	majority	of	POWs	were	beginning	to	leave	Britain,	and	thus	cannot	be	used	with	any	degree	of	accuracy	as	a	psychological	profile	of	the	POWs	at	large,	since	Jentsch	dealt	with	such	a	small	number	of	POWs.	However,	the	statements	made	by	various	POWs	offer	a	unique	window	into	their	experiences.	Jentsch’s	findings	revealed	that	a	great	many	found	“thinking	about	the	past	[led]	to	the	experience	of	guilt…[and	many	had]	‘the	problem	of	destiny’.”		Jentsch	described	the	“problem	of	destiny”	as	a	feeling	of	intense	confusion	and	distress	when	thinking	about	the	future;	many	POWs	possessed	strong	survivor’s	guilt,	coupled	with	feelings	of	homesickness.64	An	unnamed	POW	wrote	in	his	survey	in	May	1947	that	he	“could	not	sleep	for	[he]	was	continuously	at	home	with	[his]	beloved	ones	in	[his]	thoughts”,	and	another	described	with	great	detail	his	father	speaking	to	him	at	home	around	the	smoking	table.	POW	“16”	worried	about	the	economic	welfare	of	his	relatives	because	of	the	food	shortages	in	Germany,	and	the	fear	of	starting	a	vocation	from	scratch,																																																									64	Ibid,	May	1947:	40.		
	 	 	94		stating	that	he	“does	not	know	what	[sic]	to	begin.”65	One	POW	lost	himself	repeatedly	in	recollections	of	the	past,	and	stated	that	“he	[could	not]	go	through	life	like	a	stone,”	but	he	felt	that	he	remained	so	uncertain	about	the	future	that	perhaps	it	was	better	to	remain	frozen.	While	many	expressed	a	striking	fear	of	the	past,	such	as	a	fear	of	the	Gestapo,	the	POWs	also	expressed	something	new:	“now	it	is	another	feeling	of	fear:	you	might	not	satisfy	the	screener,	you	might	lose	the	chance	of	repatriation,	you	might	shock	somebody	with	a	not	too	clever	word.”66		 Some	POWs	expressed	an	uneasy	relationship	with	repatriation,	and	others	expressed	a	desire	to	stay,	even	while	simultaneously	expressing	conflicted	feelings	towards	their	homeland.	In	Soldaten,	Sönke	Neitzel	and	Harald	Welzer	describe	the	“contradictory	nature”	of	the	POWs,	where	they	in	one	sentiment	express	horror,	remorse,	fear,	and	happiness.	Neitzel	and	Welzer	argue	that	this	contradictory	nature	reflects	a	desire	to	act	as	they	think	is	expected	of	them;	therefore,	once	the	war	was	over,	the	POWs	no	longer	knew	what	was	expected	of	them.67	Some	cursed	that	they	even	had	a	decision	to	make	at	all.	POW	(46)	wrote	the	names	of	all	his	schoolmates	whom	he	knew	had	been	repatriated	and	asked	“why,	just	I,	had	to	go	to	England	in	the	last	month	of	the	war?”68	However,	for	all	their	fear	of	Britain,	those	that	decided	to	remain,	expressed	deep	fears	about	what	a	return	to	Germany	would	mean.	An	unnamed	POW	wrote,		 We	are	so	often	told	that	at	first	every	boy	shall	work	with	his	hands	for	reconstruction.	Are	we	to	be	exploited	again?	There	was	once	a	regime	that	succeeded	in	winning	over	the	youth	by	empty	phrases	and	in	making	it	docile.	Unfortunately	it	seems	as	if	in	our	time	idealism	often	meant	hunger.69																																																									65	Ibid,	May	1947:	40.		66	Ibid,	May	1947:	41.		67	Neitzel	and	Welzer,	Soldaten:	6.		68	LMA/4288/D/04/028,	May	1947:	40.		69	Ibid,	May	1947:	41.	
	 	 	95			Prisoner	14	wrote	that	even	on	“this	island,”	he	has	some	kind	of	freedom,	the	“freedom	of	the	mind,”	which	was	more	bearable	than	having	to	return	to	a	world	where	he	was	restricted.	Throughout	the	surveys	from	POWs,	a	common	fear	expressed	was	of	the	continued	control	exercised	by	either	Britain	or	Germany	over	them.	Both	countries	were	viewed	with	varying	degrees	of	suspicion,	and	a	future	in	either	country	was	plagued	with	uncertainty.	In	his	survey,	POW	18	expressed	concern	over	when	the	day	would	come	when	the	German	POW	could	finally	be	an	agent	in	his	own	space,	assess	his	world,	and	make	his	own	choices.	POW	18	argued	that	a	POW	was	not	always	weary,	but	instead	each	had	a	secret	flame,	with	“a	beautiful	inner	vitality.”	He	argued	that	until	that	day	comes	when	a	POW	could	take	his	fate	in	his	own	hands,	“it	is	not	child’s	play	to	be	thrown	about	between	Heaven	and	Hell.”70	
Conclusion	In	German	Migrants	in	Post-war	Britain,	Inge	Weber-Newth	and	Johannes-Dieter	Steinert	note	that	as	the	cultural	exchange	and	migratory	networks	between	Britain	and	Germany	grew	in	the	postwar	period,	there	was	a	softening	of	tensions	between	the	two	nations.	Many	factors	influenced	this	change	in	attitude	by	the	British,	most	principally	the	implementation	of	the	European	Recovery	Program	(Marshall	Plan)	in	1948.	The	Marshall	Plan	created	greater	economic	ties	between	Britain	and	Germany,	while	simultaneously	strengthening	political	ties	between	the	two	nations.71	Underneath	the	larger	political	trends	and	in	the	context	of	the	Cold	War,	“the	suffering	of	the	population	in	post-war																																																									70	Ibid:	42.		71	Judt,	Postwar:	144.	The	Anglo-American	occupation	forces	not	only	had	serious	concerns	about	lingering	pro-Nazi	sentiment,	but	also	the	state	of	affairs	in	postwar	Germany.	Officials	worried	that	if	Germans	remained	impoverished,	with	no	prospect	of	improvement,	they	would	return	to	Nazism,	or	potentially	even	Communism.		
	 	 	96		Germany	and	the	positive	behavior	of	German	POWs	in	Britain”	swayed	the	British	population	towards	a	renewing	of	relations.72	For	German	POWs,	the	postwar	period	was	filled	with	uncertainty.	The	British	government	had	begun	to	question	their	presence	in	the	Isles,	and	British	authorities,	Anglo-Germans,	Left	politicians,	and	concerned	citizens,	seemed	to	have	conflicting	views	over	the	role	POWs	should	play	in	postwar	British	society.	In	the	context	of	a	powerful	Labour	Party	from	1945-1951	and	the	influence	of	left-leaning	figures	like	Noel-Baker,	the	German	POW	issue	gained	some	national	traction.	However,	throughout	1945	to	1950,	the	German	pastors	once	again	helped	guide	the	POWs	through	the	experience.	As	the	pastors	expanded	their	mission	beyond	reeducation	and	repatriation,	they	were	able	to	expand	their	networks	to	connect	other	parts	of	the	British	and	German	populations.		The	POWs	represented	not	only	an	initial	intrusion	into	the	labor	force	by	the	British	public,	but	also	represented	the	intrusion	of	an	enemy.	However,	Britain	faced	a	moral	reckoning	through	the	lens	of	the	German	POWs:	what	moral	obligation	did	Britain	have	to	Germany	in	the	postwar,	Cold	War	world	as	reconstruction	began.	British	morality	took	a	backseat	as	American	attempts	to	rebuild	Western	Europe	ramped	up.	The	United	States	desired	inter-European	cooperation	to	combat	a	rising	Soviet	Union,	so	British-German	tensions	had	to	be,	at	least	on	the	surface,	resolved.73	But	as	the	interactions	between	Germans	and	Britons	became	more	pronounced,	the	relationship	developed	from	hatred	to	eventual	cooperation.74	This	warming	of	the	relationship	can	best	be	described	in	
																																																								72	Weber-Newth	and	Steinert,	German	Migrants	in	Post-War	Britain:	19.		73	Judt,	Postwar:	155-160.	74	Ibid:	155-160.	
	 	 	97		the	words	of	a	German	migrant	interviewed	about	his	experience	in	the	late	1960s.	He	was	asked	if	Britain	could	identify	as	a	Heimat,	or	homeland,	for	the	Germans:	No	Britain	is	not	a	fatherland	for	me.	But	I	feel	a	tremendous	appreciation	for	Britain.	England	has	many	attractive	traits.	We	have	all	grown	into	English	culture	a	little	bit,	we	have	all…encountered	many	people,	have	breathed	in	the	atmosphere	of	the	country…the	atmosphere	is	much	better	than	it	was	in	Germany:	friendlier,	more	polite,	calmer,	more	helpful…I	feel	a	critical	solidarity	with	England.75			In	the	postwar	years,	German	POWs	faced	a	whole	new	world	in	which	a	future	in	either	Britain	or	Germany	was	extremely	uncertain.	While	the	British	government	wanted	to	repatriate	most	of	the	POWs,	German	pastors	instead	worked	with	those	who	wanted	to	remain,	and	worked	to	bring	more	German	migrants,	and	German	Jewish	refugees	to	Britain.	Pastor	mediation	required	the	POWs	to	reflect	on	their	loss	of	home,	and	awakened	pastors	to	a	deep	issue	under	the	surface	of	the	POW	experience:	a	sense	of	dislocation	and	isolation	in	the	postwar	world.	During	these	critical	postwar	years	in	Britain,	German	pastors	and	members	of	British	society	began	to	try	and	return	the	humanity	to	the	soldiers	Nazism	left	behind,	and	try	and	find	a	place	for	them	in	British	society.	
																																																								75	Marion	Berghahn,	German-Jewish	Refugees	in	England:	The	Ambiguities	of	Assimilation,	New	York:	St.	Martin’s	Press,	1984:	174.	
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								 Conclusion		 "A	pastor	should	never	complain	about	his	congregation,	certainly	never	to	other	people,	but	also	not	to	God.	A	congregation	has	not	been	entrusted	to	him	in	order	that	he	should	become	its	accuser	before	God	and	men."		-Dietrich	Bonhoeffer,	in	Gemeinsames	Leben,	1939.												
	 	 	99			 Walter	Ulbricht,	leading	figure	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Germany	and	the	East	German	head	of	State	from	September	12th	1960	to	August	1st	1973,	said	of	the	formation	of	the	German	Democratic	Republic	(GDR):	“Something	new	has	happened:	for	the	first	time	in	German	history	our	fatherland	is	guided	by	a	plan	that	considers	only	the	needs	of	the	people,	and	aims	at	building	prosperity	and	reconstructing	of	our	fatherland.”	However,	for	the	West,	the	rise	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	solidification	of	the	division	of	Germany	was	not	the	future	intended	or	desired.	Instead,	communist	appeal	was	growing	amongst	not	only	Germany’s	disillusioned	youth	in	the	late	1940s,	but	throughout	East-Central	Europe,	and	the	postwar	world	seemed	even	more	uncertain.1	In	the	postwar,	bipolar	world,	the	German	Protestants	tried	to	form	a	united	front	against	communism,	and	from	1945	to	1958,	worked	against	the	harsh	treatment	of	refugees	and	denazification	policies.2	Fearing	that	collective	guilt	only	strengthened	communist	appeals,	the	German	churches,	including	German	Catholics,	sold	themselves	to	the	West	as	an	“alternative	way”	against	communism.3	The	Allies’	belief	in	the	success	of	an	“alternative	way”	translated	into	support	for	“good	Germans,”	like	those	in	the	German	Democratic	Union,	which	would	become	a	powerful	force	in	postwar	Germany.		However,	eventually	German	Protestant	leaders	would	lose	favor	with	their	Western	Allies,	because	of	the	Protestants	continued	push	for	a	unified	Germany	from	1945-1950.	A	division	would	leave	over	80	percent	of	Protestant	parishioners	behind	Soviet	and	East	German	lines,	terrifying	German	Protestant	pastors	in	both	East	and	West																																																									1	David	S.	Mason,	Revolution	in	East-Central	Europe:	the	Rise	and	Fall	of	Communism	and	the	Cold	
War,	Boulder:	Westview	Press,	1992.		2	Wyneken,	Religion	and	the	Cold	War:	18.		3	Ibid:	19.		
	 	 	100		Germany.4	However,	German	Catholics,	who	did	not	speak	out	on	division	and	rearmament,	appeared	to	be	more	attractive	allies	for	Britain	and	the	United	States.	Because	of	this	schism,	German	Protestants	began	to	find	themselves	on	the	outs	with	their	Western	Allied	backers,	and	that	careful	niche	of	influence	that	the	German	pastors	worked	so	hard	to	create	in	Britain,	began	to	disappear.	The	West	needed	an	ally	that	supported	the	partition	of	Germany,	and	therefore,	the	British	and	Americans	were	far	more	comfortable	with	a	supportive	Catholic	hierarchy,	even	though	throughout	most	of	the	1940s	and	1950s,	it	would	actively	ignore	its	complicit	Nazi	past.5	Tossed	away	by	their	British	allies	in	favor	of	Konrad	Adenauer	and	the	West	German	State,	German	Protestant	pastors	saw	their	political	gains	disappear.6	However,	for	men	like	Martin	Niemöller,	the	anti-Nazi	theologian,	Lutheran,	and	the	President	of	the	World	Council	of	Churches	as	of	1961,	the	mission	to	rebuild	Europe	required	continued	Protestant	efforts.	He	believed	that	only	through	Protestant	good	works	could	communism	be	defeated,	and	Germany	come	to	terms	with	its	Nazi	past.7	Only	under	the	guidance	of	Protestant	men	like	Niemöller,	Jentsch,	and	Rieger,	could	East	and	West	Germany	be	reintegrated,	and	move	forward	in	the	postwar	world.	While	their	political	relationship	with	the	West	may	have	lost	some	of	its	power,	the	German	pastors’	work	with	the	POWs	left	a	lasting	impact	on	the	climate	of	the	communities	in	both	Britain	and	Germany.	Through	the	German	POWs,	the	German	pastors	were	able	to	maximize	their	impact	on	German	Protestantism,	postwar	rebuilding	efforts,																																																									4	Ibid:	20.		5	Ericksen,	Complicity	in	the	Holocaust,	94-139	6	Wyneken,	Religion	and	the	Cold	War:	19.		7	Hans	Karl	Rupp,	“Martin	Niemöller,”	in	The	World	Encyclopedia	of	Peace,	edited	by	Linus	Pauling	and	Ervin	László,	Volume	2,	Oxford:	Pergamon,	1986:	45-46.		
	 	 	101		and	Western	perceptions	of	Germany.	They	not	only	reunited	families	and	assessed	the	state	of	the	POW	psyche,	but	also	offered	both	Germans	and	Britons	an	opportunity	for	rebuilt	linkages.	What	had	once	been	a	thriving	connection	between	two	historically	associated	nations	had	been	brutally	maimed	by	two	vicious	wars,	and	German	pastors	stepped	into	this	arena	in	order	to	help	reestablish	the	link	between	them.	This	link	not	only	existed	across	religious	channels,	but	also	migratory	channels,	which	would	become	critical	in	the	massive	ways	of	postwar	movement.	At	a	turning	point	in	European	and	international	history,	German	pastors	offer	a	window	into	larger	discussions	of	migration,	ethnicity,	rebuilding,	and	global	Christianity.	These	actions	were	undertaken	under	the	umbrella	of	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War,	and	the	onset	of	the	Cold	War.	Both	British	authorities	and	German	pastors	recognized	that	these	POWs	presented	them	with	an	opportunity	to	impact	a	part	of	the	German	population	that	would	rebuild	Germany,	and	for	German	pastors,	the	opportunity	to	assist	in	influencing	the	transformation	of	the	image	of	Germany	in	Britain	and	the	world.	By	examining	the	German	pastors	as	a	window	into	the	experience	of	captive	German	soldiers	in	Britain,	much	has	come	to	light	about	the	many	roles	of	these	men.	Motivated	by	political	and	religious	concerns,	the	German	pastors	shepherded	a	new	flock	of	the	German	POWs	in	the	hopes	of	restoring	POW	humanity,	while	also	creating	a	place	for	themselves	in	larger	conversations	about	the	rebuilding	of	Germany	and	its	Christian	faith.				 Had	time	allowed,	this	thesis	would	have	gone	into	greater	detail	about	the	establishment	of	international	and	national	church	organizations	such	as	the	WCC	and	the	BCC,	and	the	impact	of	the	German	pastors	upon	those	networks.	Further	research	would	
	 	 	102		also	have	explored	the	migratory	patterns	of	the	1950s	and	the	role	of	German	pastors	and	POWs	in	facilitating	and	influencing	that	process.	
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